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PREFACE
This essay is the explication of an idea through the 
exploration of a relationship. The idea is the potential 
of creativity as a mode of political being. The emphasis 
on the creative is intended to supplement and moderate 
the excessively rational approach to politics that proved 
catastrophically destructive in the twentieth century.
The relationship is the intellectual one between Simone 
Weil and Albert Camus, each of whom considered creativity 
central to their political thought. The result is a 
speculative reorientation to political phenomena the 
relevance of which transcends the specific historical 
circumstances in which these two thinkers wrote.
Though contemporaries and fellow participants in the 
French Resistance, Weil and Camus never met. She died in 
1943 and Camus discovered her work in the waning days of 
the Occupation. Instantly moved by this encounter, Camus 
used his influence to get permission to edit and publish 
editions of her works for the French publishing house 
Gallimard after the war.1 Their orientations to the 
world differed, but Camus admired Weil's spirituality, if
'See his notebook entries for November 1943, April 
1948 and September 1950 in Camus, Notebooks 1942-1951. 
translated by Justin O'Brien (New York: Paragon House,
1991) at pages 93, 194, 265 and 267. See also Herbert 
Lottman, Albert Camus: A Biography (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday, 1979).
iii
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not its Christian tenor, and occasionally turned to her 
work for inspiration.2 In one significant instance,
Camus requested permission from her family to visit her 
old room before going to accept the Nobel Prize for 
Literature he received in 1957.3 Despite these 
biographical linkages, however, there is no extended 
study of the intellectual relationship of Weil to Camus, 
let alone a study of the importance of that relationship 
to political thought in general. She appears but a few 
times in biographies of Camus, while he is rarely 
mentioned in the available biographies of Weil.
Among the reasons this relationship is so 
infrequently explored is the apparent incompatibility 
between the intensely religious, even mystical character 
of Weil's thought and the absurdist tenor of Camus's 
work. Camus's interest in her work belies these apparent 
differences. While editing Weil's writings, Camus found 
that her work clarified his thinking on important matters 
and he discovered that they shared close, complementary 
conceptions of the dilemmas of modern politics.
2See especially, Fred Rosen, "Marxism, Mysticism and 
Liberty: The Influence of Simone Weil on Albert Camus,"
Political Theory 7:3 (1979) discussed at length below.
3See Camus, "Extract from a Letter to Mme. Selma 
Weil," in L'Express February 11, 1960 and his unsigned 
Preface to L'Enracinement fThe Need for Roots) in Camus, 
Essais (Paris: Gallimard), 1700-1702.
iv
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Many accounts of Weil's life and thought deemphasize 
her political thought as merely derivative of her more 
significant spiritual considerations.4 Weil, educated a 
neo-Platonist, viewed the spiritual and the political as 
parts of an integrated whole.5 For the philosophically 
trained and deeply spiritual Weil, politics, like every 
other human endeavor, should be conducted in adherence to 
the Platonic conception of the "good."6 Recognizing the
4See as representative examples Diogenes Allen,
Three Outsiders; Pascal. Kierkegaard. Simone Weil 
(Cambridge: Cowley Press, 1983) ; David Anderson, Simone
Weil (London: SCM Press, 1977); Robert Coles, Simone
Weil: A Modern Pilgrimage (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1987) ; Marie-Magdalene Davy, The Mysticism of Simone Weil 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1951); Janet Little, Simone Weil:
Waiting on Truth (Oxford: Berg, 1988), and Eric Tomlin,
Simone Weil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954).
5More balanced accounts include, Jacques Cabaud, 
Simone Weil. A Fellowship in Love (New York: Harvill,
1965) ; Mary Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine: The
Social and Political Thought of Simone Weil (New Jersey: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1989); John Dunaway, Simone Weil 
(Boston: Twayne Publishing, 1984) ; John Heilman, Simone
Weil: An Introduction to Thought (Waterloo: Wilfrid
Laurier University Press, 1982); David McLellan, Utopian 
Pessimist: The Life and Thought of Simone Weil (New
York: Poseidon Press, 1990); Simone Petrement, Simone
Weil: A Life, translated by R. Rosenthal (New York:
Pantheon, 1976); Richard Rees, Simone Weil: A Sketch for
a Portrait (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966) ; Eric
Springstead, Simone Weil and the Suffering of Love 
(Cambridge: Cowley, 1986); Peter Winch, Simone Weil:
The Just Balance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), and the essays in Richard Bell (ed.), Simone 
Weil's Philosophy of Culture: Readings Toward a Divine
Humanity Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Especially instructive is Iris Murdoch's 
understanding of Weil's use of "the good." See Murdoch, 
The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Schocken Books, 1971)
v
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good as the source of political value was critical for 
Weil, but making decisions according to that good 
remained problematic. She attempted to mask the 
difficulty by adherence to a self-professed "intellectual 
rigor," but as her later writings on political matters 
indicate, this rigor tended to restrict her political 
vision.7
The absurdist tone of Camus's work has been a 
similar obstacle to taking his political thought 
seriously. While very few try to argue that he is an 
existentialist of the Sartrean type, some find it 
difficult to get beyond Camus's use of the absurd as the
where she concludes that (104) "Simone Weil tells us that 
the exposure of the soul to God condemns the selfish part 
of it not to suffering but to death. The humble man 
perceives the distance between suffering and death. And 
although he is not by definition the good man perhaps he 
is the kind of man who is most likely of all to become 
good." Murdoch's debt to Weil continues into her later 
work. See Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New 
York: Penguin, 1993).
7Weil's frail constitution made her a liability in 
the Resistance movement during World War II. In London 
in 1943, Weil was charged with drafting a document 
expressing a vision of postwar France compatible with the 
views of the Free French and rid of the errors of the 
Third Republic which died unmourned in 1940. There is 
little doubt that the Free French gave her this task 
because of their regard for her intellect, but they also 
did it to keep her out of harm's way on the continent. 
Whatever their motive, she took the task very seriously. 
The result was her only book-length essay The Need for 
Roots, translated by Arthur Wills (New York: Putnam,
1952).
vi
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starting point of his inquiry.8 His embrace of the 
absurd leads to a protracted concern with suffering and 
death, but his response is a rebellion of limits.9 
Camus's vision was grounded in a sense of the commonality 
of human experience, the sameness of the human condition: 
to paraphrase two of his early characters, "We die and we
8See Lev Braun, Witness of Decline: Albert Camus
Moralist of the Absurd (Rutherford, New Jersey:
Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1974) ; David Denton, The 
Philosophy of Albert Camus: A Critical Analysis (Boston:
Prime, 1967) ; Thomas Hanna, The Thought and Art of Albert 
Camus (Chicago: Regnery, 1958) ; Donald Lazere, The
Unique Creation of Albert Camus (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973); Patrick McCarthy, Camus (New 
York: Random House, 1982); and Joseph McBride, Albert
Camus: Philosopher and Litterateur (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1992).
9More willing to attempt, as Camus did, to 
incorporate the concept of the absurd without falling 
into the trap of existentialism are Germaine Bree, Camus 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964) and Camus
and Sartre: Crisis and Commitment (New York: Dell,
1972) ; John Cruikshank, Albert Camus and the Literature 
of Revolt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960);
Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern Rebellion (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) and "On Rebellion
and Revolution: Albert Camus' The Rebel Reconsidered"
Dissent 36 (Summer 1989): 376-84; Albert Maquet, Albert
Camus: The Invincible Summer, translated by Herma
Briffault (New York: George Braziller, 1958); Emmett
Parker, Albert Camus: The Artist in the Arena (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1965); Roger Quilliot, Sea 
and Prisons: A Commentary on the Life and Thought of
Albert Camus, translated by Emmett Parker (University, 
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1970); David
Sprintzen, Camus: A Critical Examination (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1988); and Fred Willhoite,
Bevond Nihilism: Albert Camus' Contribution to Political
Thought (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1968).
vii
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must imagine ourselves happy."10 Human happiness 
entailed denying the absurdity of the human condition 
through action: saying "no" to existential despair and
saying "yes" to human life and inevitable death. Camus's 
political vision, then, the ground of his political 
ethic, always erred on the side of life.
There were significant differences in emphasis and 
temperament between the two thinkers. Weil's thought 
tended to be more systematically philosophical than 
Camus's. Though both were intensely spiritual, Weil was 
more religiously orthodox than Camus. She in fact longed
10This is a combination of two common themes in 
Camus' early work, themes given articulation by his 
Caligula who says to Helicon "Men die; and they are not 
happy" in Caligula and Three Other Plavs (New York: 
Vintage, 1958), page 8, and by Camus' own conclusion in 
the Myth of Sisyphus (New York: Knopf, 1953 and Vintage, 
1991) that we "must imagine Sisyphus happy" (123). The 
themes of the inevitability of death and the necessity of 
living joyfully in spite of this end continue throughout 
Camus' work. In The Rebel, translated by Anthony Bower 
(New York: Knopf, 1956 and Vintage, 1991) Camus writes
(250) "But rebellion, in man, is the refusal to be 
treated as an object and to be reduced to simple 
historical terms. It is the affirmation of a nature 
common to all men, which eludes the world of power."
Camus further substantiates this commonness in 
"Reflections on the Guillotine" in Resistance. Rebellion 
and Death, translated by Justin O'Brien (New York:
Knopf, 1960 and Vintage, 1974). In this essay condemning 
capital punishment, Camus writes (217) "There is a 
solidarity of all men in error and aberration. Must that 
solidarity operate for the tribunal and be denied the 
accused? No, and if justice has any meaning in this 
world, it means nothing but the recognition of that 
solidarity; it cannot, by its very essence, divorce 
itself from compassion."
viii
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for a way to join the Catholic Church; she referred to it 
as "the Christian community." Camus could not bring 
himself to entertain organized religion as a serious 
personal option. Weil believed that justice could only 
issue as a product or manifestation of divine grace at 
work in the world. Camus too believed justice required 
"grace," but he denied a divine component to grace, 
insisting that grace and, therefore, justice could only 
be generated by and among human beings.
Despite the differences, Camus found in Weil a 
kindred spirit and this kinship had implications for his 
political thought. To begin with, Camus shared her overt 
hostility to abstractions. Preoccupied with the concrete 
problems of social and political order, both questioned 
the adequacy of abstract formulations as responses to the 
complexity of those problems. Camus made use of Weil's 
model of functional oppression and relied on her account 
of factory work in fleshing out the consequences of 
modern social arrangements for the human spirit. They 
shared a concern for the plight of the worker, each 
having an early enthusiasm for revolutionary syndicalism 
and the trade union movement. Marx's desire for the 
union of intellectual and manual labor appealed to both 
thinkers while neither could embrace Marx's revolutionary 
methods.
ix
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Few studies have explored this unlikely intellectual 
relationship. Of those that do, most focus on the 
spirituality the two seem to share.11 Two identify the 
relationship as having a political dimension. Fred Rosen 
seeks direct corrolations between the elements of their 
thought and the ultimate influence of Weil on Camus.12 
He finds that Camus adopted her critique of Marxism and 
gleaned from her work his idea of the rebel as artisan. 
Camus's conception of the rebel-artisan, Rosen concludes, 
was inadequate and while there were connections, the 
chief value of the comparison is that the two thinkers 
maintained their integrity while seeking different routes 
to individual authenticity. For present purposes, the 
value of Rosen's work is that it does identify the 
importance of art and work to the political thought of 
both Weil and Camus. Rosen's work will be of special 
interest in Chapter Three of this study where work and 
art are interrogated for their commonly-held creative 
elements.
11 See Stewart Sutherland, Faith and Ambiguity 
(London: SCM Press, 1984) especially "Chapter 4: Simone
Weil and Albert Camus;" and John Dunaway "Estrangement 
and the Need for Roots: Prophetic Visions of the Human
Condition in Albert Camus and Simone Weil," Religion and 
Literature 17:2 (Summer 1985).
12Fred Rosen, "Marxism, Mysticism and Liberty: The
Influence of Simone Weil on Albert Camus," Political 
Theory 7:3 (1979).
x
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Roy Pierce's history of twentieth century French 
political thought also identifies the relationship of 
Weil's thought to Camus's as an important one.13 Weil, 
Pierce argues, tried to unmask language to reveal prosaic 
realities beneath the surface of appearances. At the 
same time, she used a "functional sociology" to try to 
make sense of human relationships, ultimately relying on 
the power of grace to shed light on human motivations. 
Pierce's Camus finds society an abstraction with which 
human beings attempt to come to grips daily. In his 
philosophical and fictional work, Camus explored the 
struggle of individuals in an attempt to extract meaning 
from reality through their experiences. Pierce concludes 
that Weil and Camus share too deep a concern with the 
grim realities of human suffering to remain at the level 
of philosophical abstraction normally associated with 
political theory.
The present study proposes a different way to view 
the Weil-Camus relationship and a correspondingly 
different way to look at politics. Very little further 
will be said about their direct relationship; it suffices 
to say that Camus knew Weil's work very well and she knew 
his not at all. What is more important is that they
13Roy Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1966).
xi
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thought about similar questions from different 
perspectives and often reached strikingly similar or 
complementary conclusions. Their political thought 
represents two perspectives on the dilemma of twentieth 
century politics: must political order inevitably be
founded either upon the will of a single individual or in
an artificially homogeneous collective in which the 
individual is completely subsumed? Weil and Camus each 
conclude that there is, there must be, another way. 
Separately they suggest that this other way may be found 
in the human capacity and need to create the lived 
environment. The same creativity that had been so 
destructive in the name of "rational order" in the 
twentieth century could surely be turned to more
constructive use. In two persistent expressions of this 
need to create and humanize the environment, in art and 
in a more humane approach to work, Weil and Camus each 
found possibility.
This essay will trace the critical development of 
the idea of creativity in the political thought of Weil 
and Camus. The emphasis on the creative is a response to 
an excessively rational approach to political reality 
characterizing human existence since the Enlightenment. 
Chapter One explores the reorientation to human knowing 
that both thinkers believed to be a necessary prelude to
xii
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ethical political action. The reorientation involves a 
constructive integration of the imagination into the 
human project of describing the world. Chapter Two uses 
Weil's categories of necessity, power, and force to 
illustrate how the two thinkers described the political 
world in which they lived. These foundations 
established, Chapter Three turns to an investigation of 
the notion of creativity itself. The chapter proceeds 
from the assumption that work, as reconceived by both 
Weil and Camus, and art share a common creative 
component. It argues that these two basic human 
activities can and should be expressions of the human 
encounter with the natural world. Work and art should be 
the occasion for expressing insight into the human 
condition as well as for building a habitable human 
environment. Chapter Four emphasizes the way in which 
creative insight is woven into their political theories 
about the power of individuals, about home, about freedom 
and justice. The fifth and concluding chapter fleshes 
out the strengths and weaknesses of their creative 
approach to political theory.
xiii
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ABSTRACT
This essay traces the critical development of the 
idea of creativity through the intellectual relationship 
of Simone Weil and Albert Camus. Members of the French 
Resistance during the Second World War, Camus and Weil 
never met. Camus became enamored of her work after her 
death and is largely responsible for its publication. 
Camus recognized in Weil a markedly distinct, but 
kindred, spirit. Despite the apparent conflict between 
her Christian mysticism and his existential orientation, 
they both sought the preservation of the specifically 
human in a world which, in valuing a mechanistic form of 
reason, tended to objectify the human. Their respective 
political theories embrace the human creative capacity as 
a dignified response to this objectification.
Creativity emerges as a basic reorientation toward 
political phenomena. The present essay argues that their 
emphasis on the creative moves beyond their critiques of 
totalitarianism and reveals a shared need to assert a 
positive, non-dogmatic vision of political action. 
Creativity embodies a temperament, extant in the work of 
the artist and in a reconceived notion of labor, that 
both Weil and Camus believed could be usefully applied to 
the problems of modern politics.
xv i
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For both Weil and Camus, politics is the province of 
individuals. Their analyses of political reality share 
concerns with preserving the creative potential of 
individual human beings, creating and preserving home, 
and reconciling an individual sense of freedom to a 
collective sense of justice. The difficult ethic 
requires a willingness to approach political problems 
imaginatively and with flexibility.
Creative politics relies upon a nearly Greek 
conception of limits, in the person of the other, and in 
a community's laws, traditions and mores. Respect for 
the other and for communal institutions engenders respect 
for others' communal traditions. The emergent form of 
citizenship encourages individuals to find their place in 
the community. The emergent form of political rule 
creates and preserves a community in which this 
exploration is possible. Weil and Camus make a 
suggestion about the possibility of ethics in the 
aftermath of total war. Their work is a prelude to the 
formulation of a self-consciously creative form of 
citizenship.
xvii
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CHAPTER 1
KNOWING AS A PRELUDE TO POLITICS
I. Introduction
Creating a different way of political being requires 
recasting the way human beings know the political 
world.1 Simone Weil and Albert Camus believed the 
conduct of politics in the twentieth century reflected 
the lack of modesty the pursuit of human knowledge had 
exhibited since the Enlightenment. Faith in human 
reason's ability to rationalize the mysteries of nature 
found its analog in a faith in that same reason's ability 
to harness the mysteries of human nature and establish 
rational political order. Weil and Camus each saw that 
by the 1940s the chief product of the demystification of 
nature and the establishment of rational political orders 
was the efficient, catastrophic destruction of human 
life.
1The term "political being" is used to connote the 
whole range of activities we ordinarily associate with 
politics and not an ontological status. Weil and Camus 
have in mind a different way of apprehending politics 
that would render new approaches to political problems. 
This requires an explanation of how we know.
1
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2
For thinkers like Weil and Camus, the restoration of 
modesty to the conduct of the interrelated realms of 
knowledge and politics meant heeding the limits native to 
human beings: the human ability to understand and the
human need to order an often arbitrary and chaotic 
reality. The epistemological considerations of Weil and 
Camus reflect a larger twentieth century concern with the 
nature and content of human reason, its character as 
scientific and its role in modern politics. This chapter 
will show that in their considerations of human knowing, 
Weil and Camus not only reveal the intellectual 
environment in which they were educated but also 
anticipate the work of later theorists.2
The intellectual climate of early twentieth century 
Europe, of which Weil and Camus are inheritors, was
2The issue of reason's relation to politics is one 
of the central problems of political theory. Among the 
contemporary political theorists who are grappling with 
the problem are: Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human
Interests. translated by Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1971) and Habermas, Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990);
Alasdair McIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984);
Thomas Spragens, The Irony of Liberal Reason (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981) and Spragens, Reason 
and Democracy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990);
Eric Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience" in
Voegelin, Anamnesis, translated and edited by Gerhart 
Niemeyer (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1978),
89-115; and Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1984).
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defined by Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson.3 
Nietzsche's impact on twentieth century thought cannot be 
overstated. For Nietzsche, the sovereignty of reason was 
a myth, an unnatural subjugation of instinct inherited 
from the ancient Greeks.4 Human reason imposes an 
artificial order on the abyss of nature giving human 
beings a solace which makes them weak. Nietzsche's 
response was to encourage human beings to draw on their 
instinctive as well as their rational selves as a way to
3Weil's mentor Emile-Auguste Chartier (Alain) and 
Camus's mentor Jean Grenier were both enamored of 
Bergson. For a discussion of Weil's relationship to 
Alain, see especially Simone Petrement, Simone Weil: A 
Life, tr. by Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1976); Jacques Cabaud, Simone Weil: A Fellowship 
in Love (New York: Channel Press, 1964). For a
discussion of Camus's relationship to Grenier, see 
Herbert Lottman, Albert Camus: A Biography (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1979). For a more general
discussion of the intellectual climate in France in the 
first half of the twentieth century, see Roy Pierce, 
Contemporary French Political Thought (London and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1966).
4Nietzsche's objection to our cultural idolization 
of Socratic reason is most forcefully stated in Twilight 
of the Idols (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968).
Insightful renderings of Nietzsche's political thought 
may be found in Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher.
Psychologist, and Antichrist (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1974); Tracy Strong, Friedrich 
Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1975); Bruce Detweiler, 
Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) and Keith
Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political 
Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
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human fulfillment.5 Nietzsche's critique of reason 
proved useful in restoring humility to human intellectual 
endeavors, but his lauding of our instinctive selves at 
the expense of reason opened him to dangerous 
misinterpretation.
For Bergson, both Nietzschean instinct and Socratic 
reason failed fully to meet human needs. In Creative 
Evolution. Bergson argued for a life force, the elan 
vital. which wages an unceasing struggle with the 
limitations represented by matter.6 Instinct and reason 
are two ways the elan vital has made itself known. 
Intellect is naturally predisposed to order chaotic 
reality, while instinct naturally embraces the fluidity 
of that reality. Bergson believed that it was the 
natural tendency of the elan vital to combine these two 
and transcend them at the same time. The manifestation 
of this overcoming is what Bergson calls intuition, a 
self-consciously, disinterested instinct. Though 
Bergson's influence had dwindled by the time Weil and 
Camus wrote, the idea of the intuition as a supplement to
5Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 
translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1989).
6Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, translated by 
Arthur Mitchell (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1911)
and Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 
translated by W. H. Carter (New York: H. Holt and
Company, 1956).
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and mediator of the ordering power of reason and the 
passion of instinct was very powerful and proved central 
to their recasting of human knowing.7
The similarities and differences in the thought of 
Weil and Camus are manifest in their considerations of 
human knowing. Both understood human knowledge as 
derived from human experience; human experience may be 
articulated by laws of force, matter and motion. This 
articulation had limits, however, as knowledge could not 
protect us from human suffering. For Camus, suffering 
was evidence of the absurdity of the human condition. He 
took the absurd, then, as the beginning of all human 
inquiry. Weil gave the human condition, including 
suffering, a metaphysical origin which she calls 
decreation. In the act of creation, God abdicates a part 
of being, turning created reality over to the laws of 
force, matter and motion before withdrawing. It is 
critical for Weil's theory of knowing that God has been 
here, but has withdrawn, leaving a residue of the divine, 
grace, which human beings may access. For Camus, God's 
presence or absence is of no consequence. It is what 
human beings make of their own existence that counts.
Most importantly, once we move beyond the issue of God,
7See Pierce's "Introduction” to Contemporary French 
Political Thought.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
both Weil and Camus embrace justice, beauty and truth as 
evidence of something that transcends the human 
condition.
Scholarly readings of the two thinkers turn on the 
character of their understandings of how human beings 
know. Several Weil scholars, including Mary Dietz and 
Jacques Cabaud, divide Weil's thought into two periods: 
an early rationalistic or instrumentalist period and a 
later moral or mystical period.8 The advantage of such 
a reading is that it renders intelligible the shifts in 
emphasis from her earlier to her later writings. But 
such a reading also exaggerates those shifts and makes it 
difficult to see the continuities in Weil's thought from 
her earlier to her later writings. By grounding her 
epistemology in her later conception of decreation at the 
outset, I hope to follow the lead of J. P. Little and 
avoid the difficulty.9 Weil's early writings on Marx
8See Mary Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine: 
The Social and Political Thought of Simone Weil (New 
Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1989); Gabriella Fiori,
Simone Weil: An Intellectual Biography (Atlanta:
University of Georgia Press, 1989); Cabaud, A Fellowship 
in Love; and Pierce, "Simone Weil: Sociology, Utopia and
Faith," in Contemporary French Political Thought among 
others.
9J. P. Little, "Simone Weil's Concept of 
Decreation," in Richard H. Bell, editor, Simone Weil's 
Philosophy of Culture: Readings Toward a Divine Humanity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 25-50.
See also Eric Springstead, Simone Weil and the Suffering 
of Love (Cambridge: Cowley Press, 1986).
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are concerned with the excessively rationalistic tone of 
Marx's inheritors, but even earlier in her dissertation 
Weil is concerned with the lack of a spiritual component 
in modern science and epistemology. That she does not 
have the language for this until later in her career 
seems more a matter of intellectual growth than of 
irreconcilable inconsistency. Weil's writings throughout 
her career, whether in the context of epistemology and 
science, factory work, religion, or politics, are replete 
with a concern for the spiritual well-being of humankind. 
By retaining the spiritual component, Weil sought to 
counter modernity's understanding of the nature and 
limits of reason.
Camus took the absurd as his ethical and 
intellectual starting point. Camus scholars are divided 
over the role of the absurd in his thought. Some 
emphasize the pervasive indifference of absurdity that 
hangs over everything Camus wrote.10 Recently scholars 
like David Sprintzen and Jeffrey Isaac, building on the 
earlier work of Germaine Bree, have begun exploring
10See for example, Lev Braun, Witness of Decline: 
Albert Camus. Moralist of the Absurd (Rutherford, New 
Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1974) ; Thomas Hanna,
The Thought and Art of Camus (Chicago: Regnery Press,
1958); Joseph McBride, Albert Camus: Philosopher and
Litterateur (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); and
Lyman Sargent, "Camus: The Absurdity of Politics," in 
Barber, et. al., editors, The Artist and Political Vision 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, 1982), 87-115.
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whether Camus was trying to fashion a way of existence 
that would reflect his own love of the sun and the sea; a 
way of being in which beauty, truth, and justice were 
striven for without the illusion of their final 
attainment.11 In all human endeavors, as this essay 
will demonstrate, this striving was the point. In all 
human endeavors, the false sense of the possibility of 
attainment was the trap Camus wished to avoid.
Camus and Weil both believed that post-Enlightenment 
thought confused reason with truth. This chapter will 
explore their separate inquiries into this problem.
Given the frequently random substance of human 
experience, both believed that truth claims in the realm 
of human knowing were inevitably exaggerated. This 
exaggeration had devastating social and political 
consequences. Their twin conceptions of reality as 
chaotic and articulable by laws of force, matter and 
motion made them see that any description of human 
knowing must take account of the unexpected in order to 
be viable. Weil and Camus separately concluded that 
embracing a limited intuitive or imaginative component as 
part of human knowing was the necessary antidote for an
11Germaine Bree, Camus (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1964); David Sprintzen, Camus: A Critical
Examination (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1988); and Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern 
Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
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excessively logical conception of reason. Embracing this 
imaginative component was also the first step to a more 
creative way of political being.
II. Simone Weil: Decreation and Human Knowing
Simone Weil grounds her theory of human knowing in 
her ontology. She called her conception of being 
"decreation.1,12 For Weil, decreation is a way of 
conceiving created existence. God's act of creating the 
reality that humans now inhabit was one of abdication on 
His part. In her essay on "The Pythagorean Doctrine," 
Weil argues that in the act of creation God "abandons a 
bit of being to what is other than himself. Creation is 
renunciation by love."13 Creation is God's giving form 
to matter, thus bringing order out of chaos. Creation, 
then, is a renunciation by God of part of Himself as 
being. God retains decreated being, that part of being 
which He comprises. What remains in created reality 
consists of necessity or a material existence ruled by
12This section is indebted to the analysis of 
Little, "Weil's Concept of Decreation," in Bell, Weil's 
Philosophy of Culture. Weil describes the process of 
decreation, though she does not use the term there, in 
First and Last Notebooks, translated by Richard Rees 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 211-217.
13Simone Weil, Intimations of Christianity Among the 
Greeks, translated by E.C. Geissbuhler (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 182-183. See also Weil, 
On Science. Necessity and the Love of God, translated by 
Richard Rees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).
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the laws of matter and motion. Political existence takes 
place in created reality, in the realm of an indifferent 
necessity, but the insights that Weil brings to our 
understanding of political reality derive from her grasp 
of the decreated part of reality, the residue of God's 
abdication that remains in created reality.
The soul of the human being is composed of two parts 
roughly corresponding to the two levels of reality: the
decreated and the created. The first is the divine and 
uncreated part of the soul. This part is the residue of 
God's presence which forms the core of our being. The 
decreated part of the soul is the locus of the faculty of 
the supernatural in human beings. It corresponds to and 
is the potential receptacle of what Weil calls "grace." 
The second, much larger part is the natural and created 
part of the soul. This is the carnal part of the soul 
that sins and is susceptible to the "gravity" of created 
existence. If the created part of the soul remains true 
to itself, it experiences that sin as suffering. Through 
a mystical reflection on God's original act of 
abdication, it is possible for the carnal part of the 
soul to transfer the suffering derived from sin to the 
eternal part of the soul which, being innocent, suffers 
and thereby absolves the natural part of the soul. Most 
human beings have this mystical capacity, but few follow
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
the path and no one completes the mystical journey across 
the chasm of time that separates the two parts of the 
soul. Human beings are thus creatures of a dual nature 
who must live between the two parts of the soul.14
Sense experience restores the balance between the 
two parts of the soul. Through the body human beings 
know the created world and recognize themselves as part 
of that world. For Weil, evil is the distance between 
the two parts of the soul, between the decreated and the 
created. Embracing decreation suppresses this distance 
by sacrificing the autonomous self. The created being 
cannot be the locus of truth, so for Weil there is a 
fundamental incompatibility between the autonomous self 
and the truth.15 Recognizing the human incapacity to 
know truth is a prerequisite to the openness required to 
experience truth. This openness to truth requires 
renouncing the "I" that is the conceit of created human 
being. Only by this renunciation can human beings 
replicate God's initial abdication ("decreation") and 
rise above the personal to the level of the "impersonal." 
This conception of the "impersonal" is critical as it is 
the prerequisite for ethical action in created reality.
14The insight of Little in "Weil's Concept of 
Decreation," in Bell, editor, Weil's Philosophy of 
Culture.
15Ibid.
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For Weil, everything that is personal is sin, all that is 
impersonal, like truth, beauty, and justice is sacred.16 
The sacred is the ground of Weil's ethics. It points to 
the other, beyond the personal, to something shared by 
human beings.17
The "impersonal" is the perspective required to 
"know" anything. Rising to the impersonal means 
acquiring the ability to see aided by the decreated part 
of the soul. Knowledge is a question of negotiating our 
existence between the created and decreated levels of 
reality. Human beings must live in created reality, but 
cannot do so without using the wisdom available to them 
through contact, however limited, with decreated reality. 
Knowing the difference between the created and the 
decreated is a question of discerning the relationship 
between "gravity" and "grace."18 Recall that created 
existence takes place in the realm of the laws of matter 
and motion. Gravity, for Weil, is the most telling of 
those laws. "All the natural movements of the soul," she 
writes, "are controlled by laws analogous to those of
16Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in Selected 
Essays. 1934-1943. translated by Richard Rees, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), 15-16.
17Ibid.
18Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, translated by 
Arthur Wills (New York: Putnam, 1952) .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 3
physical gravity. Grace is the only exception."19 In 
created reality, "we always expect things to happen in 
conformity with the laws of gravity, unless there is 
supernatural intervention."20 This supernatural 
intervention is experienced as grace. Acting on grace 
requires recognizing the supernatural. "Two forces rule 
the universe," she writes, "light and gravity."21 
Gravity's pull can be inexorable. For Weil, the 
supernatural bathes all that humans can know in its 
light. They need only pay heed to the perspective it 
offers, the perspective of the impersonal.
The lack of "attention" to the supernatural forms 
the core of Weil's critique of human knowing. Paying 
appropriate attention, drawing upon the decreated, 
requires reintroducing human intuition and a certain 
conception of imagination into legitimate human inquiry. 
Beginning with her dissertation, Weil's epistemology 
lamented an inappropriate, excessively logic-driven 
understanding of human reason, the shunning of human 
intuition by modern science and the distance that science 
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wisdom."22 Weil took modern science as representative 
of our attitudes toward knowledge, so it bore the brunt 
of her epistemological attack. At the same time, it is 
in the realm of science, properly understood as reason 
taking intuition seriously, that Weil posited human 
possibilities.
Modem science lays claim to an objectivity which it 
cannot possibly possess.23 The impersonal does not mean 
objectivity as we understand it. Modern objectivity bred 
an indifference to the subjects of knowledge that had 
proven destructive. Weil wrote: "Indifferent things 
remain forever indifferent; it is the divine things 
which, by refusing love, acquire a diabolic efficacy." 
There was something diabolic "in the indifference which, 
since the Renaissance, science has shown for the 
spiritual life."24 In its arrogant indifference, 
science had ceased to appreciate its own nature. Science 
is worthless to humanity if it is imprisoned in the realm 
of observable nature for "it belongs to it only by its 
results and practical applications, but not by its
22Simone Weil, "Science and Perception in 
Descartes," in Weil, Formative Writings. 1929-1941. 
translated by Dorothy McFarland and Wilhelmina Van Ness 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987).
aWeil, Gravity and Grace. 105.
24This and previous quote in Weil, "The Pythagorean 
Doctrine," in Intimations of Christianity. 171.
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inspiration; for in science, as in art, all true novelty 
is the work of genius; and true genius, unlike talent, is 
supernatural.1,25 True genius can flourish only on the 
level of the impersonal. These claims, refined in a 
later essay on "The Pythagorean Doctrine," have their 
genesis in Weil's dissertation on "Science and Perception 
in Descartes.1,26
Human beings, Weil argued in her dissertation, begin 
with no knowledge except "consciousness of self and 
perception of the world."27 There is a higher knowledge 
than that attained through the ordinary investigative 
functioning of the senses. Weil called this intuited 
knowledge "simple ideas" or "common wisdom." Though 
intelligible, such knowledge is often inexplicable. For 
example, to know seven is a prime number does not explain 
why this should be so. In Weil's thought, the elegant
25Ibid.
26Weil's dissertation has been roundly criticized 
for its historical inaccuracy and its depiction of 
Descartes. Leon Braunschvig, for whom she wrote the 
thesis, gave her a ten out of twenty, the lowest he could 
give her and still pass her. See Petrement, Simone Weil. 
66.
27Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes," in 
Formative Writings. 31. See the discussions in Peter 
Winch, Simone Weil; "The Just Balance" (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially Chapter 2 
"The Cartesian Background" and David McLellan, Utopian 
Pessimist: The Life and Thought of Simone Weil (New
York: Poseidon Press, 1990), 26ff.
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simplicity of "simple ideas" borders on a conception of 
self-evidence. Modern science denigrates itself by not 
trusting these "simple ideas." The obfuscation of simple 
ideas, Weil argues, is the critical error of modern 
science. "One cannot explain simple ideas," Weil writes, 
"which are understood from the start and in themselves 
without obscuring them, for if one wants to explain them, 
either one explains something else under their name, or 
the explanation makes no sense."28 The very self­
evidence of simple ideas reveals them as the products of 
the human encounter with the world, as representations of 
the world to be distinguished from the world itself. The 
distinction is critical: simple ideas exist in relation
to our minds, not as the fabric of the world.
Weil found this distinction lost on modern science, 
trapped as it was in the language of mathematics. Modern 
science failed to remember the sumbolic function of that 
language. Weil believed that the language of 
mathematics, especially in geometry and physics, was 
well-suited not only to expressing but also to 
understanding simple ideas. In geometry, Weil found a 
purely mental activity dealing almost exclusively with 
relationships between forms, that is, relationships
28Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in 
Formative Writings. 52.
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between representations of intuited reality.29 
Geometry, with its lines, figures, and angles, all 
representing the inexplicable, accepts intuitions as real 
and articulable. This articulation or representation 
leaves these forms open to human interrogation. Intuited 
knowledge, that which we cannot express rationally except 
through representational symbols, becomes the object of 
rational investigation by anyone who cares to learn the 
techniques. What is required to know reality is not the 
secret knowledge of priests, but rather an orientation 
toward knowledge that fearlessly embraces the intuited.
In physics, Weil argued, geometry's abstract knowledge of 
forms was brought to bear on the physical world through 
mathematics. If geometry made intelligible the most 
abstract knowledge, then physics, the application of 
number and geometry to created reality, yielded insight 
into the concrete concerns of daily existence. Physics, 
by isolating the forces responsible for movement in 
created reality, brought number, the abstract language of 
forms, to bear on mundane reality.30 Between geometry
^Weil's discussion of geometry appears in "Science 
and Perception" in Formative Writings and is also 
reworked in "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of 
Christianity. See Winch, The Just Balance. Chapter 7 on 
"Equilibrium" and Chapter 11 on "Geometry."
30Weil believed number was the vital link between 
the abstraction of geometry and the concrete concerns of 
physics.' The relationship also shed light on human
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and physics, math and science rendered intelligible the 
most ordinary of human insights into reality.
Modern science, charmed by its own manipulation of 
the language of mathematics, lost sight of the limited 
symbolic character of what it renders intelligible. 
Science, Weil believed, scorns the use of "ordinary 
thinking." The result is a science that excludes 
everything having to do with intuition, which no longer 
admits anything into science except the most abstract 
form of reasoning. Weil argued that "this science that 
arrogantly scorned intuition is reduced to expressing the 
results of experience in the most general language 
possible."31 A contradiction thus lurks in modern 
science: intuited reality, which can be expressed in the
simplest terms, is scorned by a science which believes 
its detailed explanations are comprehensive, but, in its
inquiries into decreated reality. In Weil, "The 
Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of Christianity.
164, she wrote that "The notion of real number, arrived 
at by the mediation between any number and unity, was 
matter for just as severe demonstration, as clear as 
anything in their arithmetic, and at the same time 
incomprehensible to the imagination. This notion forces 
the mind to deal in exact terms with those relationships 
which it is incapable of representing to itself. Here is 
an admirable introduction to the mysteries of faith. . .
. By this one can conceive an order of certainty, 
starting from uncertain and easily grasped thoughts about 
the sensible world, proceeding to thoughts of God which 
are absolutely certain and absolutely inapprehensible."
31Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in 
Formative Writings. 33.
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mathematical formulations, must resort to the most 
"general language possible." Modern human beings live in 
a world created by their knowledge, a world of self- 
deception in which knowledge claims are empty in as much 
as they do not acknowledge their own limitations. This 
self-deception not only inhibits science, it also hinders 
the human ability to diagnose and offer remedies for 
social, political and spiritual problems. For Weil, the 
lesson of modern science is that human beings must be 
careful not to take representations as more real than the 
reality they are intended to represent. Modern science 
has forgotten this and in so doing, forgets the limits of 
its language, the language of mathematics. This math- 
driven science, by forgetting its nature as a tool of 
knowledge and mistaking itself for knowledge, obscures 
the simple ideas that are the core of understanding 
created reality.
Implicit in her critique of modern science is Weil's 
confidence in the ability of the human mind to discern 
simple ideas. A distrust of intellectual authority 
accompanies this confidence and allows the mind a 
Nietzschean kind of freedom, which Weil described as 
"absolute."32 The cost of possessing this "absolute"
32Weil acknowledged her intellectual debt to 
Nietzsche but admitted that she could not delve into his 
thought without becoming physically ill. See the letter
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freedom, however, is the suspension of thought, for at 
the moment the mind thinks about something else, it 
surrenders this freedom. This kind of intellectual 
freedom entails a paradox. "Freedom is the only power 
that I possess absolutely," Weil writes, "therefore, 
something other than myself exists. Since no power is 
limited by itself, it is enough for me to know that my 
power is not absolute to know that my existence is not 
the only existence.1,33 Human thoughts and consequent 
actions, to the degree that they occur on the level of 
the impersonal, mediate between human beings and the rest 
of existence. To recognize this is to think properly, to 
think truthfully. Knowledge takes work. It is each 
individual's responsibility to acquire knowledge which 
then can only be interpreted by that individual. "The 
authority of others can persuade me, the reasons of 
others convince me, the example of others guide me," she 
writes, "but I can learn only from myself."34 The light 
of the supernatural must aid this self-knowing, as the 
supernatural is the source of the human grasp of intuited
to her brother Andre in Weil, Seventy Letters, translated 
by Richard Rees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965),
122.
33Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" 
Formative Writings. 62.
34Ibid., 64.
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reality. Self-knowledge limits human action. Knowing 
clarifies the limits of human power in the world. Those 
limits are all a person can truly know. "I now know that 
to learn to know my own power is simply to learn to 
exercise it," she realizes, "thus, I recognize that 
becoming learned and attaining self-mastery are the same 
thing.1,35
Consideration of self-mastery takes Weil's
discussion of knowing into the realm of ethics. Freedom
is limited by confrontation with the world so judgment,
which with proper attention can be informed by the
supernatural, is the only real human possession:
All I can do is refuse my assent to what I believe 
or desire. The only thing I have that is really 
mine is my judgment. I do not have sovereign power 
over my thoughts; I am only their arbiter.36
This realization takes place on the level of the
impersonal. The valid exercise of the power to judge
must disregard considerations of the "I". The
impersonal, to the degree that it is disinterested,
reveals free will as a liability rather than a value.
Exercising power for its own sake preoccupies the human
being with created reality and thereby obscures the
decreated part of the soul. As in the case of freedom,
35Ibid.
36Ibid., 66.
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the world weighs on free will, and human beings may 
become slaves to lesser impulses.
The act of judging has an inevitable impact on the 
created world. In impersonal judgement, the world is 
recognized not as something that lords over the human, 
but rather as an obstacle. Acting requires a leap, the 
exercise of power. To act is to assume full knowledge, 
though this "does not give me the means to solve the most 
insignificant problem having to do with anything outside 
my power."37 The assumption of knowledge as a precedent 
to action is Weil's Kantian inheritance. For Weil, it 
means bringing to bear all that is known in the approach 
to a given difficulty. Action requires acting in the 
faith that the consequences can be known in advance. In 
this way, human beings are responsible, not only for the 
consequences of their actions, but in turn for the 
content of the knowledge that informs their acting. The 
implication is that action requires knowledge and on the 
question of the content of our knowledge, the presence of 
the supernatural is decisive.
What is the content of human knowledge? Weil begins 
to answer this question by reintroducing human intuition 
to science. In so doing she paves the way for the 
reintroduction of the divine to human knowing. Intuition
37Ibid., 67.
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poses the problem of human imagination. Intuition is an
impulse that requires articulation. Turning that
intuitive impulse into action requires imagination. As
Martin Andie shows, Weil's use of imagination is
ambiguous.38 There is clearly a dangerous form of
imagination; that given over to fantasy. At the same
time, a form of the imagination is a necessary component
of human knowledge. "Since the world cannot teach me and
I have to instruct myself, I will go and ask oracles,"
she writes, "I will go to this third ambiguous being that
is a composite of myself and the world acting on each
other."39 It is this oracle, this mental space of
interaction between world and self, that Weil calls
imagination. Excessive reliance on imagination is
dangerous, but renewing science by paying heed to
intuition requires taking the faculty of imagination
seriously. Without imagination:
My impressions and my thoughts would not be all 
blended together, and, outside of the certainty that 
I exist, I would have neither opinions, beliefs, 
prejudices, nor passions; my wisdom would be 
negative, but perfect. I would be always like a
38This discussion is informed by Martin Andie, 
"Discernment and the Imagination" in Bell, editor, Weil's 
Philosophy of Culture. 116-149. See also Diogenes Allen, 
"The Concept of Reading and the 'Book of Nature'" in the 
same volume, 93-115.
39Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in 
Formative Writings. 69.
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spectator at a badly staged play in which the storm, 
riot or battle is represented in a ludicrous way.40
In other words, perception would be the sole arbiter of
fact. The world would be a series of disconnected ideas.
But simple ideas do not constitute knowledge until they
are connected. Human knowing without imagination could
not make the connections that constitute knowledge and
that make judgement and action in the world possible. In
the essay on the Pythagorean doctrine Weil observes that
one and one can remain side by side throughout the 
perpetuity of time; they never will make two unless 
an intelligence performs the act of adding them. 
Attentive intelligence alone has the power of 
carrying out the connections, and as soon as that 
attention relaxes, the connections dissolve. . . . 
The necessary connections which constitute the very 
reality of the world have no reality in themselves 
except as the object of intellectual attention in 
action.41
A reasoning capacity in which imagination is repressed or 
ignored has the flaws of its virtues. Its logic is 
unbending, but thereby limited. It is purely rational, 
so inadequate to cope with a created reality that is 
defined by contingency. It denies the interconnection 
between the world and the mind that the imagination 
supplies. For Weil, intellectual attention, the only
40Ibid., 69-70.
41Weil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of 
Christianity. 188.
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kind worthy of the name human knowing, consists of reason 
informed by intuition and imagination.
Much as imagination offers a check on reason, so 
reason must check imagination, for the uncontrolled 
imagination poses serious problems of its own. Weil 
writes,
In this regard the impulse that, at the slightest 
creaking sound, sends me forth to re-create the 
world misleads me every time. Therefore I must not 
study the imagination as action, that is, in 
relation to its effects, but only as thought. The 
world is not outside my thought; it is above all 
what is not me in me. I must not try to go out of 
myself in order to define the obstacle.42
As reason concerns itself with discerning order, the
imagination values the contingency of reality.
Imagination makes it possible to accept the truth of
certain clear ideas even if their origins are not so
clearly understood. Weil illustrates using the language
of mathematics: "Why is seven a prime number? Why not
nine? I don't know. That's how it is."43 The mind
resists clear ideas because they proceed from outside the
mind, from the world through the imagination. The mind's
ordering function is to try to explain that which it
cannot by finding resemblances between the world and the
truth of these ideas, where, by definition, no such
42Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in 
Formative Writings. 70.
43Ibid., 72.
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resemblance exists. The mind attempting to overcome 
contingency hands itself over to contingency and 
ultimately yields to superstition, passion and folly. 
Human knowledge is better served if the mind accepts 
clear ideas (like "prime number") for what they are, that 
is, true as mysteries, as "offspring of the docile 
imagination."44 Unfortunately, "our intelligence has 
become so crude," Weil laments, "that we no longer 
conceive that there could be an authentic, rigorous 
certainty concerning the incomprehensible mysteries."45
The notion of the "clear idea" is central to Weil's 
epistemology. But a clear idea is an invitation to 
investigation and is itself inadequate to constitute 
knowledge. The capacity to "know" is demonstrated only 
when the mind shows it can "add a clear idea to itself 
and conceive that such addition is endless."46 What is 
then known is not the world, but a series of symbols 
representative of some worldly phenomena. This series 
may be used as a model or plan of action for human 
beings. It can make the world intelligible and therefore 
subject to human action upon it. The question of knowing
44 Ibid.
45Weil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of 
Christianity. 165.
46 Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in 
Formative Writings. 73.
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in the created world is intertwined with considerations
of ethics or the exercise of power vis-a-vis the world.
Weil believes that this power is real to the degree that
a plan of action embraces the limit of human ability to
act upon the world. But there is also the problem of
acting upon a reality which cannot be grasped finally and
completely:
In the world everything is set apart from 
everything, everything is unrelated to everything, 
everything is neutral with respect to everything.
If there is a reason why in my thought, insofar as 
it is joined to the world, nothing is immediate, it 
is because in the world everything is immediate. In 
short, what comes from me in movement is the fact 
that it is directed; what does not come from me is 
that it is extended; and what constitutes the world 
is extension.47
Knowing is the mind's ordering of a chaotic created
reality. Likewise, science is the process of the human
mind's ordering of chaotic created reality over time.
That geometry and physics conceive of the world as
extended substance, with lines, figures, number and
movements, does not mean that the world is necessarily
extended substance. Geometry and physics, conceived as
fields of knowledge, are composed of a series of clear
ideas which once accepted and mastered make chaotic
reality intelligible.
47Ibid., 77.
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The value of geometry and physics, then, consists in
the fact that they are the most useful way for human
beings to conceptualize created reality. Inquiry into
created reality along the lines of geometry and physics
helps human beings grasp their nature as dual beings:
"on the one hand a passive being who is subject to the
world and on the other an active being who has a grasp on
it."48 With their representational languages coalescing
on the level of mathematics, geometry and physics allow
the conceptualization of how the active and the passive
may be united. But geometry and physics work in the
realm of thought and so do not unite these two beings in
any concrete sense. Geometry and physics are simply the
representational presence of the world in the mind; the
mysteries they articulate remind human beings of their
relative powerlessness. Action is the indirect
unification of the active and passive aspects of being:
Not the appearance of action through which the 
uncontrolled imagination makes me blindly turn the 
world upside down by means of my anarchic desires, 
but real action, indirect action, action conforming 
to geometry, or, to give it its true name, work.49
For Weil, work consists of methodical action, that is,
action which through imagination approaches the world as
extended substance, and brings some usable order to
48Ibid., 78.
49Ibid.
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otherwise chaotic reality.50 Work, as will be seen in 
Chapter Three, is a certain form of knowing the world.
It becomes for Weil, as art is for Camus, the 
intermediary between thought and action, the locus of our 
judgment at work on our material existence. To this end, 
Weil is very specific on the purpose of science: "first 
of all to render the human mind master, as far as 
possible, of the part of the imagination that perception 
leaves free, and then to give it possession of the world; 
and perhaps, when these two purposes are considered 
closely, they amount to the same thing."51
Weil's difficult epistemology seeks to do two 
things. First, it attempts to revalue intuition and 
imagination in the process of human knowing. To 
accomplish this, she argues that intuition draws on the 
decreated part of the human soul, giving limited access 
to a perceived but incomprehensible higher reality. 
Articulation of what is intuited through the decreated 
part of the soul requires the proper use of the 
imagination, not to "re-create the world," but rather to
S0Mary Dietz has begun investigating this conception 
of work in "'The Slow Boring of Hard Boards': Methodical
Thinking and the Work of Politics" American Political 
Science Review 88:4 (December 1994): 873-86. See also 
Winch, The Just Balance.
51Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in 
Formative Writings. 84-85.
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gain perspective on that world. Second, in order to 
avoid an atomistic, feeling-driven epistemology, Weil 
introduces geometry and physics as appropriate models of 
human intellectual inquiry. Geometry has to do with 
forms, representations of reality, and making those forms 
manageable in the realm of thought. Physics is the 
application of number to geometry. It has to do with 
movement, specifically, the movement of matter in the 
created world, that is, in the realm of necessity. 
Together, according to Weil, the methods represented by 
geometry and physics offer a basis for action in the 
realm of necessity, while preserving the mystery of 
forms, "simple ideas," which can only be represented and 
never fully explained. Human beings exist in a created 
reality of matter and necessity according to Weil. In 
our negotiating this existence, human beings have the 
ability and the need to call upon the decreated part of 
their souls. At the level of decreated reality human 
beings act in accordance with obedience to God.
"Necessity is for matter the intersection of obedience to 
God and of the brute force which subdues creatures," Weil 
wrote, "at this same level of the intersection, necessity 
participates in constraint on the one hand, and on the 
other participates in intelligence, in justice, in
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beauty, and in faith."52 The realm of necessity that
Weil understood as created reality was a chaotic reality
of matter and motion, but the chaos perceived reflects
the inadequacies of human perception rather than
imperfections in creation.
The human mind has an undeniable need to order that
which presents itself as chaos or contingency. Science
represents the timeless endeavor of human beings to bring
order to that chaos. Through science, human beings
order, even positing "laws," with a greater or lesser
degree of success depending upon human capacities, but
necessity remains unchanged:
Necessity always appears to us as an ensemble of 
laws of variation, determined by fixed relationships 
and invariants. Reality for the human mind is 
contact with necessity. There is a contradiction 
here, for necessity is intelligible, not tangible. 
Thus the feeling of reality constitutes a harmony 
and a mystery.53
Weil's view of created reality resembles what Camus
understands as the "absurd," for necessity is utterly
indifferent to what human beings would understand as
moral value. The "good" and the "bad" are seldom
rewarded or punished according to what they deserve. The
indifference of necessity to good and evil carries with
52Weil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of 
Christianity. 187.
53Ibid., 178.
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it an ethical imperative, for necessity is the obedience 
of matter to God. The pair of contraries, necessity in 
matter and liberty in human beings, have their meeting 
place in that obedience, "for to be free, for us, is to 
desire to obey God. All other liberty is false."54 
Action in obedience to God requires that human beings act 
from the level of the impersonal. To imitate the 
indifference of necessity in obedience to God, Weil 
writes, "is simply to consent to it, that is, to accept 
the existence of all that exists, including the evil, 
excepting only that portion of evil which we have the 
possibility, and the obligation of preventing."55 What 
human beings "know" is created reality, the reality of 
matter: matter that sometimes moves in regular motions,
sometimes not; matter that appears as sometimes good and 
sometimes evil. What human beings must do is accept what 
cannot be changed and change the evil that it is in their 
power to change. Weil believed human beings must know 
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III. Albert Camus: The Absurd and Human Knowing
Albert Camus preferred the mantle of artist to that 
of philosopher. He was more concerned with how human 
beings live with what they know than in discerning the 
mechanism by which they know.56 Simone Weil grounded 
her theory of knowing in a theory of being, in a 
metaphysical conception of reality. For Camus, 
epistemology was a suspect philosophical category to the 
degree that it grounded human knowing in metaphysics. 
Formal epistemology was incapable of abandoning the 
notion that reason could be the objective arbiter of 
human knowledge and value. Consequently, "Even the most 
rigorous epistemologies imply metaphysics,1 observed 
Camus in The Mvth of Sisyphus, "and to such a degree that 
the metaphysic of many contemporary thinkers consists in 
having nothing but an epistemology."57 In Camus's 
conception of knowing, the presence of metaphysics 
denigrates the often mysterious character of human 
experience. Similarly, reliance upon a narrow
56Albert Camus, Actuelles I. chronicrues 1944-48 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1950), 263, quoted in Germaine Bree,
Camus. 244: "The first choice an artist makes is
precisely to be an artist, and if he chooses to be an 
artist it is in what he is himself and because of a 
certain idea he has of art."
57Albert Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus and Other 
Essays, translated by Justin O'Brien (New York: Knopf,
1955), note 9 on page 44.
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understanding of human reason gives the human mind a 
false confidence in its own control over the experienced 
world, denying pre-rational experiences often critical to 
the formation of character.58 The key to reclaiming the 
value of knowledge lay in a renewed appreciation for 
sense experience as a supplement to, not a replacement 
for, that which is known rationally. "The body's 
judgment is as good as the mind's," Camus writes early in 
his career. It was critical to Camus's thought on 
knowing that human beings should not forget that "we get 
into the habit of living before acquiring the habit of 
thinking."59
Camus undertook a thorough critique of contemporary 
understandings of knowing in an effort to redescribe 
knowing in a way that transcends formal reason without 
falling into metaphysics. The result is neither 
epistemological nihilism nor a form of intellectual 
hedonism. He privileges the possibility of an 
individual's openness to the exigencies of human
58In the manuscript he left incomplete, Camus was 
beginning to explore his own pre-rational experiences 
when he died. See Albert Camus, The First Man. 
translated by David Hapgood (New York: Knopf, 1995).
59Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 8.
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experience which he calls "lucidity."60 The lucid 
encounter with reality involves an extra-rational 
cognition which allows a given experience to be viewed 
from several distinct angles at once. Ethically, 
lucidity demands creative as opposed to "rational" 
formulaic responses to human experience. Camus's 
conception of knowing embraces the limitations of human 
reason in the face of the absurd. It recognizes as 
natural but ultimately futile the attempt to impose 
totalities on chaotic reality and seeks a way to 
circumvent the deleterious effects of an excessively 
logical, control-oriented understanding of human reason.
Camus interrogated reality from the perspective of 
the absurd. The method he gleaned from this perspective 
entailed "methodical doubt" concerning any way of 
thinking that denies or ameliorates the finitude of the 
human condition.61 He believed that these denials or
^Lucidity is central to Camus's argument in The 
Myth of Sisyphus and is further drawn out in his later 
extended essay, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt,
translated by Anthony Bower (New York: Random House,
1956), especially the chapter on creative rebellion, 253- 
278.
61 By 1951, Camus had lost interest in the term, not 
to say the concept, "absurd." In an interview with 
Gabriel d'Aubarede Camus said, "This word 'Absurd' has 
had an unhappy history, and I confess that now it rather 
annoys me. When I analyzed the feeling of the Absurd in 
The Mvth of Sisyphus. I was looking for a method and not 
a doctrine. I was practicing methodical doubt." The 
interview is translated and reprinted in Albert Camus,
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ameliorations amounted to cheating life of its value in 
favor of what may or may not come after death. Camus 
valued living, the world of the sea and sun, over somber 
meditations on death and the afterlife.62 But it was 
death which defined life for Camus. The one thing human 
beings know for certain is that they will die. With this 
knowledge, how and on what principles do they act? In 
his Mvth of Sisyphus. Camus formulated a preliminary 
response to the problem: "the principle can be
established that for a man who does not cheat, what he 
believes to be true must determine his action."63 The 
requirement of acting in accordance with the true in the 
face of inevitable death defines the absurdity of our 
existence, but leaves human beings nowhere to turn for 
solace.
Lvrical and Critical Essays, edited by Philip Thody, 
translated by Ellen Conroy Kennedy (New York: Vintage,
1968), 356.
62Camus's beautiful essays on the physical and 
spiritual landscape of his native Algeria illustrate this 
point vividly. See especially the essays which make up 
"Nuptials" (1938) and "Summer" (1954) in Camus, Lvrical 
and Critical Essays. 63-106 and 107-181. Both of Camus's 
extended philosophical essays, The Mvth of Sisyphus and 
The Rebel, are meditations on "artificial" (man-made) 
forms of death, suicide and murder respectively, as 
opposed to natural forms.
63Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 6.
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Camus saw the need for solace as a major obstacle to
human knowing. His understanding of the absurd as a kind
of homelessness makes the problem obvious:
What, then, is that incalculable feeling that 
deprives the mind of the sleep necessary to life? A 
world that can be explained even with bad reasons is 
a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a 
universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, 
man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is 
without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of 
a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This 
divorce between man and his life, the actor and his 
setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.64
Camus tries to discern how human beings can live with the
absurd sensibility that issues from this sense of
homelessness.65 The absurd sensibility also belies a
deep-rooted frustration. This frustration, a result of
demanding answers of an intractable existence, is not
rational; it begins at the limits of rationality.
Everything begins when one asks oneself "why?" Why do we
suffer? Why do we die? These questions are not rational
abstractions, but felt responses to the finite human
condition. For Camus, the way human beings handle these
basic questions determines the value of their knowledge.
The world's response to human questions about suffering
and death is a silence that awakens in human beings a
consciousness of their finitude and powerlessness. This
^Ibid.
65Ibid., 2.
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consciousness is the source of the anxiety common to all 
human beings.66 Human beings think about the fact that 
they will die and recognize that they are subject to 
time. In a way of knowing that values experience, time 
and living is all human beings have because they have no 
direct experience of timelessness or death. To exist, 
therefore, human beings must value life in the absurd 
expectation of death.
Resisting the absurdity of human existence is a 
function of human reason. In this resistance to 
absurdity, however, a disjuncture between reason and 
experience becomes evident. The disjuncture is natural 
and necessary in order to make sense of experience, but 
making sense of experience through reason necessitates an 
attempt to control reality. In this attempt lies the 
danger of relying upon reason alone to negotiate an 
absurd world. In short, the human rational capacity and 
the human experience of absurdity conflict when reason 
attempts to overcome the absurd.
Camus understands that rational constructs are 
consoling, but they are also dangerous. He finds no real
^Here Camus validates Sartre's feeling of "nausea,1 
but, as we will see, he dismisses Sartre's response to 
that feeling. Compare Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea (New 
York: New Directions Press, 1964). See also Germaine
Bree, Camus and Sartre: Crisis and Commitment (New York:
Dell, 1972).
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value in an ethic dependent on an illusory reality. The
way of knowing Camus describes allows human character to
flourish mindful of its limits without positing or
submitting to a fabricated wholeness. Camus calls the
process of substituting a constructed reality for
experienced reality "the act of eluding."
Eluding is the invariable game. The typical act of 
eluding, the final evasion . . .  is hope. Hope of 
another life one must "deserve" or trickery of those 
who live not for life itself but for some great idea 
that will transcend it, refine it, give it a 
meaning, and betray it.67
Eluding, for Camus, is an act of human imagination
masquerading as reason. It defies the limits of human
cognition and denies our shared destiny (death). Eluding
is the rationalization of the absurd in which the human
mind attempts to gain control over that which it cannot
control. A confluence of reason and imagination is a
prerequisite to human knowing, but must not deteriorate
into the act of eluding.
The tendency to elude derives from the mind's need
to overcome the contradictions of absurdity. "The mind's
first step is to distinguish what is true from what is
false," Camus writes, but "as soon as thought reflects on
itself, what it first discovers is a contradiction.1168
67Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 8.
“ ibid., 16.
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The contradiction parallels the dialogue of life with 
death. The impulse is to try to explain away 
contradiction, but contradiction must be accepted. Camus 
wrote: "The mind's deepest desire, even in its most
elaborate operations, parallels man's unconscious feeling 
in the face of his universe: it is an insistence upon
familiarity, an appetite for clarity."69 The mind must 
accept that certain phenomena cannot be explained 
comprehensively. The mind that cannot accept this 
reality yields to the temptation of eluding.
Camus's ethical thought is a response to this 
tendency to elude. That response is neither intellectual 
nor moral relativism. In his conception of the absurd 
sensibility, Camus recognizes that human knowledge would 
be useless without the ability to judge or make value 
distinctions. For Camus, ethics is firmly grounded in 
knowledge: to live is to judge, and making value
distinctions is unavoidable. It is necessary only to 
remain mindful that what human beings value determines 
how they value. Camus knew the valuation of order or 
totality was a direct result of the human confrontation 
with the disorder of perceived reality. Imposing 
totality on the world around us is a bid to order that 
world. This is natural and appropriate within limits.
69Ibid., 17.
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"Understanding the world for a man," writes Camus, "is
reducing it to the human, stamping it with his seal."70
This ordering, however, inevitably implies value: to
articulate what is known, to fashion order, human beings
value one piece of information over another. Value is a
product of human cognition and, therefore, a serious
responsibility. Only retaining a sense of human
limitations can protect against inappropriate valuation.
Knowledge gained through the absurd sensibility retains a
sense of its limits:
If thought discovered in the shimmering mirrors of 
phenomena eternal relations capable of summing them 
up and summing themselves up in a single principle, 
then would be seen an intellectual joy of which the 
myth of the blessed would be but a ridiculous 
imitation. That nostalgia for unity, that appetite 
for the absolute illustrates the essential impulse 
of the human drama. But the fact of that 
nostalgia's existence does not imply that it is to 
be immediately satisfied.71
The awareness of the limit is difficult to maintain in
the face of that essential human impulse, "that nostalgia
for unity." It is all too human to forget that
knowledge, however useful in making the world
comprehensible, is limited by the contingencies which
make up that world.
70Ibid.
71 Ibid.
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To Camus, the human appetite for clarity and the 
nostalgia for unity reveals human beings for what they 
are: finite beings possessed of intellect in search of
solace. What has not been grasped is that the intellect 
alone is incapable of providing that solace. Yet, 
attempts are made constantly. How else to explain the 
human need and willingness to fashion mental constructs 
to hide the fundamentally indifferent chaos of reality? 
The disjunction felt between this reality and the lack of 
comfort derived from mental constructs should convince 
human beings of the inadequacy of these constructs. 
Instead, Camus thought, through the act of eluding human 
beings deny their inadequacy and take an emotional and 
intellectual "leap" in order to mask reality. The leap, 
a kind of faith taking the mantle of reason, is intended 
as consolation, but once the leap is taken, human life 
and civilization become defined by it. Relationships, 
ethical behavior, and institutions must all reconcile 
themselves to the consequences of the leap. The result, 
for Camus, is a self-deception at the core of modern 
human ethical, political, and spiritual existence. It is 
this self-deception that Camus believes must be ferreted 
out before human beings can begin to know and, by 
extension, act ethically.
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The self-deception is native to two prevailing types 
of knowing which can be derived from Camus's analysis of 
inappropriate responses to the absurd.72 One category 
of knowing tries to negate the relevance or presence of 
the absurd, either by imposing totality from without, as 
in religious faith or by imposing that totality from 
within, as in scientific reasoning. A second category 
concedes the necessity of image or metaphor, but then 
embraces the absurd itself as the totality of reality.
For Camus, both of these categories of human inquiry are 
totalizing constructs and therefore inadequate.
Camus began with an interrogation of the problematic 
issue of faith through a critical consideration of 
Chrisianity. "I shall never start from the supposition 
that Christian truth is illusory," Camus told an audience 
at a Dominican Monastery in 1948, "but merely from the 
fact that I could not accept it."73 Though he knew and 
respected certain Christians, Camus's attitude toward 
Christianity was ambiguous at best. He appreciated Jesus 
as an ethical human being, but saw in him "just one more 
innocent man whom the representatives of the God of
^Ibid., 18.
^Albert Camus, "The Unbeliever and the Christians," 
in Resistance. Rebellion and Death, translated by Justin 
0,Brien (New York: Vintage, 1970), 69-70.
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Abraham tortured in a spectacular manner."74 In Camus's 
understanding of Christianity, the presence of a perfect 
God, whose very existence made acute the sinfulness of 
human beings, seemed an unnecessary obstacle to human 
fulfillment.75 From the perfection of God, Christianity 
derived the incompleteness of human beings (sin).76 At 
the same time, certain forms of Christianity held out the 
possibility of a recovered completeness through salvation 
at the end of time. The notion of the immortality of the 
soul seemed to deny the finitude of human experience, 
rendering the earthly pursuit of justice meaningless 
apart from the seemingly selfish goal of personal 
salvation. This was the Christian truth that Camus 
"could not accept."
It would be too easy to read Camus as simply another 
twentieth century writer hostile to Christianity. In 
point of fact, Camus distrusted faith in any totality
74Camus, The Rebel. 34.
^The relationship of Camus's ambiguous attitude 
toward Christianity to the rest of his thought is one of 
the more enduring debates about his work. See, for 
recent examples, Delwin Brown, "Grace: A Meditation from
Camus," The IIiff Review 43:1 (Winter 1986): 3-10; Robert 
Cohn, "Camus's Sacred: The Growing Stone," Stanford
Literature Review 5:1-2 (Spring-Fall 1988): 151-60; and
Robert Duncan, "Judgment Without Redemption: Camus
Version of the Fall," Christianity and Literature 30:2 
(Winter 1981): 43-50.
76See Camus's discussion of Kierkegaard in The Mvth 
of Sisyphus. 39-41.
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inasmuch as that faith offered humanity the opportunity
to place its destiny in the hands of an external entity.
These totalities allowed human beings to avoid
responsibility for the way they conduct their lives.
Such reasoning, which Camus found in various forms in
theology, science, philosophy and political thought,
always claimed to ennoble human beings while in reality
denigrating lived human existence. There was a further
danger in positing an ultimate source of all being and
becoming. The existence of God makes possible the
theoretical negation of God. Camus argues in The Rebel
that the presence of God cries out for a formulation of
His absence, that is, for metaphysical rebellion of the
sort which Nietzsche undertook:
When the throne of God is overturned, the rebel 
realizes that it is now his own responsibility to 
create the justice, order, and unity that he sought 
in vain within his own condition, and in this way to 
justify the fall of God. Then begins the desperate 
effort to create, at the price of crime and murder 
if necessary, the dominion of man.77
Such a dominion can only be claimed and not realized.
Nature inevitably confronts the metaphysical rebel and he
is forced to resort to violence.
The natural world was another locus of mystery Camus
believed modern human beings were trying to conquer
through a mislaid faith in human reason. The conceit of
^Camus, The Rebel. 25.
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post-Enlightenment science posited the world as something 
ultimately knowable in spite of its unpredictable power 
and diversity. In his critique of science, Camus 
acknowledges the importance of mystery, for it is in the 
scientific attempt to unmask nature that science degrades 
human existence. Science makes claims for knowing that 
are nearly metaphysical in their explanatory 
completeness. Camus, like Nietzsche before him, 
recognized this religious tendency in scientific knowing 
as fraudulent and dangerous. "During the last century," 
Camus wrote in The Rebel. "man cast off the fetters of 
religion," but "hardly was he free, when he created new 
and utterly intolerable chains."78 Though new, the 
shackles of science bore a striking resemblance to those 
of religion. With the Enlightenment, Camus argues, the 
tyrannical virtue of religious faith "dies but is born 
again, more exacting than ever" in the guise of 
scientific knowledge.79
Enlightenment belief in empirically observable 
scientific fact implies that all human experience is 
quantifiable. Ironically, the methodology of modern 
science comes to lack the humility before and respect for 
nature present in some religious thought. The conceit of
^Ibid., 279.
^Ibid.
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science, argues Camus cum Nietzsche, that it could
comprehensively explain all of reality, ultimately
dissolves into an image or metaphor. For a time, Camus
writes in The Mvth of Sisyphus, science describes the
world with marvelous efficiency. In his all too human
nostalgia for unity, "in my thirst for knowledge," Camus
must admit that the laws science enumerates are true:
You take apart its mechanism and my hope 
increases. At the final stage you teach me that 
this wondrous and multi-colored universe can be 
reduced to the atom and that the atom itself 
can be reduced to the electron. All this is 
good and I wait for you to continue. But you 
tell me of an invisible planetary system in 
which electrons gravitate around a nucleus. You 
explain this world to me with an image. I 
realize that you have been reduced to poetry:
I shall never know.80
Scientific reasoning verifies the absurdity of the world
when it resorts to an image to describe the mystery it
encounters but cannot penetrate. The most powerful form
of human reason cannot overcome the diversity of
existence. Like Nietzsche, Camus embraced the difficult
truism that "a science that was to teach me everything
ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in
metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of
art."81 For Camus, however, this acceptance entailed
^Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 20.
81Ibid. Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy [The 
Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, translated 
by Francis Golffing (New York, 1990)], 93, noted the
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neither existential despair nor nihilism. Instead it was 
an invitation to reconsider human knowing, taking 
seriously that which can be described or depicted but not 
explained.
The second category of knowing concedes the 
necessity of image or metaphor, but then embraces the 
absurd itself as the totality of reality. Camus finds 
that this form of philosophical knowing falls into the 
trap of totality by positing the absurd as the ultimate 
meaning of existence. Two philosophies of great promise 
from Camus's point of view, existentialism and 
phenomenology, each embraced absurd existence and 
criticized scientific rationality from the perspective of 
absurd sensibility. Neither, however, managed to avoid 
the snare of metaphysics. Together they represent a kind 
of "philosophical suicide," which Camus describes as "the 
movement by which a thought negates itself and tends to 
transcend itself in its very negation."82
Enlightenment's hubristic "illusion that thought, guided 
by the thread of causation, might plumb the farthest 
abysses of being and even correct it." He continued,
"[t]his grand metaphysical illusion has become integral 
to the scientific endeavor and again and again leads 
science to those far limits of its inquiry where it 
becomes art— which, in this mechanism, is what is really 
intended."
82Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus, 41.
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The existential philosophies, Camus writes, 
"starting out from the absurd over the ruins of reason, 
in a closed universe limited to the human . . . deify 
what crushes them and find reason to hope in what 
impoverishes them."83 The embrace of the absurd leaves 
the existential philosopher powerless to realize the 
transcendent in which he so fervently believes.84 
Contrary to his own disappointing experience, the 
philosopher decides that his consciousness of this 
universe "upset by failure" reveals the presence and not 
the absence of transcendence. Through a "blind act of 
human confidence," the existential philosopher puts 
forward the absurd as a god and "that inability to 
understand becomes the existence that illuminates 
everything."85 For Camus, this is not reason, but 
faith. The existential philosopher has taken a "leap"; 
he has made use of an almost mystical "device," which 
eludes the reality that absurdity represents.
“ ibid., 32.
^Camus here is thinking of Karl Jaspers and the 
branch of Existentialism which, owing to its relation to 
Kierkegaard, leans heavily toward Christianity 
represented by Gabriel Marcel among others. See Karl 
Jaspers, Reason and Existence, translated by William 
Earle (New York: Noonday Press, 1955) and Gabriel
Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, translated by 
Manya Harari (New York: Citadel Press, 1991 [original
1956]).
8SCamus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 33.
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If there is an absurd, it is in man's universe. The 
moment the notion transforms itself into eternity's 
springboard, it ceases to be linked to human 
lucidity. The absurd is no longer that evidence 
that man ascertained without consenting to it. The 
struggle is eluded.86
Camus believed that existentialism eludes the complexity
of the human condition by positing that complexity as a
discernable unity. All attempts to elude the struggle
remove the possibility of meaning from human existence.
In this way, existential philosophy renders human
existence devoid of meaning.
Phenomenology similarly removes meaning from human
existence.87 The phenomenologist tries to overcome the
apparent chaos of human experience by attributing what
Husserl calls "intention11 to the objects of that
experience. In this way, Camus writes,
Thinking is not unifying or making the appearance 
familiar under the guise of a great principle. 
Thinking is learning all over again how to see, 
directing one's consciousness, making of every image 
a privileged place. . . . Consciousness suspends in 
experience the objects of its attention. Through 
its miracle it isolates them. Henceforth they are 
beyond all judgments.88
“ ibid., 35.
■ 87Hwa Yol Jung, "An Introductory Essay: The
Political Relevance of Existential Phenomenology," in 
Existential Phenomenology and Political Theory; A Reader 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) is a useful
introduction to the political concerns of phenomenology.
“Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 43. Compare Edmund 
Husserl, Logical Investigations, translated by J. N. 
Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970) and Edmund
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Intention privileges every image. In so doing,
phenomenology balks at explaining the world, choosing
merely to describe "actual experience." This universal
privileging denies human beings the ability to
distinguish the value of a given experience, robbing them
of the ability to compare what Voegelin calls "equivalent
experiences."89 Camus concedes that the impulse to
enumerate what it cannot understand is consistent with
the absurd sensibility. To be viable, however,
phenomenology must go a step further and posit a value
which it cannot do without metaphysics. Husserl, for
example, speaks of the "extra-temporal essences" to be
found in the objects of intention:
There is no longer a single idea explaining 
everything, but an infinite number of essences 
giving a meaning to an infinite number of objects. .
. . [H]ere thought hurls itself into an abstract 
polytheism. But this is not all: hallucinations and
Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology. translated by David Carr (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970). A brilliant 
overview of Husserl's thought and its context is the 1936 
essay by Jan Patocka, "Masaryk's and Husserl's Conception 
of the Spiritual Crisis of European Humanity," in Erazim 
Kohak, Jan Patocka: Philosophy and Selected Writings
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
89See Eric Voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and 
Symbolization in History" in The Collected Works of Eric 
Voegelin Volume 12: Published Essavs 1966-1985 edited by
Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1990), 115-133.
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fictions likewise belong to "extra-temporal 
essences. "90
Husserl leaves human beings in a kind of relativism, a 
world of ideals without hierarchy. The world, Camus 
writes, has ceased "to have its reflection in a higher 
universe, but the heaven of forms is figured in the host 
of images of this earth."91 Fabricated totality is now 
posited as an infinite host of equally privileged 
unities. Existentialism and phenomenology claimed to 
"solve" the problem of the indifferent diversity of 
reality by positing that diversity as a unity whose 
contingent elements are equally privileged. This leap 
leaves human beings with a doubly ineffective way of 
human knowing. Existentialism and phenomenology each 
yield a way of knowing that succumbs to the temptation to 
posit a totality. At the same time, the claimed totality 
cannot help human beings distinguish value and therefore 
cannot help them know how to act.
A disappointed Camus found that these philosophical 
forms partook of the all-to-human nostalgia for unity. 
This dangerous nostalgia, however, had been most 
materially and spiritually destructive in the realm of 
modern politics, where the price paid could be counted in
90Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 45.
91Ibid. , 47.
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the millions of human lives.92 Camus isolated the 
origins of this strand of political being in the French 
Revolution and German Idealist philosophy. From the 
Revolution, he argues, Europeans learned the efficacy of 
the politics of terror in imposing totality or 
conformity, especially when accompanied by the rhetoric 
of human liberation. "When neither reason nor the free 
expression of individual opinion succeeds in 
systematically establishing unity," Camus writes of the 
period, "it must be decided to suppress all alien 
elements."93 Terror draws on a quasi-religious fervor 
in order to turn opponents of the regime into heretics 
who must be destroyed to maintain the purity of the 
political entity. This model of action, Camus observes, 
is at least as old as the Inquisition, only now it is 
justified by "reason" and not by "faith." With terror, 
Camus argues in The Rebel, reason is made an object of 
faith and together they are a formidable justification 
for action in the political world. Camus concludes that 
the coupling of terror to the language of human 
liberation which Napoleon turns into an empire, parallels 
the joining of reason to faith which Hegel turns into a 
philosophical system.
92Camus, The Rebel. 3-11.
93Ibid., 126.
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German Idealism, Camus argues, introduced movement
to the fixed ideas of truth, reason and justice that
characterized the Revolutionary period. Incarnate in the
world as elements of progress, these ideas "ceased to be
guides in order to become goals."94 In this context,
action becomes an end in itself performed in darkness
while awaiting some "final illumination." A conception
of human progress as an unfolding totality emerges from
these actions and that unfolding is taken for the
substance of history. The idea becomes even more
powerful when human progress is seen as a reflection of
God's work in the world. This tendency is given
philosophical expression in Hegel where:
Everything is reconciled, of course, in the 
dialectic, and one extreme cannot be stated without 
the other arising; there exists in Hegel, as in all 
great thinkers, the material for contradicting 
Hegel. Philosophers, however, are rarely read with 
the head alone, but often with the heart and all its
passions, which can accept no kind of
reconciliation.95
Hegel's dialectic allows no way to make value
distinctions. His fondness for world-historical figures
like Napoleon is ample evidence that the politics of
terror may be justified as part of the unfolding
reconciliation that is history. Marx made the ethereal
94Ibid., 13 4.
^Ibid., 135.
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unity of Hegel material. Camus finds that from Marx's 
work the revolutionaries of the twentieth century derived 
a "vision of a history without any kind of transcendence, 
dedicated to perpetual strife and to the struggle of 
wills bent on seizing power.”96 The totality of 
progress begets the totality of history as the unfolding 
of a consciousness at once human and divine. "Cynicism, 
the deification of history and of matter, individual and 
State terror," Camus concludes, "these are the inordinate 
consequences that will now spring, armed to the teeth, 
from the equivocal conception of a world that entrusts to 
history alone the task of producing both values and 
truth."97
The difficulty in Camus's analysis is his apparent 
ambivalence to a certain form of transcendence embedded 
in conceptions of human knowing. How can he criticize 
modern revolutionaries for "a vision of history without 
any kind of transcendence" and sustain his assault on a 
religion which maintains the transcendent character of 
its God and His grace? The answer lies in his 
immanentized understanding of transcendence. Camus's is 
a worldview seeking a transcendent principle of mundane 
limits. What Camus wants to articulate is a
96Ibid.
97Ibid., 146.
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transcendence of and in this world that pays homage to 
the human condition. The totalizing constructs Camus 
identified each posited their transcendence by 
disregarding the limiting exigencies of time: in a God
beyond time; in a scientific method whose technical 
acumen may claim the ability to defy time; in the absurd 
itself which finds a unified vision in a chaotic reality 
despite time; and in the unfolding of an historical 
consciousness which will be manifest at the end of 
historical time. To Camus, these are all deceptions, 
leaps, ways of eluding that reality in which we must 
live. Camus sought a way of being neither bound by nor 
ignorant of the exigencies of time.
As his critique of contemporary ways of knowing 
indicates, Camus found the purely rational approach to 
human existence grossly inadequate. Privileging "fact" 
and the logical constructs to be built from fact leaves 
too much of the human experience out at the beginning. 
Human reason and its constructs inevitably confront 
phenomena that they cannot explain. They are then forced 
to take a "leap" of near faith to cover their 
deficiencies. For Camus, these inexplicable phenomena 
warrant more careful treatment. What of the inexplicable 
in nature? What of the inexplicable in human 
relationships (e.g., an act of kindness in which the
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actor has nothing material to gain from the act) ? For 
these Camus believed that modern science, philosophy and 
political theory had no explanation. Only Christianity 
attempted to explain such things with its concept of 
grace. Camus would make use of the word "grace," but 
remove from its definition any sense that grace had come 
from God.98 Rather, Camus believed that when human 
beings act so, they give fullest expression to their 
humanity. An act of grace by one human being serves as a 
statement of what that person shares with the rest of 
humanity.
For Camus, the notion of grace’is one among many
illogical symbols, the construction of which requires
imagination as well as recognition of human limits. The
authentic reconstruction or rediscovery of these symbols
requires the imagination, perhaps the sensibility, of the
creative human being. Camus's desire for this broader
conception of knowing is evident in his earliest
writings. In "Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism,"
his dissertation, the young Camus observed that
it is a paradox peculiar to the human mind that it 
can grasp the elements and be incapable of embracing 
the synthesis; the epistemological paradox of a 
science certain in its fact, but inadequate 
nonetheless; adequate in its theories, but 
nonetheless uncertain, or the psychological paradox
98Ibid., 3-11.
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of a self that can be grasped in its parts but is 
inaccessible in its profound unity.99
By the time he wrote The Mvth of Sisyphus. Camus's view
of human knowing embraced experienced reality as well as
the anxiety associated with that knowing.
I don't know whether this world has a meaning that 
transcends it. But I know that I do not know that
meaning and that it is impossible for me just now to
know it. What can a meaning outside my condition 
mean to me? I can understand only in human terms. 
What I touch, what resists me— that is what I 
understand. And these two certainties— my appetite 
for the absolute and for unity and the impossibility 
of reducing this world to a rational and reasonable 
principle— I also know that I cannot reconcile them. 
What other truth can I admit without lying, without 
bringing in a hope I lack and which means nothing 
within the limits of my condition?100
This recognition of the absurdity of reality did not make
that experience adequate as a basis for ethical action in
the world. What Camus sought was ethical viability based
upon what human beings can know. He sought a ground for
action in which it is possible to take seriously human
experience and reconcile it to some consistent conception
of truth, justice and beauty. As will be discussed in
subsequent chapters, Camus found in the creative
articulation of the human encounter with reality a viable
"Albert Camus, "Christian Metaphysics and Neo- 
Platonism," translated in Joseph McBride, Albert Camus; 
Philosopher and Litterateur (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1992), 152.
100Ibid., 51.
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way of knowing out of which he tried to fashion a viable 
way of acting.
Before speaking of Camus's notion of creativity, 
however, it must be recognized that he is carefully 
mindful of human cognitive limitations. By its nature, 
creativity acts upon what the creator knows, briefly 
valuing that which it depicts over the rest of creation. 
Knowing enables the creative act. The creative act is 
the transposition of an idea we have of reality into a 
concrete form within material reality. Ideas and 
therefore the ability to create are bound up with the 
ability to know, that is, the ability to gain articulable 
insights into reality. These insights appear in many 
different forms and are open to at least as many 
different modes of interpretation. Camus, as journalist, 
novelist, philosopher, playwright, and essayist, uses the 
several different forms of literary expression to 
articulate and examine his own insights. Articulation of 
the insight and identifying the form that articulation 
should take is impossible without the recognition that 
one has experienced something that needs articulation.
The ability to recognize accompanied by the impulse to 
expression is what Camus calls "lucidity."101
101The term appears in both extended philosophical 
essays The Mvth of Sisyphus and the later The Rebel.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
The human capacity to know depends upon the 
possession of a kind of openness to experience that Camus 
understood as "lucidity.” "Everything begins," he writes 
in The Mvth of Sisyphus, "with a lucid indifference."102 
For Camus, lucid indifference is the indifference that 
accompanies the inevitability of death. It is not 
despair but acceptance. It entails the kind of 
psychological distance that can demand an explanation for 
human suffering without believing that suffering can be 
ultimately eradicated. Lucid indifference characterizes 
this orientation of openness to human experience.
Because it is human, this orientation is geared to 
problem-solving, so the sufferings of human beings cannot 
go unaddressed. Creating workable responses to hunger, 
pain, tyranny and other forms of human suffering and 
oppression requires the insight gained through lucidity.
Confronting injustice, and by implication positing 
an idea of the just, requires vision and the impulse to 
address creatively the source of the injustice. "Of all 
the schools of patience and lucidity," for Camus, 
"creation is the most effective."103 Lucidity lies at 
the heart of Camus's conception of knowing. It is the 
driving force in the creative process, but defies precise
102Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 94.
103Ibid., 115.
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definition. Camus's idea of lucidity is informed by his 
immanent sense of grace. In his thought, lucidity is a 
sort of wisdom, barely rational and quite intuitive, but 
no less a component of experience. Lucidity is insight 
and vision, but it is more. It is an experience that 
impels the human being to creative action in the 
community. "In other words," Camus wrote, at the very
moment when the creative being "chooses to share the fate 
of all, he asserts the individual he is."104
The lucid encounter with reality impels the creative 
being to demand an affirmation of human self-hood and 
dignity from an otherwise indifferent (absurd) reality. 
Action on the impulse requires rational freedom, but it 
is not strictly rational. "In the time of the absurd 
reasoning," Camus writes in The Mvth of Sisyphus, 
"creation follows indifference and discovery. It marks 
the point from which absurd passions spring and where the 
reasoning stops."105 In the moment of lucidity, the 
actor intuits that existence owes humanity some 
affirmation of its dignity. Once experienced, the actor 
constantly seeks more lucid insight into (or encounters
104Camus, "The Artist and His Time: Create
Dangerously," in Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 266. 
Camus here is referring specifically to the artist, but, 
as we will see, he refers by analogy to the creative 
actor in the world.
105Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 95.
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with) reality. This the actor can do only through 
repeated attempts at creative articulation of the 
experience. Inevitably finding the articulation exhibits 
an incomplete understanding, the actor is motivated to 
rearticulate the experience. The quantitative desire for 
greater understanding (rearticulation) is Camus's "ethic 
of quantity" commentators find in The Mvth of 
Sisyphus.106 Far from a nihilist indulgence concerned 
only with pleasurable sense experience, however, the 
ethic of quantity is the demand for a more complete 
understanding. The ethic of quantity, the need to 
rearticulate the lucid encounter with reality, is for 
Camus the dynamic of knowing and the root of ethical 
action in the world.
Camus's sense of knowing turns on a reorientation 
towards the human experience. Human beings must be open 
to reality in all its beauty and power, in all its grace 
and terror. Ethically, as will be discussed in the 
balance of this essay, human beings must be suspicious of 
consolation. As evidenced by the rational constructs
106See Sprintzen, Camus: Bree, Camus; John 
Cruikshank, Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); David Denton,
The Philosophy of Albert Camus: A Critical Analysis
(Boston: Prime, 1967); Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt. Camus and
Modern Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992) and Pierce, "Albert Camus: Liberal Moralist," in
Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought.
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Camus critiques and the inevitability of human reason to 
seek comfort in a kind of faith, it is perfectly natural 
for human beings to seek consolation. Camus's conception 
of knowing as an ongoing rearticulation of the human 
experience, however, indicates a basic discomfort with 
the explanations human beings offer for the inexplicable 
in that experience. Ordering reality is necessary 
insofar as it enables human beings to make sense and use 
of that reality. In the reorientation to knowledge that 
Camus suggests, human beings must remain ever mindful of 
the contingency of that reality and of the order which 
the mind imposes upon it.
IV. Conclusion: Knowing and the Beginning of Politics
The two perspectives on knowing exhibited in the 
thought of Weil and Camus differ radically in their 
presuppositions. On the one hand, Weil's epistemology is 
firmly grounded in metaphysics, dependent upon the divine 
act of creation and the residual presence of decreated 
reality. On the other, Camus's perspective on knowing 
issues from his encounter with absurd reality. Devoid of 
a meaningful conception of God, Camus's perspective is no 
less dependent on a universalized conception of what 
makes us human beings. Beyond their differing 
presuppositions, however, a markedly similar response to 
created reality emerges in their separate considerations
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of knowing. The shared response has two components. The 
first is a suspicion of totalizing intellectual 
constructs. The second is the belief that an 
understanding of reason that denigrates imagination is 
dangerous. These two tendencies form the core of their 
separate discussions of knowing and, as will be seen in 
Chapter Two, make up the beginning of their critique of 
modern politics.
For both Weil and Camus human knowing was limited to 
human perceptions in created or absurd reality. The 
error of the last two centuries of human inquiry had been 
precisely in forgetting this crucial limitation. Human 
beings often experience created or absurd reality as 
chaotic and arbitrary, only occasionally as something 
which can be ordered by laws and theorems. For the most 
part, the world as we experience it is composed of matter 
in motion, fundamentally indifferent to human moral 
strictures and a constant challenge for human 
intellectual structures. Drawing upon a natural human 
need to order chaotic reality, human beings used their 
reason to impose order upon and render useful the 
elements of that reality. Negotiating human existence, 
that is, human relationships with nature and with other 
human beings, requires that the mind somehow make the 
world intelligible. It is when the human mind
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substitutes the symbols with which it makes existence 
intelligible for the reality itself, that is, when human 
beings cease learning from nature in order to concentrate 
on what is already "known," that they fall prey to what 
Camus calls "eluding." The mental leap that eluding 
entails is the only way human beings can know or 
articulate truth, but it comes at the cost of losing 
perspective on the contingency of reality. For Weil and 
Camus, recasting politics requires that this perspective 
is restored to human knowing.
Much as their diagnoses of the problem of knowing 
are similar, the responses of Weil and Camus are, in a 
general way, similar. Owing to the influence of Bergson, 
both want to supplement, not replace, the modern 
understanding of human reason with other forms of 
cognition. For Weil, reason may be supplemented by human 
intuition and the imagination drawn from the divine or 
decreated part of every human soul. Reason so conceived 
requires an orientation toward knowing that does not fear 
the intuited self-evidence of what she calls "simple 
ideas" merely because those ideas cannot be explained 
fully. As discrete entities, these simple ideas are 
inadequate to constitute knowledge. Weil's conception of 
human knowing also requires the discipline imaginatively 
to add those simple ideas together to form series. The
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series they produce must then be useful in describing the 
human relationship to nature. This imaginative addition, 
which she calls ''intellectual attention," stops well 
short of fantasy and stops long before it calls on the 
individual to " re-create the world.1 Human knowing 
always operates in the realm of thought for Weil. When 
human beings apply their ideas to the world, those ideas 
are transformed into action and the limits of human power 
are realized. The limits of human power, then, mark the 
limits of the applicability of human reason. For Weil, 
these limits find their intellectual representation in 
physics. There are physical limits (e.g., "gravity") 
which human beings simply cannot transgress without the 
help of machines. The application of human reason to the 
world as a tool, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, 
is what Weil calls "work."
For Camus, the human encounter with the absurdity of 
reality, the human inability to find solace, requires 
that human beings recast their orientation to human 
reason. Like Weil, he wants to restore the imaginative 
component to the understanding of human reason in order 
to broaden the means of expression. Only by restoring 
imagination can what has become an all too mechanical 
conception of knowing be humanized. Mechanized reason, 
Camus argues in The Rebel, greases its wheels with the
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blood of human beings. The problem is that Camus, unlike 
Weil, cannot seek the source of imagination in a
conception of the divine. Lacking a belief in God, he
cannot deal in a transcendence that is made up of
something besides human beings. Instead, he finds the 
source of imagination in the possibility and limit that 
all human beings hold in common: the joy of life and the
absurd inevitability of death. Once life is pursued 
fully reconciled to death, a perspective on our own 
existence is gained that no fictional totality can 
provide. This perspective engenders the awareness that 
no truth is ultimate and that human happiness must be 
sought if human beings are to retain the dignity that is 
their birthright. The value of what is known is 
dependent upon maintaining this perspective. Camus found 
a model for attaining this perspective in his artist's 
orientation to the world. As will be seen in Chapter 
Three, the creative being's temperament makes truths 
accessible as temporary embodiments in works of human 
beauty and makes a living human justice possible.
The refashioned conceptions of human knowing found 
in the thought of Weil and Camus each entail a kind of 
distance. For Weil that distance requires confronting 
the objects of knowledge from the level of the 
"impersonal." For Camus, the act of knowing entails the
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application of the artist's "lucid indifference." For 
both thinkers, these perspectives are diagnostic tools 
and necessary preludes to ethical action in the world. 
Before this discussion can proceed to the character of 
ethical action, the next chapter must trace their 
respective diagnoses of the defects of modern social and 
political order.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CONTEXT OF POLITICS:
NECESSITY/ POWER AND FORCE
I. Introduction
In their discussions of knowing, Weil and Camus each 
recognized that any critical reconstruction of reality 
that imposes order where there is none does violence to 
the human experience of that reality. The ordering 
impulse, however, is an everpresent component of human 
being. Ordering to gain a functional understanding of 
reality is a necessary step in problem-solving. The 
human ability to reason finds its value in this problem­
solving capacity. Ordering becomes dangerous when that 
perceived order is substituted or mistaken for truth or 
reality. Truth claims justify dismissing or destroying 
elements of reality that do not conform to their visions. 
Such a dismissal, whether mental or material, reguires 
the use of a kind of violence that Weil and Camus both 
find incompatible with authentic human existence.
Weil and Camus knew that the violent reality 
confronting the twentieth century human being was but a 
distorted reflection of the human encounter with the
69
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natural world. Reorienting human beings in their 
relationship to that reality assumed primary significance 
for both thinkers. The post-Enlightenment conceit of 
human beings as potential masters of nature was 
dangerous. Nature must be recognized for what it is: 
the unpredictable environment in which all human activity 
takes place. Weil called this environment "necessity," 
the God-created realm of matter and motion of which human 
beings are part and to which they are subject. In their 
scientific investigations, human beings perceived a kind 
of moral disinterest in necessity's functioning which 
they tried to imitate and call objectivity. This 
objectivity had become a disastrous ethical model for 
modern human beings. Weil believed that this moral 
disinterest was a human perception. The moral 
indifference of necessity was an interpretation of our 
encounter with reality that Weil could not reconcile with 
her conception of a world created by a loving God. Her 
ethical thought is an attempt to bridge the gap between a 
reality that appears morally indifferent and a political 
world to which human beings must respond ethically.
Camus faced a similar dilemma from a different 
perspective. He too confronted a natural world that 
appeared morally disinterested. The human encounter with 
the natural world could be violent, beautiful, terrifying
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or inspirational. What ethical imperative could be drawn 
from such a mix? There was no God existent in the 
background compelling human beings to act ethically out 
of gratitude or a sense of grace. Yet in the beauty of 
the natural world and in the need of human beings to live 
together, Camus discerned the possibility for ethics.
His task was seeking a principle which compelled human 
beings to act ethically in the absence of the divine.
The discrepancy between this need to act ethically and 
the apparent indifference of nature is what Camus 
understood as the absurd. Weil and Camus posited the 
relationship to the natural world as critical to 
understanding human behavior, and from this relationship 
they each derived remarkably similar questions and 
insights about ethics and politics.
II. Necessity: Order, Violence and Indifference
Weil and Camus worked from the shared premise that 
modern political reality was material in character. As a 
consequence, the human capacity to reshape political 
existence depended upon bringing non-material elements to 
bear on this reality. These non-material elements, of 
which thought, imagination and human creative capacities 
are good examples, inevitably expose the limitations of 
materialism. It is all too human to want to minimize 
these limitations through human knowing, the process of
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ordering material reality and making it comprehensible 
and useful. But this ordering always takes place within 
a larger context, the larger natural world whose beauty 
and violence often defy the ordering impulse. This 
larger unpredictable world forms the context of politics 
for both Weil and Camus. Camus explored this context 
through his investigation of the absurd. His fiction is 
crucial in that exploration. It is Weil, however, who 
gives the name necessity to this context, and suggests 
mapping it as a prelude to understanding political 
reality.
Weil's Necessity
Weil uses "necessity" as a blanket term to cover the 
complexities of created existence. Her references to 
necessity can be confusing. On the one hand, she refers 
to created reality itself as necessity and, on the other, 
believes that created reality is governed by mathematical 
necessity.1 Further, any one of a number of human
1To illustrate, Weil wrote in "Draft for a Statement 
of Human Obligations" that "The reality of this world is 
necessity. The part of man which is in this world is the 
part which is in bondage to necessity and subject to the 
misery of need" in Selected Essays. 221. Of mathematical 
necessity Weil wrote in the essay on the Pythagorean 
Doctrine: "Necessity is constituted for us by the 
quantitative laws of variation in the appearances. Where 
there is, strictly speaking, no quantity, there is 
something analogous; a quantitative law of variation, 
that is a function. Function is what the Greeks called 
number or relationship, arithmos or logos, and it is also 
this which constitutes limit" in Intimations of
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endeavors each exhibit their own necessity. At various 
places in her work she identifies mathematical necessity, 
economic necessity, political necessity, the necessity of 
power, the necessity of war and the necessity of peace.2 
From the free use she makes of the term, it is clear 
that, for Weil, interaction with necessity defines 
mundane human existence. Any discussion of Weil's 
political thought must begin, therefore, by unravelling 
her notion of necessity.
Necessity as the God-created arrangement of the 
world, Weil writes, "constitutes an order whereby each 
thing, being in its place, permits all other things to 
exist."3 Necessity is the interconnected wholeness 
existent among the elements of nature. It is this 
wholeness that science seeks to uncover. Necessity 
challenges science by manifesting itself in the natural 
world as volatility, violent and arbitrary one moment,
Christianity. 179.
Respectively, for mathematical necessity see the 
essay on "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of 
Christianity. 179; for the necessities of economics and 
politics, see Oppression and Liberty; for the necessity 
of power, see "The Power of Words" in Selected Essays. 
168; for the necessity of war, see Iliad or the Poem of 
Force. translated by Mary McCarthy (Wallingford, PA: 
Pendle Hill Publications, 1956), 21; for the necessity of 
love, see the essay on "The Pythagorean Doctrine," 181.
3Weil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of 
Christianity. 185.
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beautiful and forgiving the next, and often all of these 
at once. Human beings try to shield themselves from this 
volatility by making it intelligible and articulable, 
that is, by scientific investigation and fabrication. To 
make sense of this volatile reality, science discerns 
tendencies and posits laws and maxims concerning what is 
observed. Given the limitations of human knowing and the 
inevitability of new experience, these findings are 
always subject to revision. This fluidity in human 
knowledge is as it should be. Confronting nature as an 
adversarial or coercive presence, however, is dangerous. 
It places the human being outside of nature and poses 
necessity as something to be overcome, not embraced as 
the human context.
Human beings cannot fully comprehend necessity.
Human knowing can provide insights into its functioning, 
with mathematics (exhibited in geometry and physics) 
being the best model of that.4 Each human activity, 
however, has its own necessity, that is, each has 
contingent elements that must be present and ordered in a 
certain way for that activity to occur. The basic 
observable characteristics of necessity were the 
effortlessness with which its presence is manifest and
4See her discussion of mathematical necessity in 
"The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of 
Christianity.
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the apparent moral indifference of that manifestation. 
Weil argued that this moral indifference was not present 
in God's creation, but rather reflected the inadequacy of 
human perception. Failure to make this crucial 
distinction led modern humanity to value its own 
knowledge too highly. Weil cited attempts to discern the 
"natural laws" of economics and politics as giving human 
beings a confidence that what they were articulating 
could not be otherwise. The consequence of this false 
confidence was an ideological disregard for the 
appropriate relationship of means to ends, resulting in 
the atrocious sacrifices Weil saw made for the sake of 
words with "capital letters."5
Misreading the character of necessity, that is, as 
an adversarial or coercive presence to be overcome, had a 
profound impact on the ethical sense of modern humanity. 
The coercive presence of the natural world appeared 
effortless, morally neutral or objective. In its 
apparent neutrality, necessity became a compelling model 
for human behavior after the Enlightenment. The 
imitation of necessity's apparent indifference (i.e.,
5In her essay "The Power of Words" (1937), Weil 
writes: "For our contemporaries the role of Helen is
played by words with capital letters. If we grasp one of 
these words, all swollen with blood and tears, and 
squeeze it, we find it is empty." In Weil, Selected 
Essavs. 1934-1943. 156.
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"objectivity") resulted in attempts to distance the human 
actor from the moral implications of the human act. 
Objectivity justifies the act without demanding 
responsibility for the consequences of the act. This 
kind of justification disregarded concerns about the 
moral efficacy of human acts. "We have understood 
nothing," Weil wrote, "so long as we do not know what 
difference there is, as Plato says, between the essence 
of the necessary and that of the good."6 Necessity is 
the necessary; what is cannot be otherwise. To impute 
value, good or evil, to natural necessity is strictly a 
human imposition. Therein lies the danger inherent in 
the attempt to imitate the apparent objectivity of 
natural necessity. Human beings cannot act without 
reference to a value. Acting with objectivity is not 
possible. Distinguishing between good and evil in human 
action is the ethical obligation of every human being.7 
Weil suggested that a lack of diligence in making this 
distinction in religion, politics, and economics 
accounted for the destructiveness of these activities 
over the course of human history.
^eil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of 
Christianity. 189.
7Simone Weil, The Need for Roots, translated by 
Arthur Wills (New York: Putnam, 1952) and the antecedent
document "Draft for a Statement of Human Obligations" in 
Selected Essavs. 219-227.
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Each human act involves a moral choice, a fact which
is obscured by the pretense to objectivity. The apparent
indifference of necessity, the objective ideal, is not
just an obstacle to human action. While it can be a
hindrance, a more appropriate orientation to natural
necessity could also provide the opportunity for
authentic human freedom:
Living man can on no account cease to be hemmed in 
on all sides by an absolutely inflexible necessity? 
but since he is a thinking creature, he can choose 
between either blindly submitting to the spur with 
which necessity pricks him on from the outside, or 
else adapting himself to the inner representation of 
it that he forms in his own mind; and it is in this 
that the contrast between servitude and liberty 
lies.8
There are three responses to the presence of necessity, 
but only one is compatible with the exercise of human 
freedom. The first is to parrot what has been observed. 
Modern humanity had taken this imitative course, seeking 
the objective ideal in ethics, while ignoring the 
limitations of human perception and action. The second 
response is to withdraw from reality into a mystical or 
nihilist fantasy. This is the approach taken by the 
ideologue. The third approach, Weil's, is to attempt to 
live within the limits of necessity, to address evil with 
reference to the good knowing all the while that the
8Simone Weil, Oppression and Liberty, translated by 
Arthur Wills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953),
86.
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human understanding of these basic concepts is never 
comprehensive.
Weil grounds her idea of consent in this orientation 
to necessity. Living within the limits of necessity 
entails acceptance of the natural world as it is. 
Accepting necessity in all its apparent ambiguity enables 
human beings to choose without reference to changing that 
which cannot be changed. "Necessity is precisely the 
intermediary between our nature and our infinitely small 
faculty of free consent," she writes later, "for our 
nature is submissive to it and our consent accepts it."9 
Necessity is matter in obedience to God, so our consent 
to necessity is our obedience to God. Only in such 
obedience can there be liberty "for to be free for us is 
to desire to obey God. All other liberty is false."10
Natural necessity, then, is the context of political 
life. Embracing it in the manner Weil suggests means the 
human being discerns a harmony of interests with the 
world and with other human beings. The embrace does not 
mean trying to replicate the moral indifference human 
beings perceive in necessity, for God's creation is not 
morally indifferent and human beings cannot be or act
’Weil, "Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of 
Christianity. 185.
10Ibid. , 186.
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with moral disinterest. Rather, Weil's ethical
imperative is that human beings must oppose the evil they
can oppose and accept those elements of necessity that
cannot be changed. There is in the apparent indifference
of natural necessity, however, an analog to just
political action. She writes,
Justice for man presents itself first as a choice, 
choice of the good, rejection of evil. Necessity is 
the absence of choice, indifference. Yet it is the 
principle of coexistence. And basically the supreme 
justice for us is acceptance of the coexistence with 
ourselves of all creatures and all things which make 
up the existent.11
Between the inimitable indifference of necessity and the
inevitable choice required by justice lies the realm of
ethical action. The ethical actor must navigate between
the God-created world and the apparent moral indifference
of the reality discerned by human beings. Weil's
response is to respect the tension revealed in these two
perspectives. As a prelude to speculation on the nature
of politics, she cautions against human arrogance toward
the natural world and encourages the appreciation of the
tension human investigation of the natural world reveals.
nIbid., 189. Compare Weil, "Are We Struggling for 
Justice?" translated by Marina Barabas Philosophical 
Investigations 10:1 (January 1987): 1-10.
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Camus's Absurd Necessity
Weil's conception of necessity as a model of 
"objective” human ethical action finds reflection in 
Camus's conception of the absurd. In his early fiction, 
Camus has his characters confront difficult natural 
environments that color and complicate ethical decision­
making. These depictions demonstrate Camus's need to 
come to grips with the difficulty of making ethical 
decisions and creating justice in the face of an 
apparently indifferent (absurd) reality. Like Weil with 
necessity, Camus recognized that the absurd had become a 
problematic ethical model, and he sought to remedy that 
through his conception of rebellion. The rebellion he 
describes in The Rebel is an ethical manifestation of the 
frustration of human beings in complex situations.12 
Camus fashions rebellion as an attempt to turn that 
frustration into positive action.
Camus recognized rebellion as an ethically 
problematic response to absurdity. Two forms this 
rebellion took in the nineteenth century had been 
catastrophic for the twentieth. Marx and Nietzsche each 
responded to a world without God by trying to reconceive 
God, Marx in history and Nietzsche in the self. Like all 
metaphysical and historical rebels, the two thinkers
12Camus, The Rebel.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8 1
reached beyond their human capacities, attempting to
create a world more intelligible than the absurd one they
inhabited. Of such rebels Camus wrote:
The great rebel thus creates with his own hands, and 
for his own imprisonment, the implacable reign of 
necessity. Once he had escaped from God's prison, 
his first care was to construct the prison of
history and of reason, thus putting the finishing
touch to the camouflage and consecration of the 
nihilism whose conquest he claimed.13
Here Camus echoes Weil: it is in the attempted imitation
of an apparently disinterested necessity that the search
for justice is derailed. The apparent indifference of
necessity manifests itself in the natural world as
sunshine, storms, earthquakes, floods, and plagues. The
apparent effortlessness of these phenomena, however, is
what traps the ambitious rebel into erroneously believing
he can transfigure the world by influencing it in the
same way. The attempt to imitate the absurd, Camus
argues, only further subjects the actor to the absurd
with devastating ethical consequences.
Camus began his interrogation of this dangerous
phenomenon with the figure of the Roman emperor Caligula
in his play of the same name.14 Camus's Caligula mocks
the indifference of the world which has taken the life of
13Ibid. , 80.
14Albert Camus, "Caligula" in Caligula and Three 
Other Plavs. translated by Stuart Gilbert (New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1958).
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his beloved Drusilla. In so doing he takes the role of 
fate or destiny upon himself. Caligula's justice will be 
necessity's apparent justice. "Bring in the condemned 
men," he demands early in the play, "I must have my 
public. Judges, witnesses, accused— all sentenced to 
death without a hearing."15 Caligula executes his 
subjects without cause or warning in imitation of the 
deaths that await all human beings. He creates a social 
and political environment in which natural disasters like 
famine become the object of imperial decree. But this 
emperor is no ordinary tyrant. It is Cherea who 
recognizes the uniqueness of Caligula's project: "You
can take arms against a vulgar tyrant, but cunning is 
needed to fight down disinterested malice. You can only 
urge it on to follow its bent, and bide your time until 
its logic founders in sheer lunacy."16 Caligula's 
intention to imitate necessity's disinterest keeps him 
from becoming a force of necessity himself and "capturing 
the moon." Caligula meets the end of all human beings 
who overreach: he is assassinated, like no more or less
than a "vulgar tyrant." His death cry, "I'm still 
alive," does not indicate the persistence of absurd
15Ibid., 17.
16Ibid., 22.
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necessity, for that is a given.17 Rather, it cautions 
that the human impulse to a tyranny masquerading as 
indifference or disinterest is a permanent part of the 
human experience.
Like a post-Enlightenment scientist, Caligula takes 
on necessity as if it were an opponent to be overcome.
His weapons are what he perceives to be the weapons of 
necessity: absolute power exercised arbitrarily. Yet
Camus's absurd, like Weil's necessity, is the context of 
human life, not an opposition to life. The apparently 
coercive presence of necessity against which Caligula 
rebels is exercised naturally, without discernible will. 
Caligula wants to act without will, naturally, with the 
same power and capriciousness he perceives in necessity. 
As a human being, however, Caligula cannot act without 
will. All his acts are acts of human will and thus lack 
the innocence, even elegance, of necessity. His attempt 
to thus duplicate the indifferent power of necessity 
brings destruction to those he rules and himself.
Camus's art suggest that there is a benignity in nature 
that does not translate to the human relationship with 
the natural world or to human beings' relations with each 
other. Depicting the absurd was a matter of 
communicating this inherently benign character of the
17Ibid., 74.
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natural world and the sometimes absurdly malignant 
consequences of human existence in it.
Caligula makes the mistake of trying to imitate the 
inimitable. As necessity, however, the natural world is 
an ethically ambiguous presence in Camus's fiction. 
Necessity is a stifling atmosphere that seems to restrict 
the ethical options of Camus's characters. For example, 
the sun is the most powerful and oppressive presence in 
The Stranger.18 The chief human presence, Meursault, is 
an incidental presence for much of the first half of the 
novel. It is the sun which occupies a central place in 
the narrative. Only after Meursault's incarceration, 
when he has been taken out of the sun, does Meursault 
become the center of the narrative. Camus's use of the 
sun is not surprising given his strong Neo-Platonic 
roots.19 At a minimum, the sun in Plato's Allegory of 
the Cave represents the highest sort of knowledge, that 
toward which the philosopher is led. The philosopher 
cannot live in the sun, nor can he gaze upon it directly.
18Albert Camus, The Stranger, translated by Matthew 
Ward (New York: Vintage, 1988). The Stranger was a
later manifestation of an idea begun in an earlier 
manuscript that Camus abandoned incomplete. See Camus, A 
Happy Death, translated by Richard Howard (New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1972).
19See Camus's dissertation, "Neo-Platonism and 
Christian Metaphysics," translated in McBride, Albert 
Camus: Philosopher and Litterateur. 77-174.
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He must be led back down into the cave, back into the
world of necessity. The most he can glean from the
presence of the sun is the knowledge that truth exists,
and he should be compelled to take advantage of the
perspective and insight that knowledge imparts. In The
Stranger, Meursault wants to live in the sun, above
necessity, at one with his particular understanding of
truth. He cannot.
Meursault's commitment to his truth proves to be his
downfall. Exceedingly honest about his lack of real
human feeling, Meursault shuns considerations of the
socially appropriate. He refuses the trip back into the
cave and chooses to live in the sun's physical presence.
The sun's presence overwhelms him. At his mother's
funeral, the sun's heat distracts him from the solemnity
of the occasion. Later, on the beach, he loves the feel
of the sun on his skin after a swim. Yet, the sun itself
forces Meursault to deal with life in the cave. In the
fateful confrontation with the Arab on the beach,
The sun was starting to burn my cheeks, and I could 
feel drops of sweat gathering in my eyebrows. The 
sun was the same as it had been the day I buried 
Maman, and like then, my forehead especially was 
hurting me, all the veins in it throbbing under the 
skin. It was this burning, which I couldn't stand 
anymore, that made me move forward. . . . And this 
time, without getting up, the Arab drew his knife 
and held it up to me in the sun. . . . The 
scorching blade slashed at my eyelashes and stabbed 
at my stinging eyes. That's when everything began 
to reel. . . .  My whole being tensed and I squeezed
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my hand around the revolver. The trigger gave; I 
felt the smooth underside of the butt; and there, in 
that noise, sharp and deafening at the same time, is 
where it all started. I shook off the sweat and the 
sun. I knew that I had shattered the harmony of the 
day, the exceptional silence of a beach where I'd 
been happy.20
The sun makes life possible, but it can also be an 
unbearable presence. The light and heat seem to drive 
Meursault to kill the Arab. The sun's presence in The 
Stranger is liberating and oppressive and neither. It 
conveys the sense of natural necessity in all its 
ambiguity. The truth with which Meursault lives is the 
non-human truth of the perceived indifference of 
necessity. When he shows himself indifferent to the 
Arab's life, society shows itself indifferent to his.
Upon his arrest, Meursault is dragged back into the cave 
to await his sentence.
The sun is a persistent symbol, but there are other 
elements of nature in Camus's fiction, like the sea and 
pestilence, that are equally ambiguous representations of 
necessity. In The Plaaue. the sea has a spiritually 
cleansing capacity. Yet in the same work it is also the 
sea which, after the outbreak, isolates Oran from other 
communities of human beings. Similarly, the plague, 
itself a manifestation of necessity, for a time appears 
all-powerful. Its mere presence transforms relationships
20Camus, The Stranger. 58-59.
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among human beings, to their place, and to time. All 
that went before is rendered unintelligible in the midst 
of the plague.21 But the town outlasts the plague and 
when it disappears "normal" life is resumed.
Normalcy itself is a reflection of the absurdity of 
life subject to natural necessity. In The Plaque, a 
"normalcy" returns to the natural world that human beings 
duplicate by falling back into old habits. Habit, for 
Camus, becomes a more subtle form of man-made necessity. 
Modern civilization in Oran is one of habit. Human 
beings habitually proceed as if they were indifferent to 
each other, but there is in that indifference a value.
It is impossible for human beings to live without making 
choices, without positing values. The habits of modern 
Oran have spiritual, social and political consequences 
for its inhabitants. The plague subjugates those old 
habits, but they are gradually replaced by new plague­
time habits. Like other elements of necessity, habit has 
a resilient but ambiguous character. It can be a trap, 
but is also necessary as a human coping mechanism in
21 Albert Camus, The Plaaue. translated by Stuart 
Gilbert (New York: Vintage, 1991 [originally 1948]).
Compare the conduct of daily life in Part One of The 
Placrue before the epidemic to that the narrator describes 
at the beginning of Part Four in the depths of the 
plague.
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Camus's work.22 Habituation is a kind of indifference 
that allows us distance on a dreary or violent existence. 
For instance, it makes Sisyphus's scorn possible.23 
Habit's capacity to render us emotionally or spiritually 
numb can be valuable in circumstances like plague or the 
death of a beloved. Like Meursault's attempt to live 
only in the sun, however, Camus suggests that to live 
only for habit, that is, in apparent imitation of 
necessity, is inhuman and ultimately impossible.
Necessity's function in the work of both Weil and 
Camus is essentially didactic. Its presence should serve 
to remind human beings of their limitations. The attempt 
by human reason to unmask the mysteries of nature, to 
treat the natural world as a puzzle that ultimately can 
be solved, or an opponent to be overcome, obscured a 
truism that both thinkers thought should be preserved: 
though human beings have it in their power to shape their 
environment, that environment never ceases shaping human 
existence. Unlike human actions, necessity is morally
22In The Plaque, their habits help the inhabitants 
of Oran cope with the daily horror of life amidst the 
plague, but also kept them at a distance from their 
spiritual needs before the outbreak. In The Stranger, 
his habits allow Meursault to exist independent of real 
human emotion until his murderous act breaks the harmony 
of the day. Habit is a kind of rhythm in Camus's fiction 
that can be valuable as well as stultifying.
^Camus explores these aspects of the absurd in the 
philosophical essay The Mvth of Sisyphus.
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benign and lacks will. Necessity is simultaneously 
beautiful, deadly powerful, and indifferent to human 
conceptions of good and evil. The indifference of 
necessity, its ethical objectivity, makes it a compelling 
model for human behavior, a model for ethics beyond good 
and evil. The human propensity to create these models 
were the focus of Nietzsche's diagnosis. Weil and Camus 
each recognized that it was this temptation wrapped in 
the cloak of power to which several tyrants in the 
twentieth century fell.
III. Power and the Problem of Oppression
The ethical appeal of necessity's apparent 
indifference finds dangerous reflection in the 
institutional arrangements of human civilization. As 
human constructs, institutional arrangements can only 
aspire to the impartiality exhibited by necessity. Weil 
and Camus each acknowledged that institutions give 
structure and order to our civilization, but both feared 
the power thereby vested in these institutions.24 
Because our institutions, whether political 
(legislatures, laws) or cultural (rituals, customs), are 
human constructs, they are insufficiently motivated or
24For both thinkers, the presence of an objective 
"science" of politics, justifying these institutional 
arrangements as natural, contributed to this basic 
distrust of institutions and the conceits of human 
knowledge.
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equipped to be self-regulating. Institutions left 
unattended yield the possibility of tyranny, that is, the 
possibility that their power will be usurped by an 
ambitious individual or group. To Weil and Camus, 
leaving this possibility unchecked was a fundamental flaw 
of twentieth century politics.
Weil's concern was the effect of institutional power 
on the human spirit. In her early work she uses Marx's 
methodology in order to unmask the socially oppressive 
power concealed by contemporary political and economic 
institutions.25 Weil recognizes that power serves only 
itself. All who come in contact with power, either as 
wielders or subjects, are susceptible to its debilitating 
effects. Camus found oppression in institutional
25See for example Weil, "Critical Examination of the 
Ideas of Revolution and Progress" in Oppression and 
Liberty. 134-40; "The Great Beast: Reflections on the
Origins of Hitlerism" in Selected Essays. 89-140; "Is 
There a Marxist Doctrine?" in Oppression and Liberty. 
169-95; "Prospects: Are We Heading for the Proletarian
Revolution?" in Oppression and Liberty. 1-24;
"Reflections concerning Technocracy, National-socialism, 
the U.S.S.R. and certain other matters" in Oppression and 
Liberty. 25-9. The secondary literature on Weil's 
Marxist influence is extensive. The most thorough book- 
length studies are Lawrence A. Blum and Victor J.
Seidler, A Truer Liberty; Simone Weil and Marxism (New 
York and London: Routledge, 1989) and David McLellan, 
Utopian Pessimist. See also Dietz, Between the Human and 
the Divine, especially Chapter 3; and Staughton Lynd, 
"Marxism-Leninism and the Language of Politics Magazine: 
The First New Left...and the Third" in George Abbott 
White, editor, Simone Weil: Interpretations of a Life
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981), lll-
36.
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arrangements, and he, like Weil, is convinced of our need 
for them. In his fiction, however, he depicts the 
limitations of political and cultural institutions, 
underscoring their limited responsiveness to the needs of 
individuals and their vulnerability to abuse. Power, in 
Camus's work, is the inevitable product of all 
institutional arrangements and though his literary 
approach differs from Weil's philosophical approach, they 
both recognize power as the core of institutional 
relationships and as the root problem of institutional 
politics.
Weil: Power, Marx and Institutional order
Necessity exerts an influence through the natural 
world that can appear benign or coercive to human beings. 
Human political relationships, at both the institutional 
and the interpersonal levels, reflect this human 
encounter with the apparently capricious environment that 
is necessity. The coercive power manifest in human 
relationships reflects the coercive presence of 
necessity. Weil discerns two categories of this coercive 
power in human relationships. She calls the coercive 
component in interpersonal relationships "force" and the 
coercive component of human institutional relationships 
"power." Though they differ in character it is important
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to remember that they derive from the same phenomenon: 
the human encounter with necessity.
Weil distinguishes force from power in the following 
way: "Power, by definition, is only a means, or to put
it better, to possess a power is simply to possess a 
means of action which exceeds the very limited force that 
a single individual has at his disposal.1,26 Power, 
thus, is the potentially oppressive ability to command 
another individual's disposition of force. Weil's 
understanding of power took shape as an analysis of 
institutional oppression. In her early essay Oppression 
and Liberty. Weil borrowed from the Marxist critique of 
socially oppressive structures, concerning herself with 
the effects of structural oppression on the human 
spirit.27 Human beings attempt to shield themselves 
from the capriciousness of necessity with structures or 
institutions.28 But these structures become founts of 
power in themselves and breed oppression. "Wherever in 
the struggle against man or nature," Weil writes,
26Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 69.
27Weil, Oppression and Liberty.
28A number of scholars have labelled Weil's early 
concern with institutional relationships "functional 
sociology." See the discussions in Pierce, "Simone Weil: 
Sociology, Utopia and Faith" in Contemporary French 
Political Thought: McLellan, Utopian Pessimist; and 
Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine.
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"efforts need to be multiplied and coordinated to be 
effective, coordination becomes the monopoly of a few 
leaders as soon as it reaches a certain degree of 
complexity."29 With this centralization, the power 
exerted by these institutions may be manipulated and 
abused. Power means the ability to command the 
disposition of force. This ability to command usually 
relies on coercion and a material superiority. Power 
that depends upon the control of matter, argues Weil, is 
unstable. The exercise of power, determined by the 
possession or lack of possession of the material wealth 
of society, arbitrarily divides that society into those 
who command and those who obey with the result that "the 
whole of social life is governed by the struggle for 
power, and the struggle for subsistence only enters in as 
one factor, indispensable to be sure, of the former."30
The recognition of the dialectical relationship of 
power to the possession of material wealth belies Weil's 
early debt to Marx who also found the source of 
oppression in the material arrangement of society. Weil, 
like Camus and many of their contemporaries, found the 
spirit of Marx's project compelling, but his theoretical 
inadequacies impossible to ignore. "Marx, it is true,
^eil, Oppression and Liberty. 64-65.
30Ibid., 71.
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never had any other motive except a generous yearning 
after liberty and equality,” Weil writes, "but this 
yearning, once separated from the materialistic religion 
with which it was merged in his mind, no longer belongs 
to anything except what Marx contemptuously called 
utopian socialism.1,31 In his desire to transform 
material reality into a less oppressive form, Marx 
inverted the Hegelian fallacy and attributed the 
qualities of mind to matter. He put his faith in 
material transformation of their environment to save 
human beings from themselves. "Marx's truly great idea," 
Weil argues, "is that in human society as well as in 
nature nothing takes place otherwise than through 
material transformations."32 In his revolutionary 
thought, however, Marx had abandoned his otherwise useful 
materialist method. Weil sought to reclaim Marx's method 
and to focus on the conditions and limits indigenous to 
human culture.
Weil's misgivings about Marx's conflation of mind 
and matter derive from his revolutionary goal: the
emancipation, not of human beings, but of the forces of 
production. Through his "scientific method," Marx 
believed that a modern technique (emancipated production)
31Ibid., 45.
32Ibid., 45.
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would liberate humanity. Weil argues that Marx's faith
in modern technique reveals his dependence upon the
methods of the capitalist system he so wishes to see
dismantled. She argues of Marx:
In his view, modern technique, once freed from 
capitalist forms of economy, can give men, here and 
now, sufficient leisure to enable them to develop 
their faculties harmoniously, and consequently bring 
about the disappearance, to a certain extent, of the 
degrading specialization created by capitalism; and 
above all the further development of technique must 
lighten more and more, day by day, the burden of 
material necessity, and as an immediate consequence 
that of social constraint, until humanity reaches at 
last a truly paradisal state in which the most 
abundant production would be at the cost of a 
trifling expenditure of effort and the ancient curse 
of work would be lifted; in short, in which the 
happiness of Adam and Eve before the fall would be 
regained.33
Capitalism is dependent on a technique, the division of 
labor, which subjugates the needs of human beings to the 
needs of the "naturally" functioning market. Marx, Weil 
shows, simply intended to replace one technique with 
another. Productive forces may be liberated, she argues, 
but human beings will still be imprisoned in their 
discrete, spiritually vacuous tasks.
By invoking the Adam and Eve story, Weil underscores 
her understanding of the mythopoeic character of Marx's 
analysis. She also reveals her suspicion of his faith in
33Ibid., 43.
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technique.34 Marx imaginatively assumes that there is 
some secret, intrinsic virtue to productive forces that 
will enable human beings to overcome the obstacles of the 
material world. Attributing the imaginative qualities of 
mind to matter makes this assumption possible. While 
Weil believes that a certain kind of imagination serves 
humanity well, Marx's imagination, which he calls 
"science," yields a dialectic the function of which is 
the ceaseless improvement of modes of production. This 
ideal of material progress Weil finds incompatible with 
respecting the limits of human capabilities. Ironically, 
Marx's unceasing aspiration to improve production mirrors 
the aspiration to efficiency that forms the very core of 
capitalism. In Marx's thought the aspiration is a faith 
in the liberation of productive forces and results in a 
kind of religion. "The term religion may seem surprising 
in connection with Marx," Weil writes, "but to believe 
that our will coincides with a mysterious will which is 
at work in the universe and helps us to conquer is to 
think religiously, to believe in Providence."35
^Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Mvth in Karl Marx 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961) and David
McLellan's "Introduction" to Karl Marx, The Grundrisse 
(New York: Harper, 1971) both make this point forcefully 
and persuasively.
35Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 44.
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The problem of the present order, as Weil diagnosed 
it, was that human beings had been made to adapt to the 
needs of instruments (like technique) originally created 
to serve them. Weil later felt the physical consequences 
of this as a laborer in various factories. A preliminary 
solution, she argues, is to have techniques, including 
instruments of labor and governance, adapted to the needs 
of human beings. She wondered whether "it is possible to 
conceive of an organization of production which though 
powerless to remove the necessities imposed by nature and 
the social constraint arising therefrom, would enable 
these at any rate to be exercised without grinding down 
souls and bodies under oppression."36 Weil never 
believed that reorganizing production would completely 
liberate human beings from oppression. Human community 
inevitably requires some constraint. She did think that 
reorganizing production could make human existence less 
physically and spiritually debilitating. Though her 
emphasis changed in her later work, the well-being of 
those "souls and bodies" remained Weil's focus in her 
social and political thought. The ambiguity of human 
nature dictates the need for governing political, social 
and economic structures. The task was to bring those
^Ibid., 56.
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structures in line with the needs of human beings qua 
human beings.
Weil concedes that power is the inevitable residue 
of the functioning of social and political institutions. 
Limiting that power, especially in its negative effects, 
was the responsibility of both those subject to it and 
those wielding it. Limiting power in the social sphere 
is the province of the individual human being who through 
reason possesses the capacity for autonomy. Weil thought 
Marx bequeathed modern humanity a useful starting point: 
the conditions of existence do determine the limits and 
methods of social reform. Human beings must, Weil 
believed, seek social evolution in the daily efforts of 
the individual human being, mindful of the limits 
represented by human nature, temperament, education, 
routine, customs, practice, natural or acquired needs, 
and environment.37 In short, human beings must remain 
mindful of their relationship to nature and suspicious of 
the project of mastering it.
Growing knowledge of the natural environment coupled 
with the human ability to convert simple ideas into tools 
to maximize labor made nature more useful but also 
stripped it of its divine character. When this happens, 
the ignored divinity takes more of a human shape, and
37Ibid. , 59.
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human beings falsely declare themselves emancipated from 
nature's dominion. But that emancipation is only an 
appearance. Human beings must eat, sleep and reproduce 
and so remain subject to immediate natural necessity. In
"mastering" nature, however, human beings had learned the
lessons of necessity well. Their social relationships 
have come to mirror the appearance of necessity. But 
while the relationships of necessity are ruled by a 
disinterested influence, those of the social order 
modelled on necessity can only be ruled by directed power 
or force. To the degree that humanity is no longer 
harried by nature, Weil argues, "man escapes to a certain 
extent from the caprices of blind nature only by handing 
himself over to the no less blind caprices of the 
struggle for power."38
Power is the non-physical material substance of 
human society exercised by material means.39 Though the 
exercise of power is limited by the material conditions 
from which it issues, power, by its nature, seeks to
M Ibid., 83.
39In his work on Weil, David McLellan aptly 
describes force as a kind of "non-physical matter" whose 
chief characteristic, we might add, is movement. See 
McLellan, Utopian Pessimist. 75. The concept of "non­
physical" matter is a difficult one, but essential to 
understanding Weil's thought. A non-political example 
might be the way we sometimes think of love as a thing we 
are in or not.
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transform those material conditions. Beyond this, power 
seeks its own self-preservation and can only do that 
through expansion. To expand, it must increase the 
amount and quality of material available to it. Several 
loci of power attempting to preserve themselves at the 
same time create an atmosphere of competition very much 
akin to war. Weil argues that this atmosphere of war is 
inevitable because every power consciously strives to do 
three things: 1) to improve production and control in
its own sphere; 2) to limit or destroy its competitors;
3) to extend to the farthest possible limit the social 
relations on which it is based.40 If Weil is right and 
the problems of the social order are tied to the exercise 
of power, then those problems cannot be addressed without 
adjusting the way power is viewed. Nineteenth century 
notions of progress lacked an appropriate understanding 
of the nature of power. A system based on power will 
only create new resources for its own expansion, not for 
some utopian transformation at the end of history.41
"In general," Weil writes, "one can only regard the 
world in which we live as subject to laws if one admits 
that every phenomenon in it is limited; and it is the
40Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 72.
41Ibid., 73-75.
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same for the phenomenon of power, as Plato 
understood."42 The arbitrary exercise of power ignores 
this limitation. It is in the nature of power to seek 
its own growth. Power cannot be expected to regulate 
itself. In competition with other loci of power it 
reaches beyond the limits of what it can effectively 
control. This internal contradiction is the seed of 
destruction carried by all oppressive power-based 
systems.43 There is, then, a fundamental opposition 
between the limited material bases of power and the 
unlimited character of the race for power considered as a 
relationship among human institutions.44 The human 
drive to acquire power eventually outstrips the limited 
material bases of power with cataclysmic results. 
Primitive man was a slave to necessity. Now, Weil 
writes, "collective dominion transforms itself into 
servitude as soon as one descends to the scale of the 
individual, and into a servitude fairly closely 
resembling that associated with the primitive conditions 
of existence.1,45 The lesson to be learned, argues Weil, 
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are still subject to an even more exacting necessity than 
that found in nature. They are subject to the human-made 
necessity of power.46
Camus: The Limits of Power— Ritual and Institutions
Like Weil, Camus distrusted institutional 
arrangements and the power they wielded, but he could not 
envision human society without them. The fragility of 
human existence required the protective devices embodied 
in social institutions like governing structures and 
rituals. These structures and rituals are the vessels in 
which the substance of a civilization are borne. They 
embody the principles upon which society is based.
Ritual acts, from political rituals like jury trials and 
voting to more basic communal rituals like burial, are a 
renewed public recognition of those principles.47 In
46Ibid., 83.
47See David I. Kertzer, Ritual. Politics and Power 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). The
scholarship on the relation of ritual to politics is 
extensive. See, for example, the discussions in Murray 
Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1964); David Kowalewski, 
"The Protest Uses of Symbolic Politics: The Mobilization
Functions of Protester Symbolic Resources," Social 
Science Quarterly. Volume 61 (1980): 95-113 and J.G.A. 
Pocock, "Ritual, Language, Power: An Essay on the
Apparent Meanings of Ancient Chinese Philosophy," 
Political Science. Volume 16 (1964): 3-31. For the 
problem of the use of the term "ritual" see, for example, 
Jack Goody, "Against 'Ritual': Loosely Structured
Thoughts on a Loosely Defined Topic," in Sally F. Moore 
and Barbara G. Meyerhoff, eds., Secular Ritual (Assen:
Van Gorcum, 1977), 25-35.
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Camus's novels, he uses ritual to demonstrate the 
emergence of the unsatisfactory use of a political power 
that eschews considerations of meaning for those of 
material control over its subjects.
Rituals, especially those having to do with the 
disposition of the dead, appear in Camus's work as a 
reminder that a community cannot derive its identity only 
from its political structures. Camus suggests that in 
extraordinary circumstances the institutions and rituals 
of the political order overwhelm and supplant elder 
communal rituals. In these circumstances, communities 
must define themselves by the political power they wield 
and find they have nothing to fall back on when that 
power is inadequate to the task before it. In the 
abrogation of the ritual, the meaning upon which 
political authority is based has been abrogated out of 
existence.
Besides being repositories of meaning, rituals have 
another function. They can be made to serve society's 
interest by defining "norms" and justifying their 
enforcement.48 This punitive-preservational function
^ h i s  is an implied concern of Emile Durkheim, The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life, translated by Joseph 
Swain (Glencoe: Free, Press, 1974). See also Kertzer,
Ritual. Politics, and Power and Sean Wilentz, editor, 
Rites of Power: Symbolism. Ritual and Politics Since the
Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1985).
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renders ritual susceptible to manipulation. Camus 
portrayed this manipulation in his fiction, suggesting 
that ritual meaning can be abrogated under the aegis of 
the legitimacy granted governing authority. In 
abrogating communal rituals, political power endangers 
communal meaning. Such power must necessarily become 
coercive and, as suggested above, it must undercut 
itself.
In his early novels The Stranger and The Plaaue. one 
ritual in particular, the funeral, concerns Camus.49 
That the disposition of the human body is very important 
to Camus reflects his orientation to the natural world. 
His affection for the physical aspects of human existence 
and his indifference to the question of an existence 
after death made the fate of the physical self critical. 
For Camus, the body shown reverence in life is worthy of 
similar reverence in death. Lack of respect for the 
physical self becomes, for Camus, an indication of the 
state of civilization and a commentary on its use of 
power. There are two central funeral images in Camus's 
work: the funeral of Meursault's mother at the beginning
of The Stranger and the apparent digression on burials in
49Camus, The Stranger and Camus, The Plaque.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 5
Part Three of The Placrue.50 An examination of these 
images as confrontations between communal meaning and 
political power shed light on Camus's understanding of 
the dangers of modern conceptions of political power.
In The Stranger, the funeral is used as a coercive 
tool by authorities seeking Meursault's conviction for 
murder. Meursault's disinterest in his mother's funeral 
is the crime for which he will really be convicted and 
sentenced to death in the novel. His weapon is not the 
gun he uses to kill the Arab, but the cold indifference 
with which he kills expectations of human emotion. The 
novel's famous first line demonstrates: "Maman died
today. Or yesterday maybe, I don't know."51 
Meursault's is an indifference not born of cruelty, but 
rather of his own unwillingness to lie to himself for the 
sake of public appearances or for the comfort of 
others.52 He refuses to express a sense of loss that he 
does not feel, but by doing so places himself outside of 
the community, which rituals like the funeral are
50Camus, The Stranger. 3-14 and Camus, The Plaaue. 
165-185.
51Camus, The Stranger. 3.
52For a good cross-section of commentary on The 
Stranger see Adele King, editor, Camus's L'Etranaer:
Fifty Years on (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) and
the older, but still useful essays in Germaine Bree,
Camus: A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962).
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supposed to sustain. The funeral, a ritual designed to 
honor the dead, to console the living and to allow one to 
publicly make peace with the death of a loved one, is for 
Meursault not a source of consolation but rather a 
necessary chore. Viewing the body, conversing with the 
funeral director, the long, hot walk to the burial site, 
and the sweating undertaker's helper are all part of the 
oppressive environment of the funeral Meursault endures 
with a studied lack of interest.
Meursault's indifference is viewed as inappropriate, 
even, as the reader later learns, dangerous. Certainly 
his murder of the Arab validates the view that 
indifference like Meursault's can be dangerous. But 
here, as later at his interrogation and trial, a 
structure, the funeral ritual, interposed between 
Meursault and the accepted mores of society, fails. Much 
is made at trial of Meursault's cool disinterest in his 
mother's funeral. This "evidence" is supposed to reveal 
the character of a man the judge calls "Monsieur 
Antichrist" each day after questioning him. Since the 
funeral ritual cannot glean the appropriate response out 
of Meursault's indifference, political authority sees fit 
to use the funeral, despite its religious significance, 
for social coercion, as a manifestation of societal power 
and judgment. In this respect the ritual is compromised
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by the authorities either to try to coax some 
"acceptable" response from Meursault or to bring him to 
j udgment.
Meursault's response to the funeral ritual calls 
into question the adequacy of the ritual to serve its 
function in this social environment. That it fails to 
elicit the appropriate response from Meursault is 
troubling but not decisive. Camus implies that a 
responsive social order would have recognized his lack of 
a need for consolation, honored the dead, and not held 
Meursault accountable for the way he mourned. While 
society cannot be disinterested about its rituals, it 
must be careful not to overstep boundaries of its 
authority; that is, it must be cautious in construing the 
relationship of political power to fundamental rituals.
In this case, the attention paid at Meursault's trial to 
his actions during and after the funeral strip the ritual 
of its sacrality and show society's investment in 
coercing Meursault into behaving "normally" through the 
ritual. It also compromises the more secular trial 
ritual by disregarding the sacrality of the funeral and 
emptying the funeral of its content except as evidence of 
Meursault's character.53
53Camus, The Stranger. 98-107.
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Meursault's profound indifference to the sacrality
of the funeral ritual is thus mirrored by the
authorities. In the extraordinary circumstance of a man
who would not cry at his mother's funeral, the ritual is
compromised by the society whose meaning it helps define.
Meursault's behavior at the funeral becomes a measure of
his suitability to live in society, and the ritual
thereby becomes another instrument of social coercion.
Meursault is tried and convicted by a society which, in
its willingness to compromise its rituals, values its own
power and preservation over any commonly-held meaning
(sacred or political) of the community.
Camus further delved into the complexities of the
interaction of political authority and communal meaning
in his post-World War II novel The Plaque. In the middle
of the chronicle, Part Three, as the effects of the
plague reach their height, the narrator undertakes an
apparent digression on burials:
The narrator cannot help talking about these 
burials, and a word of excuse is here in place. For 
he is well aware of the reproach that might be made 
him in this respect; his justification is that 
funerals were taking place throughout this period 
and, in a way, he was compelled, as indeed everybody 
was compelled, to give heed to them. In any case it 
should not be assumed that he has a morbid taste for 
such ceremonies; quite the contrary, he much prefers 
the society of the living and— to give a concrete 
illustration— sea-bathing.54
54Camus, The Plague. 172.
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This part of the novel is seething with an 
uncharacteristic irony. The plague has isolated Oran 
from the rest of the world and now it isolates the people 
of Oran from each other. Social interaction is minimized 
for fear of infection. Plague pays no heed to the human 
need for consolation and so pays no heed to the human 
need for ritual ceremonies like funerals. In these 
circumstances, the authorities have no choice but to 
acknowledge the disturbing reality. This choiceless 
choice troubles Camus. There are times, as in the 
different circumstances surrounding Meursault, when 
rituals are inadequate. Their power to ground human 
existence is undeniable, but that power is limited and 
can be compromised. However efficacious it may be to do 
away with or alter such a communal ritual, Camus 
suggests, a society must not do so lightly. Without 
meaningful ritual, civilization is imperilled.
In the initial stages of the plague, the funeral 
ritual, from hospital to earth, is reduced to fifteen 
minutes. People are not allowed to die in the presence 
of loved ones. The sick are taken to hospital to die 
alone and loved ones are then quarantined. When the sick 
die, they are whisked away to the graveyard where a 
familiar scene is repeated. No sooner, the narrator 
writes,
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had the priest begun to sprinkle holy water than the 
first sod rebounded from the lid. The ambulance had 
already left and was being sprayed with 
disinfectant, and while spadefuls of clay thudded 
more and more dully on the rising layer of earth, 
the family were bundling into the taxi.55
As the intensity of the plague increased, even these
formalities were dispensed with. A coffin shortage
precipitated reuse of the coffins available. Relations
were refused access to the burials. For public health
reasons, mourning the dead became a crime. They kept
patrols of the areas around the burial sites to prevent
loved ones from sneaking in to mourn. Then came the all
too familiar image of mass burials:
In a patch of open ground dotted with lentiscus 
trees at the far end of the cemetery, two big pits 
had been dug. One was reserved for the men, the 
other for the women. Thus, in this respect, the 
authorities still gave thought to propriety and it 
was only later that, by the force of things, this 
last remnant of decorum went by the board, and men 
and women were flung into death-pits 
indiscriminately. Happily, this ultimate indignity 
synchronized with the plague's last ravages.56
The imagery of Nazi atrocities is powerful, but Camus
invites us to consider whether the circumstances in
reality and fiction are really as different as they
appear. By invoking the image, Camus alludes to the
rational institutional arrangement of the extermination
of European Jews by the Nazis and invites us to consider
55Ibid., 174.
56Ibid., 175.
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whether political power has usurped the ritual in the 
creation of a horrific new secular form of ritual.57 
The question of this transformation of ritual is 
critical.
The death camp imagery becomes even more explicit 
when the available cemetery space runs out. The 
cemeteries are dug up, their former occupants taken to a 
crematorium and the plague victims buried in their place. 
During the plague's worst ravages, plague victims 
themselves are taken by street-car to a crematorium set 
up on the outskirts of town where their earthly remains 
are incinerated. Doctors try to convince residents that 
the ashes and odor from the crematorium are not harmful, 
but
the residents of this part of town threatened to 
migrate in a body, convinced that germs were raining 
down on them from the sky, with the result that an 
elaborate apparatus for diverting the smoke had to 
be installed to appease them. Thereafter only when 
a strong wind was blowing did a faint, sickly odor 
coming from the east remind them that they were 
living under a new order and that the plague fires 
were taking their nightly toll.58
570n the organizational nature of the extermination 
camps, see, for example, Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and 
the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991)
and Richard L. Rubinstein, The Cunning of History; The 
Holocaust and the American Future (New York: Harper,
1978).
58Camus, The Plague. 178-179 (my emphasis). In 
images such as these one sees where commentators derive 
their sense of the novel as a parable of the Second World 
War. See Shoshana Felman, "Camus's The Plague: Or a
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In the plague narrative, public health considerations 
supplant communal meaning and the ritual. The fever 
breaks before the local authorities have to devise 
further ways to deal with the number of bodies. "Happily 
it grew no worse," the narrator writes, "for otherwise,
it may well be believed, the resourcefulness of our
officials, not to mention the burning capacity of our 
crematorium, would have proved unequal to their 
tasks. "59
Though different, the two cases of assault on 
ritual, and therefore on communal meaning and identity, 
reflect dangerously inappropriate uses of political 
power. In the one case, public order required the 
compromise of the ritual, but another ritual of that
order, the trial, is also compromised in the process. In
the other case, the indifference of plague to public 
health meant the authorities had to dispense with the
Monument to Witnessing" in Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, 
editors, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature.
Psychoanalysis and History (London: Routledge, 1991), 93- 
119; Steven Kellman, The Plaque: Fiction and Resistance
(New York: Twayne Publishing, 1993); Roger Quilliot, Sea
and Prisons: A Commentary on the Life and Thought of
Albert Camus, translated by Emmett Parker (University,
AL: University of Alabama Press, 1970); Philip Thody,
Albert Camus: 1913-1960 (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1961); Raymond Stephanson, "The Plague Narratives of 
Defoe and Camus: Illness as Metaphor," Modern Language
Quarterly 48:3 (September 1987): 224-41.
59Camus, The Plaque. 179.
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ritual itself during plague-time. The result of the 
abrogation of ritual may be a perverse transformation of 
the elder ritual, stripping it of its sacr«ixity and 
giving it over to the preservation of governing 
authority. Or, it may be a simple sacrifice of meaning 
to other more immediate ends, as in Meursault's trial.
In either case, the ritual is transformed and the 
community's self-understanding will have to be recreated 
before legitimate political power may be exercised.
The impotence of basic rituals in the face of 
natural necessity (like plague) is one thing, but their 
impotence in the face of political authority seriously 
troubles Camus. The political world Camus depicts values 
public order above all else including questions of 
meaning and identity. The more serious the threat to 
that order, the more drastic the measures human beings 
are willing to take to combat it. In the case of Camus's 
plague narrative, one protective device (the funeral 
ritual) gives way to another (political institutional 
power) as the meaning of the burial ritual becomes 
subject to the discretion of authorities who find they 
must ultimately do away with the ritual if the community 
is to survive. Camus understands the need to subjugate 
ritual to governmental regulation in extraordinary 
circumstances, but the fragility of basic rituals clearly
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disturbs him. In neither The Stranger nor The PIague is 
an effort made to preserve the truth or meaning embodied 
in the ritual. Governing authorities know that ritual is 
essential, but freely disregard it when it hinders the 
(extra-)ordinary functioning of the political community. 
Defining the parameters of a community's needs and 
limiting the power of those entities entrusted to 
preserve them is a problematic proposition at best.
Camus suggests that the roots of a community, including 
the meaning and identity embodied in their rituals, are 
an important source of protection against tyranny and 
should be preserved as such.
The depiction of confrontations between a sacral 
ritual like funeral and governing authority (even 
ritualized as in the trial) in Camus suggests his concern 
with the nature of political power and authority in the 
twentieth century. The confrontation is between communal 
meaning, rooted in the traditions and history of a 
society, and the institutional forms that meaning takes 
in governing structures. Camus finds governing 
structures far too willing to compromise communal 
meanings. There are degrees of culpability across 
situations. Certainly the prosecution of a murderer and 
the implementation of public health measures during 
plague are not the same in scope or content. But the
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implication is the same in both cases: when governing
forms begin ignoring the content of communal rituals, 
when communal meaning is no longer a factor in the 
administration of the state, all that remains are the 
forms of that administration.
When only the forms remain, the question becomes one 
of the legitimate exercise of political power. When 
governing forms ignore basic communal rituals, they 
deprive themselves of the communal meaning upon which 
their authority is based. Forms without deeper meaning 
lose their power to claim willing obedience from those 
they rule. Forms without substance are forced to command 
obedience through more coercive means. Camus's 
depictions suggest that the communal meaning embodied in 
ritual is one of the limits of the power of government. 
The question is not whether the authority of communal 
rituals may be compromised by the exercise of political 
power. These rituals are, after all, human constructs 
and susceptible to some regulation. Camus's real concern 
seems to be the character of that regulation.
Weil and Camus each see political power and its 
exercise for what it is: necessary to the preservation
of political community. They also recognize that power 
can take on a life of its own. Human beings are subject 
to that power, but must also subject that power to
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limits, as in Camus's concern with the "appropriate" use 
of that power when confronted by communal meaning. For 
both, then, power is a part of the natural world and thus 
a part of the political world. Unlike necessity's 
influence, power in the political world can and must be 
regulated. Forms of government can mitigate the abuses 
of power, a system of "checks and balances" come to mind, 
but it is the human being exercising political power who 
must ultimately regulate its uses.
IV. Force, Agency, Abstraction and the other 
The need shared by Weil and Camus for a responsible 
human presence in the exercise of power expresses not so 
much a faith that this check will suffice, but rather a 
demand for human responsibility in the use of power.
Weil and Camus each wrote out of a context in which the 
power of political institutions was uncontrolled by any 
other value save the acquisition of more power. This 
conception of power justified itself with abstractions, 
treating the human presence itself as an abstraction.
Each human being, however, possesses "agency," that is, 
each exerts an influence on the natural and political 
world. Weil and Camus concerned themselves with the 
character of that agency, specifically conceiving human 
agency as a counter to the enormous power of political 
institutions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1 7
Weil: The Objectifying Capacity of Force
In Weil's thought, the apparently coercive presence 
of necessity manifests itself as power on the level of 
human institutions. Weil uses the term "force” to 
describe relationships in which one person exercises 
control over the existence of another. The effect of 
this type of force on human beings is a recurrent theme 
throughout Weil's political thought.60 Her most 
profound discussion of the effects of force on the human 
spirit occurs in The Iliad, or the Poem of Force.61 
”The true hero, the true subject, the center of the 
Iliad,” Weil writes, "is force." In the Greek epic Weil 
finds force employed by man, enslaving man, and having 
accordingly adverse effects on the human spirit. Weil 
believed the poem vividly illustrated what certain people 
in her own century had forgotten: that the human spirit
"blinded by the very force it imagined it could handle" 
ends up "deformed by the weight of the force it submits 
to."62
^See for example Weil's essays "Human Personality" 
and "The Power of Words" in Selected Essays. 9-34 and 
154-71 respectively.
61Weil, The Iliad or the Poem of Force.
62This and earlier quote, ibid., 3.
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Weil defines force as "that x that turns anybody who 
is subjected to it into a thing."63 Her use of the 
algebraic unknown x is significant, for what she has 
called a definition is actually more of a description of 
an inexpressible. Force is the unknown factor in human 
relationships that determines the value of those 
relationships. It closely resembles the Nietzschean 
"will to power" in that it held the potential for use in 
the most productively creative ways or in the most 
heinous and cruel ways imaginable.64 As the nominal 
subject of the Iliad is war, specifically the Trojan War, 
it is force in its more violent aspects that Weil finds 
at work in the epic. The presence of force in its 
destructive aspects, however, does not preclude the 
possibility of justice and love, and herein lies the 
value of the poem to Weil and her discussion of force in 
general.
Weil depicts force as a power possessed and abused 
by individual human beings. In the Iliad, there are 
countless encounters on the battlefield and in the ranks
“ibid.
^See Alphonso Lingus, "The Will to Power" in D.B. 
Allison, editor, The New Nietzsche (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1985), 37-63. Weil balked at discussing Nietzsche 
though she acknowledged his greatness as a thinker. See 
her letter to her brother Andre in Seventy Letters cited 
in Chapter One.
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of command in which one individual holds force to the 
neck of one he has taken as an adversary. This is force 
in its most summary form— "the force that kills."65 The 
abusive inappropriate exercise of force makes the other a 
thing, as in killing a man, an act which turns the human 
being into a corpse. But there is a more cruel way to 
use force, to turn a human being into a thing without 
killing. "How much more varied in its processes, how 
much more surprising in its effects is the other force," 
Weil writes, "the force that does not kill, i.e., that 
does not kill just yet."66 In this species of force, 
the other is at the utter mercy of the wielder of force. 
Death can come at any moment, or not. In this 
circumstance, the other becomes a contradiction, a thing 
with a soul. "He is alive, he has a soul," she writes, 
"and yet— he is a thing."67 The soul was not meant to 
live inside a thing. In being held hostage through the 
use of force, human being and soul are deprived of the 
dignity that is the birthright of each human being.
Human being as thing is an unacceptable 
contradiction for Weil. The human presence exercises a 
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that presence as human.68 The human presence is owed 
consideration simply because it is human. This 
consideration, the pause human presences should produce 
in each other, Weil calls reflection. Things do not 
command reflection. Only the human commands such 
attention. Of the unfortunate creatures who are made 
things but deprived of death, Weil writes, "their days 
hold no pastimes, no free spaces, no room in them for any 
impulse of their own. . . they are another human species, 
a compromise between a man and a corpse."69 The life of 
the thing is meaningless to all but the thing. "This 
thing constantly striving to be a man or a woman, and 
never achieving it," Weil writes, "here, surely is death 
but death strung out over a whole lifetime; here surely 
is life, but life that congeals before abolishing."70 
The person on whom force is used becomes a thing, but the 
possessor of that force too suffers the consequences of 
that possession. Weil, in an echo of the Hegelian 
master-slave discussion in the Phenomenology. finds that 
the person as a thing is no longer able to see the
“Simone Weil, "Essay on the Notion of Reading," 
translated by Rebecca Fine Rose and Timothy Tessin, 
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possessor of force as a human being, and the question of
the humanity of the wielder of force is broached.71
"Force, in the hands of another," Weil argues,
"exercises over the soul the same tyranny that extreme
hunger does; for it possesses and in perpetuo the power
of life and death."72 Human beings are unfit to wield
this kind of power. All through the Iliad, the pressure
of assuming this kind of power over others takes its
toll. Force, Weil writes, "is as pitiless to the man who
possesses it, or thinks he does, as it is to its victims;
the second it crushes, the first it intoxicates.1,73
This kind of force, like the power native to
institutional relationships, lives only to replicate
itself. Its exercise robs the human being of that which
could mitigate its effects, the power of reflection:
The man who is the possessor of force seems to walk 
through a non-resistant element; in the human 
substance that surrounds him nothing has the power 
to interpose, between the impulse and the act, the
71See Hegel's discussion of lordship and bondage in 
Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 111-19.
Essential commentaries include Alexandre Kojeve, 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, translated by James 
H. Nichols, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1969) and George
Armstrong Kelly, "Notes on Hegel's 'Lordship and 
Bondage,'" in Kelly, Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis:
Studies in Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978), 29-54.
^Weil, Iliad. 10.
^Ibid., 11.
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tiny interval that is reflection. Where there is no 
room for reflection, there is none either for 
justice or prudence. . . Thus it happens that those 
who have force on loan from fate count on it too 
much and are destroyed.74
Force blinds its possessor, hubristically self-identified
as indestructible, to an inevitable undoing. So
intoxicated, wielders of force assume complete license in
dealing with other human beings who take on the aspect of
so many objects. "And at this point they exceed the
measure of the force that is actually at their disposal,"
Weil writes, "now we see them committed irretrievably to
chance; suddenly things cease to obey them."75 At the
point of overreaching, the wielder of force is undone;
naked to misfortune.
Force is a component of all human relationships, but
when human beings overreach and use it to make others
submit to their will they have sown the seeds of their
own destruction. "Violence," Weil writes, "obliterates
anybody who feels its touch."76 But because it is part
of the fabric of human relationships, Weil maintains the
possibility of the moderate use of force either to
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simply to act in accordance with love or justice. Even
the moderate use of force, however, can be double-edged:
A moderate use of force, which alone would enable 
man to escape being enmeshed in its machinery, would 
require superhuman virtue, which is as rare as 
dignity in weakness. Moreover, moderation itself is 
not without its perils, since prestige, from which 
force derives at least three quarters of its 
strength, rests principally upon that marvelous 
indifference that the strong feel toward the weak, 
an indifference so contagious that it infects the 
very people who are the objects of it.77
The illusion of indifference provides a distance on human
actions that permits the justification of any action,
just or hideous, that can be carried out. Only the self-
conscious, moderate exercise of force can counter the use
of force that is like a will to power. Only in a self-
awareness of the consequences of individual actions can
human beings behave justly and with a sense of obligation
to others. Such moments of self-awareness, resembling
what Camus calls lucidity, Weil calls miraculous
manifestations of grace.
In the context of force, the possibility exists for
the creative use of the force human beings possess.
These moments Weil understands as "grace." The value of
the Iliad lies in its ability to represent, in the midst
of an environment of unrelenting force, "those brief,
^Ibid.
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celestial moments in which man possesses his soul."78 
She writes,
The soul that awakes then, to live for an instant 
only and be lost almost at once in force's vast 
kingdom, awakes pure and whole; it contains no 
ambiguities, nothing complicated or turbid; it has 
no room for anything but courage and love.79
Moments of grace and self-possession are few in the
Iliad. The notable exceptions, she argues, are the
scenes of friendship which are the only redeeming product
of this violent world of force. Without the courage and
love of friendship, Weil believes, justice is not
possible.
Justice and love, which have hardly any place in 
this study of extremes and of unjust acts of 
violence, nevertheless bathe the work in their light 
without ever becoming noticeable in themselves, 
except as a kind of accent. Nothing precious is
scorned, whether or not death is its destiny;
everyone's happiness is laid bare without 
dissimulation or disdain; no man is set above or 
below the condition common to all men; whatever is 
destroyed is regretted.80
For Weil, the Iliad demonstrates that the precious in
each human life must be preserved. Subjecting the human
spirit to force is turning the non-corporeal into matter.
What is then destroyed is our access to the decreated
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spirit is the common human lot and is borne differently 
by each according to his or her virtue. To offset the 
effects of this subjection, Weil believes that human 
beings must strive to resist the impulse to control their 
environment, including the human substance of that 
environment, for "only he who has measured the dominion 
of force, and knows how not to respect it, is capable of 
love and justice."81
The issue with which Weil grapples in her discussion 
of force in the Iliad is the nature of human action in 
the world or human agency. Her analysis reflects her 
concern that modern human relationships, economic, social 
and political, are run through with power considerations. 
The consequence, and this does not change from Oppression 
and Liberty to the essay on the Iliad, is the warlike 
conduct of all forms of human intercourse. Read in this 
way, Weil's analysis of force and human agency in the 
Iliad becomes a sharp critique of human agency and ethics 
in the contemporary world.82 The warlike conduct of
81Ibid., 33 (my emphasis) .
82Weil was an avowed pacifist until the world in 
which she lived forced her to alter her stance on the 
subject. See Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 114-115;
Weil, "Cold War Policy in 1939," in Selected Essays. 177- 
94; Weil, "East and West; Thoughts on the Colonial 
Problem," in Selected Essays. 195-210; Weil, "A European 
War Over Czechoslovakia?" in Formative Writings. 264-68; 
Weil, "The Next World War," International Review 3:1 
(1938): 35-43.
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human affairs is incompatible with an ethical way of 
being in the world. Because in Weil's analysis 
competition consumes all the time and energy at one's 
disposal, little of either is left for the stillness and 
reflection, that is, reflection upon the human presence, 
that could potentially bring order and calm to human 
affairs. Weil's task, insomuch as she was concerned with 
mundane political matters, was to formulate a way of 
being in which reflection could be reintroduced as a 
priority in the conduct of human affairs.
Camus: Institutional and Human Agency
As Camus's primary political concerns are ethical, 
his depictions of human agency also reflect a concern 
with what Weil calls "force." At least two kinds of 
human agency are present in Camus's fiction. The first, 
which can be called institutional agency, draws heavily 
on his understanding of power and derives its authority 
from institutional representation. Institutional agency 
brings to bear the authority of an abstraction on 
concrete situations, and often compromises the integrity 
of human interaction. The second form of agency, which 
can be called human agency, involves this interaction and 
the relationship of individuals to each other in the 
mutually supportive pursuit of common interests. In this 
type of relationship the means of force are never
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distinct from their ends, whether those ends are 
comprehension and action, compassion and understanding, 
or love. In the first form, agency means literally 
acting as the agent of an institutional entity. In the 
second, agency means acting as the agent of mankind.
Camus finds the first is often necessary, but he 
questions its legitimacy. The second kind of agency he 
found increasingly rare, but its recovery is essential to 
a healthy, functional political order.
Camus believed that institutional authority is 
necessary to the maintenance of order in human community. 
The power these institutions wield must be brought to 
bear by human agents. In institutional agency, these 
actors interpret the interests of the institution and 
through their actions further those interests. Against 
the potential objection that this agency is simply an 
extension of the institution's power, it must be recalled 
how the power of the funeral ritual was compromised by 
agents of the law in both The Stranger and The Plaque. 
Institutions, like law and ritual, exert an authority by 
their very functioning that is distinct from the force 
brought to bear by individuals in the name of these 
institutions. In The Stranger. The Plaque and his play 
"The Just Assassins," Camus tests the efficacy of 
institutions and the principles upon which they are
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founded by placing their agents in complex, almost 
Sophoclean, situations. The outcome is nearly always an 
unsatisfactory compromise from the perspectives of the 
individuals involved and the needs of human community. 
Institutional agency, like the power of the institutions 
themselves, is portrayed at the limits of its efficacy, 
and the consequence is the use of force to compel an 
unsatisfactory end to an unresolvable predicament.
In Camus's fiction there are two principal 
mainsprings of institutional agency: Christianity and
the law. No one is condemned without the offer of 
salvation from one or both of these sources. The pairing 
of Christianity and the law is instructive because both 
are attempts to institutionalize the practice of an 
ethical or moral way of being.83 Each projects itself 
as a bearer of what Western civilization understands as 
the good and the just. Camus finds neither adequate to 
this task, but he finds this neither surprising nor 
necessarily a weakness. His portrayals of Christian and 
legal authorities are therefore ambiguous. The force 
they bring to bear is appropriately limited; Camus asks
^Camus makes uses this pairing as late as his novel 
The Fall in the person of Clamence the judge-penitent. 
See Albert Camus, The Fall, translated by Justin O'Brien 
(New York: Knopf, 1956).
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only that the agents of this force recognize those 
limitations.
Christianity posed real difficulties for Camus.84
Nowhere in his work is this more evident than in the last
chapter of The Stranger where Meursault is offered the
chance to confess to the chaplain in his jail cell while
awaiting execution. The chaplain ignores Meursault's
requests to be left alone and finally pushes Meursault to
verbal and physical assault.
I grabbed him by the collar of his cassock. I was 
pouring out on him everything that was in my heart, 
cries of anger, cries of joy. He seemed so certain 
about everything didn't he? And yet none of his 
certainties was worth one hair of a woman's head.
He wasn't even sure he was alive, because he was 
living like a dead man.85
The chaplain had come to offer consolation in the form of
a confession. What he achieved by his persistence was a
purgation, but not the kind he anticipated. After
Meursault finishes his tirade, he is somehow liberated.
When the guards tear the chaplain away from Meursault,
the chaplain can only look at Meursault with tears in his
eyes and walk out of the cell. From his perspective, the
wWhat Camus's ambiguous attitude toward 
Christianity means to the rest of his thought is one of 
the more enduring debates about his work. See, for 
recent examples, Brown, "Grace: A Meditation from
Camus"; Cohn, "Camus's Sacred: The Growing Stone"; and
Duncan, "Judgment Without Redemption: Camus Version of
the Fall."
85Camus, The Stranger. 120.
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perspective of Christianity, the chaplain has failed. He
has failed to lead Meursault to God. But from
Meursault's perspective, the encounter has been
cathartic. It was, he thinks, "as if that blind rage had
washed me clean, rid me of hope; for the first time, in 
that night alive with signs and stars, I opened myself to 
the gentle indifference of the world."86 The encounter 
with the chaplain, intended to bring Meursault comfort 
and the chaplain satisfaction, serves only the former, 
bringing Meursault a kind of peace with his own fate, a 
"happy" fate devoid of hope.
The encounter of the chaplain with Meursault 
underscores one of the problems with institutional 
agency; measuring success by the goals of the 
institution which are often inapplicable to the 
situation. The chaplain, owing to the source of his 
authority, had his own goals going into the encounter. 
They were to offer Meursault consolation, "allow" him to 
confess his sins, and to bring him to a relationship to 
God. Given Meursault's worldview, these goals are 
unrealistic and doomed to failure. There is nonetheless 
a purgative value of the encounter for Meursault, which 
is lost on the chaplain who must judge the outcome based 
on his original goals. Had the larger goal of the
“ibid., 122.
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chaplain been to offer Meursault a purgative release, the 
chaplain may have been able to leave the cell in a 
different frame of mind. The chaplain sees a doomed 
soul; Meursault feels a free man. Meursault refuses 
consolation, but embraces the cathartic effect of his 
outburst. He can now face the judgement of the court 
with the scorn he associates with overcoming the human 
condition.
Camus's ambiguous depiction of Father Paneloux in 
The Plague further illustrates the complexity of 
Christian institutional agency in trying circumstances. 
Father Paneloux's first sermon following the outbreak, 
for all its weaknesses, offers the first comprehensive 
reading of the plague's meaning. In his first sermon, 
Father Paneloux reveals the plague as the judgement of 
God on the citizens of Oran. His is the first 
explanation of its causes and the first suggestion that 
the plague is somehow manageable.87 You, he tells the 
people of Oran, have brought this upon yourselves. 
Paneloux, as messenger, assumes the perspective of God 
and places himself above the community. He also implies 
that an adjustment in the way the people of Oran live 
their lives will mitigate the effects of the plague. His 
reading makes the causes and consequences of the plague
87Camus, The Plaque. 93-99.
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intelligible and places the responsibility for the plague 
on the people of Oran. The sermon creates a negative 
sense of belonging among the citizenry, evoking a general 
state of unrest akin to madness.88 In an attempt to 
offer an explanation of and implicit solution to the 
plague, Father Paneloux worsens the situation.
Father Paneloux's Christian reading of the plague is 
counterproductive. The disillusion in the community that 
follows is incompatible with battling the plague. The 
priest is not moved to change his position until he 
witnesses the particularly painful death of the 
magistrate Othon's young son. A frustrated Dr. Rieux 
confronts Paneloux with the child's innocence, but 
Paneloux responds "perhaps we should love what we cannot 
understand."89 Rieux, like Ivan Karamazov, is not 
convinced: "No, Father. I've a very different idea of 
love. And until my dying day I shall refuse to love a 
scheme of things in which children are put to 
torture."90 It is Rieux, however, who observes "We're 
working side by side for something that unites us— beyond 
blasphemy and prayers. And it's the only thing that
“ ibid., 100-101.
89Ibid. , 218.
90Ibid., 218. See Camus's discussion of 
Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov in The Rebel. 55-61.
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matters."91 Paneloux misinterprets Rieux's as a 
statement about salvation. The doctor responds, 
"Salvation's much too big a word for me. I don't aim so 
high. I'm concerned with man's health; and for me his 
health comes first."92 Paneloux knows he has not 
convinced Rieux to love what he cannot understand, but 
Rieux and the experience have convinced Paneloux to 
reconsider his first reading of the plague.
Paneloux's second sermon is entitled "Is a Priest 
Justified in Consulting a Doctor?"93 This sermon is not 
a refutation of his first, but the tone has changed. His 
voice is quieter and he refers to "We" instead of "You." 
His first sermon, he argues, was true but lacked charity. 
All human trials work together for the good of those who 
believe. Some things we can grasp as touching God, while 
others we cannot. There is no reason for the suffering 
of a child, but we must believe or deny everything. The 
religion of plague-time is not the religion of everyday. 
We must choose all or nothing, embrace or deny the 
humiliations that go with our existence. Paneloux calls 
his religious ethic an "active fatalism." Each of us 
must be the one who stays and fights in the name of the
91Camus, The Plaque. 219.
92Ibid., 219.
93Ibid., 220-228.
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difficult love that is God's. Paneloux concludes that it 
is illogical for a priest to call on a doctor, and dies 
of an illness that resembles but cannot be confirmed as 
being plague.
With the second sermon, Father Paneloux embraces his 
own impotence, but refuses to attribute the same weakness 
to the God of the Church he serves. His contribution to 
the effort against the plague is the realization that 
there can be no final reading of the source of evil. The 
force any single individual can bring to bear in plague­
time must remain aware of its limits, and embrace the 
consequences of those limitations. His first sermon, 
lacking charity, also lacked an awareness of his own 
limitations, that as a human agent of the Church he was 
incapable of assuming God's perspective. The 
inexplicable and painful death of an innocent rendered 
his initial reading of God's will in the plague 
meaningless. The second sermon reflects Paneloux's 
realization that the force and perspective he brought to 
bear on the plague was institutional and human, not 
divine.
The limitations of Christian agency are secondary to 
the larger issue of the limitations of institutional 
agency. This is underscored by a look at agents of the 
law in Camus's fiction and their attitude toward justice.
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During Meursault's interrogation, the judge and 
prosecutors decide, based on his apparent indifference to 
societal norms, that he is evil incarnate. At the end of 
a session, "the judge would lead me to the door of his 
office, slap me on the shoulder, and say to me cordially, 
'That's all for today, Monsieur Antichrist.' I would 
then be handed back over to the police."94 Can there be 
another outcome besides death for one so judged?
Likewise, in The Plaoue. the magistrate Othon initially 
has a particularly harsh understanding of justice. When 
Tarrou and Rieux encounter Othon, Tarrou asks the 
magistrate if his work has increased owing to plague 
conditions.95 Othon replies that criminal cases are 
down and that most inquiries regard the new regulations. 
Tarrou suspects that the reason for this apparent anomaly 
might be because by contrast ordinary laws appear to be 
good ones. Othon replies, "What does that matter? It's 
not the law that counts, it's the sentence. And that is 
something we must all accept."96 In the minds of 
Meursault's prosecutors and Othon, justice cannot take 
account of extenuating circumstances. Law works most 
efficiently for them if the case is decided before it is
94Camus, The Stranger, 71.
^Camus, The Plaoue. 145-146.
96Ibid., 146.
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brought to trial. Camus believed that this was an 
irresponsible position for institutional agents to take. 
Law thought of in this way is dangerous and resembles 
absurdity itself. The sentence on each human being is 
death, but if, as Othon holds, the law does not count, 
what transpires before death is of no real consequence. 
All may well be permitted provided one is not caught.
In the "Just Assassins," Kaliayev, in jail for 
political assassination, is approached by the magistrate 
Skuratov to make a deal: betray his comrades and he will
not die for assassinating the Grand Duke. Kaliayev 
dismisses Skuratov as a "flunky." Skuratov accepts 
Kaliayev's hostility, but ably defends his own position: 
"One begins by wanting justice— and one ends by setting 
up a police force."97 Kaliayev counters that the 
assassination was in accordance with the dictates of 
justice, but Skuratov replies "Appearances 
notwithstanding, I am not your enemy. I won't even say 
that your ideas are wrong. Except when they lead to 
murder."98 Kaliayev does not make a deal and dies for 
his crime. But Skuratov effectively answers Kaliayev's 
revolutionary rhetoric by pointing out its legal and 
moral consequences. The audience is left unable to trust
97Camus, Caligula and Three Other Plavs. 281.
98Ibid., 281.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 3 7
Skuratov, but also sure of the justice of his position 
and the inevitability of Kaliayev's end. With Skuratov, 
in a play written after both The Stranger and The Placrue. 
Camus offers an example of effective institutional 
agency. He is an intelligent, articulate foil for 
Kaliayev's revolutionary zeal. Unable to convince 
Kaliayev to make a deal, he successfully clouds the issue 
for the audience by questioning Kaliayev's contention 
that justice and taking human life can be compatible.
In the cases of Meursault's judges and Othon the 
magistrate, the justice enshrined in law is circumscribed 
by the actions of its agents. In the case of Skuratov, 
the agent makes a compelling justification for upholding 
the law based on the impermissibility of murder. Othon's 
outlook changes upon the death of his son from plague, 
but the lesson is learned: the character of the agent
determines the effectiveness of institutional power in a 
given situation. The agent's job is to make the 
institutions they represent effective. In extraordinary 
circumstances, those agents may be called upon to take 
unique measures to meet the exigencies of those 
circumstances. They must do so without compromising the 
integrity of the institution. When this last condition 
is not met, institutional agency discovers that its rules
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of engagement are inadequate. Only then is it "the 
sentence that counts.1,99
The limited effectiveness of institutional agency 
lies in its grounding in abstraction. The choices made 
by its agents refer to some principle or set of 
principles that may or may not be shared by the actor and 
may or may not be shared by the community. The other 
form of agency, human agency, always confronts 
abstraction; that is what life in the absurd means. The 
obligation of human agency is not to choose against 
abstraction, but to recognize that living entails 
choosing among abstractions, and living ethically means 
choosing the right abstraction. In Camus's fiction, the 
right abstraction is always the one that refers to the 
specifically human. In his fiction, especially The 
Plague, Camus contends that the ethical actor should 
always err on the side of human being.100
For Camus, abstraction entails disengaging the human 
through the application of an idea or symbol, especially 
in this case, some goal or interest that presents itself 
as being at odds with the specifically human. The 
ambiguities of abstraction are vividly illustrated in The
"Camus, The Plaque. 146.
100,,Human being" refers to those sharing the 
condition of being human. The term itself is an 
abstraction, thus the need to choose among abstractions.
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Plaque when the journalist Raymond Rambert approaches 
Doctor Rieux about getting out of the quarantined 
Oran.101 The quarantine has left Rambert isolated from 
his girlfriend back in France. He seeks desperately to 
return to her. To this end, he approaches the doctor 
about being certified plague-free. Rieux refuses because 
no one can be so certified. Rambert bargains, but Rieux 
replies that "the law was the law, plague had broken out, 
and he could only do what had to be done."102 Incensed, 
Rambert accuses Rieux of "using the language of reason, 
not of the heart," of living "in a world of 
abstractions."103 He accuses Rieux, who unknown to 
Rambert is also isolated from his wife, of putting the 
public health before the "more human" needs of those who 
are separated from loved ones. Rieux can only 
acknowledge that this is so, but that it is more 
complicated than that. The two part company, but Rieux, 
exhausted from his work, is stung by Rambert's words. 
Rambert sets abstraction off as the opposite of love. 
Abstraction, to Rambert, privileges the non-human over 
against the human. Rieux reflects:
101The account is in Camus, The Plaque. 83-92.
102Ibid., 87.
103Ibid.
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Could that term "abstraction" really apply to these 
days he spent in hospital while the plague was 
battening the town, raising the death-toll to five 
hundred victims a week? Yes, an element of 
abstraction, of a divorce from reality, entered into 
such calamities. Still, when abstraction sets to 
killing you, you've got to get busy with it.10A
Abstraction is impersonal, but no less real for Rieux.
He sees the negative ethical implications of regarding
others as abstractions, but in the context of plague, to
enter emotionally into each case would be suicide. He
could not serve his function as doctor. Rieux concludes
that there are different varieties of abstraction, that
in certain situations, abstraction is a necessary part of
the human armor. What could be more abstract than the
anonymous, random suffering and death meted out by
plague? To meet the exigencies of such a situation, that
is, "to fight abstraction," Rieux thinks, "you must have
something of it in your own make-up."105
There is another kind of abstraction, that which
Rambert thinks he encounters with Rieux. It entails
adhering to abstract rules and regulations in an effort
to keep "special" cases to a minimum. In this process,
those whose immediate interests are impeded by those
regulations have the specifics of their case disregarded
in the name of some public safety issue or other. As a
10AIbid. , 88-89.
105Ibid. , 91.
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consequence, they feel as if authority has reduced them 
from the status of human beings to that of abstractions. 
There are times, as The Plaque vividly illustrates, when 
it is necessary to conduct the polity in this way, that 
is, constricting the needs of the one in the name of the 
needs of the many. But in situations that fall outside 
the parameters of regulations, the limitations of those 
regulations are reached, and decisions become matters of 
personal judgment. The decision becomes personal as the 
line between the institutional response and the human 
response is blurred. This is what Rambert believes he 
has confronted in Rieux. From Rambert's perspective, 
Rieux has fallen back on regulations to avoid dealing 
with the specifics of Rambert's case. A Sophoclean 
conflict emerges as Rieux responds to Rambert's talk 
about love with considerations of law, health and the 
public good. But Rambert's love is specific, and as the 
reader learns, Rieux takes the law in this case to be a 
generalized love encompassing all of humanity. By not 
acquiescing to Rambert's demand, Rieux prevents the 
spread of the plague to innocent populations. In Camus's 
portrayal, abstraction, though dehumanizing, can be the 
humane response to inhuman circumstance.
In his depiction of the episode between Rambert and 
Rieux, Camus exhibits sympathy for both. Rambert's
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personal rebellion against the abstractions of civil
society is not so different from Rieux's personal
rebellion against the epidemic. It is when Rambert's
appeals are exhausted and he joins forces with Rieux and
the others to combat the effects of the plague that he
comes to understand the real nature of the fight. The
point of the battle with the plague is not victory, for
the pestilence cannot be overcome, but survival, for it
can be outlasted. Outlasting an ambivalent evil like
plague may be done one person at a time, but is better
done collectively. This is the value of the struggle
depicted in The Plague over that depicted in The
Stranger, as Camus reminded Roland Barthes:
Compared to The Stranger. The Plague does beyond any 
possible discussion, represent the transition from 
an attitude of solitary revolt to the recognition of 
a community whose struggles must be shared. If 
there is an evolution from The Stranger to The 
Plague, it is in the direction of solidarity and 
participation.106
The transition in the second novel represents not a
repudiation but an expansion, a further articulation of
the ethical path Camus began seeking with his earlier
work. Camus seeks an ethical way of being in which the
cry of Rambert and the struggle of Rieux are embraced and
bound by communal and legislative norms. Individuals
participate, but they can do so in the context of others
106Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays. 3 39.
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through cooperation and a sense of purpose. The struggle 
against the oppressive use of power in politics need not 
compel the resistor to use the methods of the oppressive 
power. The mistake of modern political actors had been 
to resist tyranny by creating another form of tyranny. 
Like Weil, Camus recognized that power begets either more 
power or destruction. Old ways would not do; a new 
approach was needed. For Camus, that new approach to 
ethics had to embrace both the solitary (human beings die 
alone) and the solidary (human beings all die alone) in 
each human being.107
V. Conclusion: Prelude to an Ethic of Positive Force
Though their emphases differ, the ethic at work in 
Camus's The Plaque mirrors the ethic emergent in Weil's 
essay on the Iliad. In rough outline, a number of 
critical developments characterize this ethic of positive 
force.
First, both Weil and Camus emphasize the 
relationship of understanding or diagnosis to action.
Weil looks beyond the savagery of the battle in the Greek
107See Albert Camus, "The Artist at Work" in Exile 
and the Kingdom, translated by Justin O'Brien (New York: 
Knopf, 1957), 158. The painter Jonas undergoes a period 
of spiritual and creative exile which ends when he puts 
down his brushes. The story ends with the image of a 
canvas "completely blank, in the center of which Jonas 
had merely written in very small letters a word that 
could be made out, but without any certainty as to 
whether it should be read solitary or solidary."
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epic to see moments of friendship bathing the poem with a 
kind of grace. Camus's Doctor Rieux shuns final decision 
over what to call the epidemic. Instead, he chooses to 
act on it to mitigate its effects. He recognizes, like 
Weil does in her essay on "The Power of Words," that 
arguments over naming have become an excuse not to act in 
modern political life.108 Others in Camus's novel, like 
Tarrou, the civil servant Joseph Grand, and Rambert each 
embrace Rieux's approach to one degree or other.
Second, there is a balancing of the needs of the 
many and the needs of the one seen at work in the Rieux- 
Rambert encounter. This was not an unquestioned 
subjugation of the individual to the force of the state, 
but rather an acknowledgment that the good of the 
community often serves the good of the individual. The 
moments of friendship Weil finds in the Iliad similarly 
obscure questions of state loyalty in the name of a 
broader conception of human being.
Third and finally, in both Weil's essay on the Iliad 
and Camus's The Plaque, there is a generalized love of 
humanity that impels the members of opposing armies on 
the one hand, and the medical community and the 
sanitation squads on the other to meet the overwhelming 
adversities of war and plague-time. The presence of this
108Weil, "The Power of Words," in Selected Essays.
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generalized love demonstrates that even in the face of 
extraordinary adversity, compassion, cooperation and 
understanding can and do breed friendships, like that 
which develops between Rieux and Tarrou, and concern for 
the specific other, like Grand's looking after the 
criminal Cottard. Compassion, cooperation, and concern 
for the other are missing in the political world as Weil 
and Camus depict it and thus become the seeds of ethical 
being for both thinkers.
In a context in which institutional force is 
inadequate but necessary, the force of human 
relationships evolves in connection with the struggle.
For Weil, these human relationships spring from 
reflection, the pause that another human presence 
produces. That pause can be an eternity, the difference 
between a measured response to a situation and a brash, 
violent one. Reflecting on the presence of every other 
is a trying and difficult undertaking. This fact alone 
makes it appealing to Weil. An ethical life is not 
possible without effort; it is not possible in the 
absence of this kind of reflection.
Camus portrays this kind of reflection in The 
Plague. It is friendship and the sense of their being 
comrades-in-arms which makes the struggle against the 
plague bearable for the characters in Camus's second
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novel. Human agency is brought to bear through effective
joint and solitary action. The characters draw a sense
of identity from their work, but their work manifests and
does not determine their humanity. Humanity uses
abstraction to shield itself from necessity in its most
virulent forms. But abstraction alone is inadequate as
Camus illustrates by having Rieux and Tarrou use their
passes to take a swim. They escape to the beach and
begin swimming side-by-side "isolated from the world, at
last free of the town and of the plague."109 A calm
settles from this shared moment away:
They dressed and started back. Neither had said a 
word, but they were conscious of being perfectly at 
one, and the memory of this night would be cherished 
by them both. When he caught sight of the plague 
watchman, Rieux guessed that Tarrou, like himself, 
was thinking that the disease had given them a 
respite, and this was good, but now they must set 
their shoulders to the wheel again.110
Here is a beautiful, vivid illustration of the positive
force possible and necessary between human beings. It is
the positive force of shared belonging that Camus
illustrates in The Plaque and Weil refers to in her
discussion of the Iliad as love. The remainder of this
essay will be an examination of how Weil and Camus in
different ways attempted to mold this admittedly vague
109Camus, The Plaoue. 257.
110Ibid.
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concept into concrete ways of being in the world. The 
next chapter will illustrate how each began their 
positive response with the image of the creator that lies 
at the core of their separate conceptions of work and 
art. Each, with differing emphases, offered the 
attentive, creative engagement of our spiritual, social 
and political environment as the best response to the web 
of power relationships in which modern human beings were 
enmeshed.
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CHAPTER 3
WORK, ART AMD REVOLT:
THE CREATIVE USE OF FORCE
I. Introduction
Simone Weil and Albert Camus shared a sense of the 
presence of force in human relationships. In human 
contact with the natural world ("necessity"), in human 
social and political arrangements ("power"), and in human 
contact and interactions with each other ("force"), the 
implied coercion of force colored all human 
relationships. The problem posed by this worldview was 
not how to rid ourselves of the presence of force, but 
rather how to make constructive, creative use of the 
force that penetrates every facet of existence.
The thought of Karl Marx and the appeal of 
revolutionary socialism indicated that the source of most 
human beings' daily contact with what Weil calls "force" 
could be found in their work experiences. What Weil and 
Camus found in modern labor was a mind-numbing 
degradation in the name of efficiency and profit. Each 
suggested that a restoration of creativity to the process 
of work and, by extension, to everyday existence, could
148
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counter the degrading effects of our contact with force. 
The idea of creativity is a neglected aspect of the Weil- 
Camus intellectual relationship, particularly in their 
political thought. Of the significant studies of the 
relationship of Weil's political thought to that of 
Camus, Fred Rosen's "Marxism, Mysticism, and Liberty" 
most directly addresses the issue.1 Rosen demonstrates 
the extent to which Camus adopted Weil's critique of 
Marxism in The Rebel and based his conception of the 
rebel as "artisan" on that critique. Rosen concludes 
from this that their differing conceptions of freedom and 
justice reflect their mutual concern with and distrust of 
the impulse in modern man to seek and impose absolute 
values. In The Rebel. Rosen argues, Camus draws heavily 
on Weil's original and authoritative analysis of the 
sources and effects of oppression in the modern world. 
Modern technology, in Weil's judgment, renders impossible 
the realization of Marx's twin visions: the end of the
1Fred Rosen, "Marxism, Mysticism and Liberty: The
Influence of Simone Weil on Albert Camus," Political 
Theory 7:3 (August 1979): 301-319. Two other comparisons 
of Weil and Camus tend to be religious studies concerned 
with the spiritual connections in the two thinkers. See 
Stewart Sutherland, Faith and Ambicruitv (London: SCM 
Press, 1984), chapter 4; and John Dunaway, "Estrangement 
and the Need for Roots: Prophetic Visions of the Human
Condition in Albert Camus and Simone Weil," Religion and 
Literature 17:2 (Summer 1985). Pierce's analytical 
history Contemporary French Political Thought contains a 
sweeping and valuable historical account of the two 
thinkers' political theory.
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separation of intellectual and manual labor and the 
universal availability of knowledge. The rationalization 
of productive forces, specialization and increased 
division of labor had transformed the lot of the worker. 
"Active, creative workmen who understood their work and 
machines," Rosen writes, "were replaced by passive 
automata who were ignorant of the nature and 
technicalities of their work and performed simple 
repetitive operations."2 Weil correctly concluded that 
the problem would not be remedied by fostering false 
hopes of the liberation of workers, but rather must be 
overcome through re-organizing production in such a way 
as to restore to the worker a lost dignity.
Camus's use of Weil's critique went beyond a mere 
reconsideration of Marxist thought. Rosen finds that 
Camus's conception of the rebel issues directly from 
Weil's critique and is manifest in Camus's discussion of 
art and the artist. "Like the rebel, and, in opposition 
to the nihilist revolutionary," Rosen writes, "the artist 
both negated the world as he found it and consented to 
use it in his own creative synthesis."3 The artist, 
living in this tension between negation and consent,
2Rosen, 3 03.
3Ibid., 305.
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"provides the foundations of civilization itself."4 
Camus did not propose to turn civilization over to 
artists, but rather to transform industrial workers into 
artisans, in this way restoring their human dignity.
Rosen argues that this conforms to Weil's vision in which 
the worker became an artisan when he united intelligence 
with execution. "It is not clear," writes Rosen, "how 
Camus intended artistic creativity to enter, for example, 
into precision engineering. But Camus might have 
followed Simone Weil's conception of the artisan worker 
as one part of civilization of which his own conception 
of the creative artist formed another indispensable 
part."5 Rosen contends that if Camus intended to have a 
civilization based "solely" on artistic creativity, he 
would have a hard time reconciling it with industrial 
labor, even were he able to salvage the idea of the 
artisan. By way of comparison, Rosen argues that 
creativity played no significant role in Weil's thought. 
She did not, he contends, concern herself with trying to 
reconcile such disparate modes of being as art and labor 
with or without a conception of the artisan. Her main 
concern, Rosen writes, "was with individual autonomy and 
liberty and not with the simplicity of life and honest
4Ibid., 305-306.
5Ibid., 306.
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virtue traditionally associated with the peasant cobbler 
and carpenter.1,6 As the present discussion will 
demonstrate, however, creativity is an important part of 
Weil's political thought and a conception of the artisan 
played a significant role in her thought. It is the 
precise relationship between work and art, and the 
creative component that these two forms of activity 
share, that is the keystone of the political theory of 
both Weil and Camus.
Rosen correctly stresses the importance of work and 
art in the thought of Weil and Camus. By not exploring 
the relationship of work to art, that is, by keeping them 
as discrete categories and not thinking about them 
relationally, he misses the importance of the creative 
sensibility to both writers. As a result, Rosen, among 
others, reads Camus far too literally on the point of the 
artist's role in politics and disregards Weil's use of 
the image of artistic creation especially in discussions 
of political reform.7 Their conceptions of creativity
6Ibid., 308.
7A discussion of the creative aspect of Weil's 
thought is sorely missing from the secondary sources 
except in discussions of her emphasis on work. Among the 
best of these are McLellan, Utopian Pessimist: Dietz, 
Between the Human and the Divine; and Winch, Simone Weil; 
The Just Balance. There are, however, extended 
discussions of the affect of Camus's conception of 
himself as artist on his political thought in Hanna, The 
Thought and Art of Albert Camus who set the tone for
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draw on the image of the artist while transcending 
considerations of art. As Rosen's analysis indicates, 
each wished to imbue labor with a creative component as a 
way of restoring dignity to the mass of human beings. If 
Weil and Camus agree on a conception of the artisan, it 
is in the sense that all human beings can be, within 
limits, artisans of their own political existences and 
their own political environments, the form of government 
under which they choose to live and its legal and 
institutional manifestations. A creative sensibility 
empowers the ruled, but also benefits the ruler, provided 
appropriate limits are respected. Weil and Camus each 
sought to restore this limiting creative sense of the 
political to modern politics.
Augmenting the work of Rosen and others, this 
chapter will explore how Weil and Camus integrated the 
creative into their considerations of both labor and 
politics. The next section will outline the critique of 
the relationship of workers to revolt inherited from 
earlier thinkers and which they saw in the revolutionary 
movements of the day. Neither Weil nor Camus believed
further discussions in Bree, Camus; John Cruikshank, 
Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt (New York; 
Oxford University Press, i960); Sprintzen, Camus; A 
Critical Examination; and Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern 
Rebellion. My own analysis relies heavily on these 
works.
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the relationship of modern labor and revolution had 
survived modern working conditions. Their response to 
this realization was not to abandon work, but rather to 
recast it in a way that each worker could know his or her 
self through work. Changing the conditions of the 
factory would not suffice. The idea behind their 
recommendations regarding labor was to free up mental and 
physical space for the worker. Responsible, engaged 
citizenship was incompatible with the life led by the 
miserable automatons the modern factory system had 
created. If the "spare" time created by their 
recommendations was to be valuable, then a more general 
reorientation to human existence would have to be made.
To this end, both thinkers emphasized valuing the 
"creative" element in human social and political 
existence. Camus explored the creative through his own 
artistic abilities. He considered artistic creation the 
purest form of revolt. Weil too used the image of the 
artist to capture the sense of the creative, albeit from 
a subtly different perspective. The third part of this 
chapter will explore the image of the artist and the role 
of the creative in the political thought of each thinker. 
The chapter will argue for their attempt to integrate the 
reconception of work and the image of the creator as a 
foundation of individual political ethics.
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II. Revolt and the Reconception of Work 
The Presence of Marx
As Rosen suggests, Camus explicitly admired Weil's 
thoroughness in analyzing modern working conditions. "It 
is.only fair to point out that this era of technocracy," 
he insisted in The Rebel, "was described about twenty 
years ago by Simone Weil in a form that can be considered 
complete."8 Camus's familiarity with Weil's writings on 
modern labor stems from his editorial responsibility for 
the publication of her works after her death.9 This 
section will demonstrate Camus's affinity for Weil's 
thought as she built on the Marxist critique of 
capitalism and then applied it to her own experience in 
the factories of Paris. Both thinkers found modern 
industrial labor akin to slavery in its degrading effects 
on the worker. An elder economy of craftsmen had given 
way to an economy of job-holding wage slaves. Both 
thinkers believed that this slavery should have 
engendered revolt. That it did not was one of their 
chief shared concerns. Despite the rhetoric of 
socialists and other political activists, modern slavery
8Camus, The Rebel. 216.
9This work includes an unsigned introduction to 
Weil's La Condition ouvriere (Paris: Gallimard, 1951).
His thoughts there are reflected in his comments on her 
work in The Rebel. 214, 216 discussed below.
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engendered only resignation. The prevailing economic 
order denied the worker a consciousness of self which 
might have borne a sense of autonomy and human dignity. 
The unconsciousness of the modern worker left him or her 
nothing in the name of which to revolt. The task, as 
Weil and Camus understood it, was not to lead the workers 
in revolution, but rather to restore dignity in work.
This section will conclude with an overview of the three 
ways in which Weil and Camus proposed to reconceive work.
Their shared concern with the plight of the modern 
worker and the revolutionary implications of that plight 
issued from their early critical encounter with the 
thought of Karl Marx. Each in turn, Weil in Oppression 
and Liberty (1934) and Camus in The Rebel (1951), 
embraced the impulse driving Marx's thought but rejected 
his nearly religious conclusions about the historical 
inevitability of a worker's revolution resulting in the 
downfall of capitalism and the establishment of a 
classless society.10 Their doubts about the prophetic 
efficacy of Marx, however, did not prevent either from
10The religious content of Marx's analysis is 
recognized in Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 40-56 and 
Camus, The Rebel. 209-215.
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taking his critique of capitalism seriously and retaining 
work at the center of their political concerns.11
Weil believed that Marx had failed to follow his own 
valuable methodology. Erroneously assuming that 
productive forces necessarily increase and that social 
institutions adapt in the interest of creating a good 
society, Marx lost sight of the role human beings play in 
the material transformation of the world.12 The 
decisions human beings make about the use of resources 
and of force, not the "forces" themselves, determine 
whether a structure or condition is oppressive or not. 
"Productive forces" have no instrinsic value of their 
own. They are the product of human initiative. If shown 
to be oppressive in the exercise of their power, steps 
should be taken to ensure more positive use of that 
power. For Weil, Pierce argues, human initiatives "are 
in no way determined by the conditions of existence, but 
the conditions of existence render ineffective all
11Valuable discussions of the thought of Karl Marx 
on that of Weil can be found in McLellan, Utopian 
Pessimist; Deitz, Between the Human and the Divine and 
Winch, The Just Balance. Equally useful discussions of 
Marx's influence in Camus's thought can be found in Fred 
Wilhoite, Beyond Nihilism; Albert Camus' Contribution to 
Political Thought (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1968); Bree, Camus; Sprintzen, Camus: A 
Critical Examination: and Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern 
Rebellion.
12Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 45-46.
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initiatives not compatible with them."13 Her affinity 
for Marx's project sheds doubt on the first part of this 
conclusion, but there is little doubt that she believed 
successful initiatives demanded compatibility.
Though Camus found in Marx a revolutionary prophecy 
failed, he believed that Marx was owed credit for 
identifying the despair of the contemporary world: "that
when work is a degradation, it is not life, even though 
it occupies every moment of life."14 Marx appreciated 
that the degrading conditions of modern work were reality 
for most people. He had done humanity a service "by 
demanding for the worker real riches, which are not the 
riches of money but of leisure and creation.1,15 Marx 
only failed by succumbing to the temptation to prophecy 
and leaving himself open to misinterpretation. Marx's 
demand for justice was dependent upon the success of his 
prophecy and not upon an "ethical justification of 
justice." Therefore, the relationship between ethics and 
justice disappears in Marx's prophecy when as "good and 
evil are reintegrated in time and confused with events, 
nothing is any longer good or bad, but only either
13Pierce, 95.
14Camus, The Rebel. 209.
15Ibid., 209.
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premature or out of date."16 Marx's material dialectic 
was incompatible with a theory of revolution dependent on 
the actions of those dead souls who labored in the modern 
factory. He passed this failure on to those who took his 
name and his method into the twentieth century. Camus, 
with great sympathy for socialist movements and their 
concern for the worker, did not share their faith that 
political maturity would come out of the extreme poverty 
of the modern worker.17 
Work, Slavery and Revolt
In at least one respect, Weil and Camus agreed, Marx 
had been right. A sympathy for and an understanding of 
the experience of work was a necessary beginning to 
recasting human social and political existence. Only at 
the point of contact with force might one discern how to 
make constructive use of it to rebuild a civilization 
nearly destroyed by two global conflicts in thirty years. 
Weil's was the most direct contact with the problems of 
the laborer. An activist for workers' rights while a 
young professor, she undertook a year of factory work 
during which time she tried to take the living conditions 
of her fellow workers as her own. The experience 
profoundly changed her attitude regarding the means and
16Ibid.
17Ibid. , 215.
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limits of social reform. Camus's early experience as a
journalist in the poor quarters of urban Algeria exposed
him to the misery of the laborer and elicited a sympathy
he would maintain throughout his life. Like Weil, he was
very active in socialist labor movements early in his
career and though he soon grew suspicious of "movements,"
as Parker and others show, he never stopped concerning
himself with the plight of the modern worker.18
Weil found in the structure and relationships of the
factory the categories of force she later identified in
her essay on the Iliad, namely "the force that kills" and
"the force that kills but not just yet." Both were
pervasive in the modern workplace. Addressing the
effects of force on the worker, Weil believed, required
sharing their lot firsthand. As she told her philosophy
students at Roanne in 193 3:
Human beings are so made that the ones who do the 
crushing feel nothing; it is the person crushed who 
feels what is happening. Unless one has placed 
oneself on the side of the oppressed, to feel with 
them, one cannot understand.
18See Emmett Parker, Albert Camus: The Artist in
the Arena (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1965); Ian Birchall, "The Labourism of Sisyphus: Albert
Camus and Revolutionary Syndicalism," Journal of European 
Studies 20:2 (June 1990): 135-165; and Fred Wilhoite,
Bevond Nihilism.
19Simone Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, translated by 
Hugh Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978), 139.
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Weil embraced this classroom rhetoric by working a number 
of factory jobs in Paris from late 1934 until late summer 
1935.20 A self-consciously undertaken experiment, the 
impact of this experience on Weil's thought cannot be 
overstated. Throughout the period, Weil, as frail and 
weak of constitution as she was perceptive, kept a 
journal in which she jotted down her feelings during and 
after her fourteen-hour days.21 She also wrote a series 
of letters which reflected her journal and in which she 
added further insight into her experience.22 Her 
perspective on the relationship of work and revolution 
profoundly changed during this period of intensive labor, 
but it also strengthened her resolve that refashioning 
civilization required rethinking modern attitudes toward 
work and the worker.
20From December 1934 until 1 April 1935 she worked 
in the factories of the Alsthom company, manufacturers of 
electrical equipment for trams and underground railroads. 
Upon leaving Alsthom, she was hired at the factory of J-J 
Carnaud et Forges de Basse-Indre at Boulogne-Billancourt 
where she was engaged in metal-stamping. Dismissed from 
this job on 7 May without explanation, she got another 
factory job at Renault on 5 June which she held until she 
left voluntarily, as she had planned, on 22 August. 
McLellan, Utopian Pessimist. 93-117, and Petrement,
Simone Weil: A Life are most valuable biographical
discussions of this experience.
21Weil, "Factory Journal" in Formative Writings. 
149-226.
22Weil, Seventy Letters.
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Weil conceived work as the application of the mind
as a tool to the matter which makes up created reality.
Through work, that is, through the methodical action of
reason, human beings bring usable order to matter.23
Weil initially found that immersion into factory life
liberated her from such abstract formulations. "I feel
that I have escaped from a world of abstractions," she
wrote to a pupil in 1935, "to find myself among real
men— some good and some bad, but with real goodness or
badness."24 But she also found an environment organized
with little regard for human needs. The human need to
apply mind to matter through work was swallowed up by the
modern factory. What went on in the factory was not
work, but rather an oppressive and spiritually deadening
repetition of mechanical movement. Weil wrote to a
friend and the wife of a prominent trade-unionist,
Albertine Thevenon:
I have learnt quite a lot about the organization of 
a firm. It is inhuman; work broken down into small 
processes, and paid by the piece; relations between 
different units of the firm and different work 
processes organized in a purely bureaucratic way.25
^See the discussion of the methodical action of 
reason in Chapter One.
24Weil, Seventy Letters. 11.
25Ibid., 15.
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A replaceable part in a larger machine, the worker was
constantly at the mercy of a mechanical form of
necessity. The work itself reflected the inhuman context
in which it was performed:
One's attention has nothing worthy to engage it, but 
on the contrary is constrained to fix itself, second 
by second, upon the same trivial problem, with only 
such variants as speeding up your output from 6
minutes to 5 for 50 pieces, or something of that
sort.26
The repetition of the work and the fixity of one's
attention on a minute fragment of the process denied the
worker any sense of accomplishment or completion. Weil 
found the emphasis rather on efficiency, more pieces 
finished in less time. Any increase in efficiency was 
met only by expectations of further increases in 
efficiency.
Factory conditions produced effects on human beings 
akin to slavery in the sense that the worker was acutely 
aware of being nothing in him- or herself and completely 
obedient to overseers. Weil discerned two elements to 
the slavery of work in the factory: "the necessity for
speed and passive obedience to orders." In the first 
instance, "one has to repeat movement after movement 
faster than one can think, so that not only reflection
26Ibid.
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but even day-dreaming is impossible.1,27 Each day, for 
as long as one worked, "the worker has to annihilate his 
soul, his thought, his feelings, and everything.1,28 In 
the case of work orders, "from the time he clocks in to 
the time he clocks out he may at any moment receive any 
order; and he must always obey without a word."29 The 
certainty of dismissal and the near impossibility of 
getting another job discouraged the worker from any 
response beyond the most passive obedience. The 
spiritual effects of industrial servitude, Weil mused, 
might be worse than those of actual slavery. "I have 
sometimes thought it would be better to be subdued to 
that sort of obedience by external compulsion, such as 
the whip," Weil wrote Auguste Detouef in 1936, "rather 
than have to subdue oneself to it by repressing all that 
is best in oneself."30
Camus found the de facto slavery of the modern 
worker an enduring concern as well. By the time he 
published The Rebel, he had come to full sympathy with 
Weil's analysis of the oppression of the modern worker. 
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factory worker," Camus insisted there, "must be read in 
order to realize to what degree of moral exhaustion and 
silent despair the rationalization of labor can lead."31 
"Every worker," he wrote in echo of Weil, "has been 
brought to the point of performing a particular function 
without knowing the overall plan into which the work will 
fit."32 Workers so employed were denied the sense of 
involvement and achievement with their work that had been 
the hallmark of an older understanding of work. Those 
who oversaw the worker assumed a social position over and 
above the worker. As in a form of slavery, the 
overseer's presence reminded the worker of his or her 
status as something less than human. In this sense, the 
overseers, Camus argued, had become "a class whose social 
importance is decisive.1,33 Weil, Camus believed, had 
added oppression by occupation to the traditional 
understandings of oppression by armed force and by 
wealth. "The Marxist plan to abolish the degrading 
opposition of intellectual work and manual work," Camus 
believed, "has come into conflict with the demands of 
production."34 The consequence was the rise of the
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manager and the precedence of the accumulation of capital 
over human fulfillment. Weil, Camus concluded, was 
right; "the worker's condition is doubly inhumane in that 
he is first deprived of money and then of dignity."35
Though The Rebel reflects his appreciation of Weil's 
analysis of the condition of the worker, Camus's own 
experience of the servitude of the working class dated 
from his upbringing in Algeria. Living side-by-side with 
other poor colons and poorer Moslems, Camus early grasped 
the connection between work and survival, between hard 
work and futility, between poverty and being viewed as a 
barely human thing.36 His early journalism tended to be 
a crusade against the conditions endured by the working 
class. The young Camus quickly denounced French 
government crackdowns on strikes. In 1938, new Premier 
Edouard Deladier sent 10,000 French riot police into the 
Renault factory in Paris to break up a sit-down strike. 
The police, using tear gas against the non-violent 
strikers, were successful. In response, Camus used 
bitter irony to chastise Deladier in a December 12, 1938 
article for Alcer-Republicain for his use of "those 
instruments of democracy called troops, militia and
35Ibid., 216.
^See Lottman, Albert Camus; A Bioaraphv on Camus's 
childhood. Also instructive is the newly released semi- 
autobiographical final work of Camus, The First Man.
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counsels of war.1'37 By his action, Deladier had shown a
complete lack of compassion and understanding of what it
meant to be a worker. The incident only confirmed for
Camus that politicians
have no idea how difficult it is to be simply a man. 
To live, without being unjust, a life filled with 
inequities, on 1200 francs a month, with a wife, a 
child and the certainty of dying without being 
inscribed in the textbooks of history.38
Camus had little doubt that Deladier could justify his
action in the name of one governmental necessity or
other. His concern was that this justification could
only be known to the worker, in whose interest Deladier
was supposed to exercise the powers of his public office,
in the form of "layoffs, factory shutdowns and the loss
of my 1200 francs."39
Camus gave his sense of the absurdity of the
worker's condition further expression four years later by
choosing the figure of Sisyphus as the "absurd hero" in
his first extended philosophical essay.40 In the myth,
Sisyphus is condemned for loving life to the detriment of
37Albert Camus, "Dialogue Between a Premier and a 
Worker Earning 1200 Francs a Month," Alger-Republicain, 




40Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus and Other Essays.
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his reverence for the gods. His punishment is
"ceaselessly" to roll a rock to the top of a mountain,
"whence the stone would fall back on its own weight."
The gods judged the futility of the punishment
appropriate to the crime: they "thought with some
reason," Camus wrote, "that there is no more dreadful
punishment than futile and hopeless labor."41 For
immortal gods this would indeed be true, but it was clear
to Camus that the immortals of the myth failed to
appreciate that which Sisyphus comprehended all too well.
What the gods imagined to be "dreadful punishment" was
precisely what Sisyphus (and Camus) understood as absurd
existence. The modern workplace was one of Sisyphean
labor. "The workman of today," Camus writes, "works
every day in his life at the same tasks, and this fate is
no less absurd."42 The tragedy of this condition is
that the worker, like Sisyphus, is conscious of his fate,
but he feels helpless in the face of it. Camus
distinguished this conscious helplessness from the latent
power of Sisyphean revolt:
Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and 
rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched 
condition: it is what he thinks of during his
descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his
41Ibid., 110.
42Ibid., 121.
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torture at the same time crowns his victory. There 
is no fate that cannot be overcome by scorn.43
Turning that scorn into revolutionary political action
was the goal of the political activists of the period,
for whom Camus, like Weil, had great admiration but
little hope. Rather, Camus's use of Sisyphus, at least
one commentator has suggested, "is to opt for piecemeal
economic struggle" against a more sweeping vision of
revolution.44
Camus's optimism for the future of the working class 
reached a highpoint in the aftermath of the liberation of 
Paris. In an editorial for Combat. he argued that the 
"immediate realization of a true popular democracy" 
depended upon support for the working class. "We believe 
that any politics separated from the working class is 
futile," he wrote, "and that the future of France is the 
future of its working class."45 Camus's disillusionment 
with the postwar world issued directly from the failure 
of the new order to respond to the needs of those who 
built it. The postwar French government was no more
43Ibid., 121.
44Birchall, 146.
45Camus, editorial, Combat. October 1, 1944, in 
Albert Camus, Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the
Resistance Newspaper "Combat" 1944-47. translated by 
Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University
Press, 1991), 58.
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responsive to the needs of its working people than the
unmourned Third Republic. Worse, neither that neglect
nor the terror and murder of the previous three decades
had generated the "no" that would turn the worker from
slave into rebel. His disappointment was the impetus for
Camus's conception of rebellion:
What is a rebel? A man who says no, but whose 
refusal does not imply a renunciation. He is also a 
man who says yes, from the moment he makes his first 
gesture of rebellion. A slave who has taken orders 
all his life suddenly decides that he cannot obey 
some new command. What does he mean by saying 'no'? 
. . . [H]is no affirms the existence of a 
borderline.46
Workers who had taken orders all their lives had not been
able to summon the courage or strength to say "no" when
the time came following the liberation. Camus
nonetheless retained some hope, and twenty years after
abandoning the Communist Party and partisan politics in
general, his concern for the oppression of the worker
remained in the foreground of his political thought. In
an article for L'Express in November 1955, Camus
protested the treatment of the working class and issued a
warning to a France indifferent to their struggle. The
French people must, he wrote,
neither scorn reforms in the name of some far- 
distant society, nor forget when reforms are 
proposed that our final goal is the reintegration of 
the working class into all its rights through the
46Camus, The Rebel. 13.
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abolition of the proletariat. Sooner or later the 
resistance of privileges will have to give way 
before the general interest.47
Camus continued to believe that when "the existence of a
borderline" could finally be affirmed, the general
interest would be served. The problem for Camus and Weil
was why the modern worker had been unable to say "no."
Camus's "no" required a consciousness of self as
human being that Weil found the factory worker could not
afford. The temptation, to which Weil herself succumbed,
was to work in a condition of unconsciousness in order to
shield the self from suffering. This was easier than
remaining conscious, which meant waging an unceasing war
with inhuman conditions. "I do not say it is impossible
to retain the lucidity, self-responsibility, and dignity
appropriate to a human being," she wrote to Detoeuf, "but
it means condemning oneself to a renewed fight every day
against despair."48 Surviving modern industrial labor
meant enduring a dialectic of humiliation and reaction.
Factory work
means a daily struggle with oneself, a perpetual 
self-mutilation and sense of humiliation, and 
prolonged and exhausting moral suffering for all the 
time one must be abasing oneself to satisfy the 
demands of industrial production and then reacting, 
so as not to lose one's self-respect and so on
47Camus, editorial, L'Express. November 25, 1955 
quoted in Emmett Parker, Artist in the Arena, 151.
48Weil, Seventy Letters. 57.
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indefinitely. That is the horror of the modern form 
of social oppression; and the kindness or brutality 
of one's superiors makes little difference.49
The consequences of enduring this dialectic were physical
and spiritual exhaustion. Yet Weil found the factory
experience invaluable. Her factory journal concludes
with an assessment of the violence the factory
perpetrates against the human being:
Gained from this experience? The feeling that I do 
not possess any right whatever, of any kind (take 
care not to lose this feeling). The ability to be 
morally self-sufficient, to live in this state of 
constant latent humiliation without feeling 
humiliated in my own eyes; to savor intensely every 
moment of freedom or camaraderie, as if it would 
last forever. A direct contact with life.50
The ability to be morally self-sufficient was a critical
discovery for Weil. She found it essential to surviving
the soul-numbing conditions she encountered in the
factory. Here Weil found that the choice for self is not
always the choice for nihilism. Sometimes it is the
choice for survival. Weil found that among those who had
made this choice, her fellow workers, a correlation
between "generosity of heart and aptitude for general
ideas" existed. She discerned that a human being "always
needs to have some external signs of one's worth for
oneself" and that "the main fact isn't the suffering but
49Ibid., 39.
50Weil, Formative Writings. 225.
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the humiliation."51 External signs of worth, signs as
modest as being trusted with the knowledge of the process
in which work is done, were completely lacking from the
modern work experience.
Weil's writings on her factory experience reveal
that the conditions in factories were even worse than the
young workers' rights activist had imagined. From her
ignorance of the reality of factory life, her political
activism, she realized, had been grossly inadequate. In
the future for Weil, no sound conception of politics
could ignore the condition of the modern worker. In
January 1935, she wrote to Albertine Thevenon:
Only when I think that the great Bolshevik leaders 
proposed to create a free working class and that 
doubtless none of them— certainly not Trotsky, and I 
don't think Lenin either — had ever set foot inside 
a factory, so that they hadn't the faintest idea of 
the real conditions which make servitude or freedom 
for the workers— well, politics appears to me a 
sinister farce.52
Weil found the structure of the factory oppressive, the
work itself oppressive and worse, those oppressive
51Ibid.
52Weil, Seventy Letters. 15 (Weil's emphasis). Weil 
had a very unsatisfactory meeting with Trotsky in late 
December 1933. Petrement, 188, writes: "Simone took
advantage of Trotsky's presence [in the family apartment] 
to have a discussion with him. The discussion quickly 
turned into a quarrel; in the adjoining room, where they 
were seated, the Weils heard a series of loud shouts.
(The shouting was most likely done by Trotsky. Simone 
always spoke calmly; she never got excited during a 
discussion.)"
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conditions deadening the souls of the workers. Robbed of
the will to think or to live in any way that could be
called human, they became non-beings. The sinister farce
of revolutionary politics was that it believed that these
soulless, beaten creatures were the vanguard of anything
more than a next generation of industrial slaves. Weil
concluded that "an obviously inexorable and invincible
form of oppression does not engender revolt as an
immediate reaction, but submission."53
That the oppression of modern industrial labor
squelched the human revulsion toward oppression was a
serious matter. The realization undermined a line of
revolutionary thought dating back to the nineteenth
century. Weil retained her revolutionary hopes but now
found it necessary to reexamine the means. In an
important letter to Monsieur Bernard, the technical
director of a factory at Rosieres, Weil wrote:
I long with all my heart for the most radical 
possible transformation of the present regime, in 
the direction of greater equality in the relations 
of power. I do not at all believe that what is 
called revolution nowadays can bring this about.54
The reasons were simple: the conditions of the factory
were not conducive to thought, much less to
considerations of human dignity, to outrage over denial
53Weil, Formative Writings. 226.
54Weil, Seventy Letters. 40.
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of that dignity or to thoughts of revolution. Even were 
this not the case, she believed, no "so-called working- 
class revolution" could overcome the environment of 
passive obedience. Workers would go on obeying passively 
so long as their survival demanded they work in the 
current system of production and "so long as the system 
of production is based on passive obedience.1,55
Weil claimed that her pessimism did not put her 
"against the parties described as revolutionary." It was 
just that all political action, whether it called itself 
revolutionary or not, seemed dependent upon the same two 
factors. The first was "the subordination and dependence 
which are implied in modern forms of technique and 
economic organization; and the other is war."56 Free 
human action was impossible in the presence of current 
forms of either. The increasing rationalization of labor 
and the preparation for war, as demonstrated in the 
discussion of power, amounted to the same thing: 
maximizing efficiency and eschewing considerations of 
human dignity to the ends of production and the 
acquisition of more power. As to issues of subordination 
and dependence, Weil saw the problem of the factories 
quite independent of the political regime: "to progress
55Ibid.
56Ibid.
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from total subordination to a certain mixture of 
subordination and co-operation, with complete co­
operation as the ideal."57 A revolution of slaves would 
only create a new tyranny. Any change in the political 
order required change in the situation of the worker and 
either change would have to be incremental. "The only 
way to preserve one's dignity under inevitable physical 
and moral sufferings is to accept them," she wrote M. 
Bernard, "to the precise extent that they are 
inevitable.1,58 But acceptance and submission were very 
different things for Weil. Acceptance could lead to 
collaboration among the oppressed, whereas submission 
bred only complete subordination. "To induce men to 
proceed from a state of total subordination towards a 
certain measure of collaboration, one must surely begin," 
it seemed to Weil, "by encouraging them to hold up their 
heads.1,59
Artisanship and the creative Reconception of Work
In the minds of both thinkers, work was a necessary 
part of human existence and essential for the survival of 
the species. Modern approaches to work, not work itself, 
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in the modern factory. Work must be revalued and thus 
reconceived as an essential human activity. For Weil, 
reconceiving work meant doing so in a form challenging 
the worker's mind without destroying the worker's body. 
This reconception would mean making structural changes to 
the workplace itself, making it a more human environment. 
It would also mean adjusting the modern approach to work 
in terms of the artisan. Work must be approached as a 
craft. Overcoming the gap between manual and 
intellectual labor, that is, engaging the worker in his 
labor on the intellectual and emotional levels, would 
give work meaning beyond the wage paid. A worker who 
appreciated his or her work as a craft might see that 
work as an activity with meaning, as a vocation. "Our 
age," Weil wrote in The Need for Roots, "has its own 
particular mission or vocation— the creation of a 
civilization founded upon the spiritual nature of 
work."60 The failure of modern working conditions to 
allow meaning in labor indicated a flaw at the core of a 
modern civilization she found "sick because it doesn't 
know exactly what place to give physical labor and to
“Weil, The Need for Roots. 96. In the concluding 
sections of this work, Weil argues that the spirituality 
of work consists in the fact that work and death are the 
two things that make each of us human and make our return 
to decreated reality possible.
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those engaged in physical labor."61 In the artisan, 
with a period of apprenticeship and the resulting sense 
of self as craftsman, human beings possessed a model of 
how labor might be rendered meaningful. The abolition of 
the "proletarian lot" she believed depended "upon the 
creation of forms of industrial production and culture of 
the mind in which workmen can be, and be made to feel 
themselves to be, at home."62
To alleviate prevailing forms of suffering, Weil 
recommended specific changes in factory organization.
Her goal throughout was to counter the objectification of 
the worker by reintegrating thought and imagination into 
the work process. Denying human beings the opportunity 
to think and solve problems for the bulk of their waking 
existences and then expecting them to be thoughtful, 
careful citizens seemed absurd. Weil suggested that 
communities and factories should see to the education of 
their workers. Labor should be only a part of a worker's 
larger culture of mind.63 Workers should be allowed to
61 Ibid., 299.
62Ibid., 72.
^eil thought one way to do this was to make 
literature available to all workers in an easily 
digestible form. To that end she made the effort of 
"popularizing" Sophocles' Antigone for the workers at 
Rosieres. M. Bernard discouraged these efforts after the 
strike of 1937. See Weil, Seventy Letters. 36 and Weil, 
"Antigone" in Intimations of Christianity. 18-23.
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know the process of which their tasks were a part. They 
should work shifts at the various tasks and be given a 
part in decision-making about the process itself. The 
resulting sense of process would give each a perspective 
on the importance of their task and a sense of identity 
with the larger operation. These steps toward 
circumventing the division of labor, however, were not 
sufficient in and of themselves. Weil also suggested the 
reconfiguration of tools so that they could be worked 
without exhaustion and were flexible enough to avoid 
monotony, yet challenging enough to engage a fully 
qualified worker.64 Each of her suggestions was 
intended to transform the workplace into one in which 
workers could invest their intellectual and spiritual as 
well as their physical energy. The goal was to escape 
the brutal constraint of necessity Weil herself had 
experienced in the factories of Paris and later in the 
fields of the surrounding countryside.65
In her emphasis on the worker's culture of mind, on 
education, and on knowing the process, Weil suggests a 
kind of modern artisanship. This artisanship is complete
^Weil, The Need for Roots. 57.
65Much as she had with factory work, Weil sought out 
the experience of work in the fields in the summer of 
1941. See Gustav Thibon's preface to Weil, Gravity and 
Grace, 3-45.
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with the hard work, caring and connectedness of 
apprenticeship, converting the master-slave relationship 
of modern labor to a craftmaster-understudy relationship. 
Her focus on the nature of work itself is a reflection of 
her lost faith in the efficacy of collective movements to 
address factory conditions. Camus found her self- 
professed apolitical project essential to his own 
rethinking of ethical life. Though he too distrusted 
collective movements, Camus found in the trade-union or 
syndicalist movement evidence that a reorientation to 
their work could be an avenue to human political 
empowerment.66 In revolutionary trade-unionism, Camus 
found a political activism in the name of the work 
itself, "an example of a revolutionary practice which 
kept intact the values of revolt."67 In The Rebel.
Camus wrote, "it is this movement alone that is 
responsible for the enormously improved condition of the 
workers from the sixteen-hour day to the forty-hour 
week.1,68 The key for Camus was the organization of 
these unions by trade or craft. There, forms of work 
created a sense of shared identity that groups of human
66 See Wilhoite, Bevond Nihilism. 180-183;
Cruikshank, Literature of Revolt. 115; and Birchall, "The 
Labourism of Sisyphus."
67Cruikshank, 115.
^Camus, The Rebel. 297.
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beings found worth risking their well-being over. In 
trade union activism Camus found the artisan-mentality at 
work in the political world. The reforms exacted by the 
movement had been necessary but were hardly adequate.
They were a critical initial step, which, for Camus, were 
evidence enough that political action through the 
commune-like structure of trade unions was an effective 
antidote to the ideology-driven revolutionary movements 
of the twentieth century. "Trade-unionism,11 Camus wrote, 
"like the commune, is the negation, to the benefit of 
reality, of bureaucratic and abstract centralism.1,69
The affinity for the trade union movement means that 
the artisan, as Rosen argues, must be central to the 
reconception of work proposed by both Weil and Camus.
The artisan has studied the craft as an apprentice. When 
problems arise, the artisan has the manual and 
intellectual acuity to address them. The choice of craft 
and the period of training, usually at a critical time of 
character development, mean that a great part of the 
artisan's identity derives from the chosen craft. Weil, 
through her emphasis on the worker's craft and education, 
and Camus, through his affinity for syndicalism, each 
point to artisanship as a way to counter what they found 
to be the wage-driven economic life of the modern worker.
69Ibid., 298.
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The distinction between craft and job is decisive. Jobs 
are interchangeable on the marketplace. A lost job means 
lost money and thus lost security. These are difficult 
enough matters in their own right. To lose the privilege 
of practicing one's craft because of technological 
advance or to be humiliated for that privilege, by low 
pay or faulty, inadequate equipment, crushes the human 
spirit. Its appreciation of the importance of the 
artisan is the reason Camus finds the revolt represented 
by trade-unionism appealing. In his admittedly 
idealistic conception, trade unions were groups of 
people, bound together by their identity as artisans, 
taking a political stand in the name of a critical source 
of their identity. Their actions are collective, but 
singular. They are motivated not by "gain" in the 
material sense, but rather by preservation, of self and 
craft. It is the value of preservation that Camus and 
Weil try to restore to the conduct of modern economic and 
political existence by their emphasis on the importance 
of the artisan.
Camus had no illusions about embracing revolutionary 
syndicalism as a cure for modernity's problems. It was, 
like the other forms of revolt he identifies, an image of 
what properly motivated revolt could look like and 
accomplish. He explored the strengths and shortcomings
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of artisanship and trade-unionism in his oft-overlooked
novella "The Silent Men."70 Roger Quilliot writes of
the story that "if Camus wanted to prove that he, too,
was capable of sticking to his narrative and, as he said
jokingly one day, of writing 'socialist realism,' he
certainly won his wager."71 However lightly Camus took
'socialist realism' the story is central to any
discussion of his attitude toward artisanship and
collective action. Quilliot concludes that
There is nothing to say about "Les Muets" except 
that the novella can be read at a sitting, and that 
the characters impose themselves upon us through 
their presence, their shabby happiness, their 
artisans' pride, their bursts of anger and their 
impotence.72
In the context of this discussion, however, they impose 
themselves upon us in the way that concern for their 
condition imposed itself upon Camus. Quilliot's 
conclusions, though intended to be cursory, are an 
instructive prelude.
The story takes place in the aftermath of a failed 
workers' strike at a small cooperage. Cooperage is an 
embattled craft, threatened by trucks and other faster
70Camus, Exile and the Kingdom. 62-84. This 
connection is suggested but not explored in Birchall, 
"The Labourism of Sisyphus."
71Quilliot, Sea and Prisons. 253.
^Ibid., 253.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 8 4
forms of transportation. The shop was not making enough
money to cover expected profits so the difference had to
come out of the pay of the workers. Yvars, an old
employee that Camus uses for continuity, muses
The boss was not giving any raise; the strike had 
failed. They hadn't managed things right, it had to 
be admitted. An impetuous walkout, and the union 
had been right to back it up only half-heartedly. 
After all some fifteen workers hardly counted; the 
union had to consider the other cooper's shops that 
hadn't gone along.73
The commune-like unity of purpose and action is missing
from the cooper's strike. Whatever the needs of the
workers, in the absence of the cooperation of the union
or the other cooper's shops, the strike had been ill-
advised. They had been unable to counter the boss's
offer to "take it or leave it." They took it, returning
to work, but in the silence of humiliation.74
Camus's narrative reveals a violation of intimacy
that speaks to the problem of the artisan and identity.
One takes a craft for a lifetime. Lasalle, the boss, had
grown up in the shop and known several of the workers
most of his life. His attitude toward them had been a
kind of paternal benevolence. "He liked his workmen, no
doubt, and often recalled the fact that his father had
begun as an apprentice," thinks Yvars, "but he had never
^Camus, Exile and the Kingdom. 65.
74Sprintzen, Camus, 257.
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gone to their homes; he wasn't aware."75 The sense of 
extended family nonetheless persisted until the strike.
In Lasalle's handling of the negotiations, he treats his 
employees as they would be treated in a factory, that is, 
like replaceable machine parts. By taking a position of 
absolute power, Lasalle breaks the strike but also 
destroys the sense of extended family holding the shop 
together. Camus tellingly has Lasalle's daughter become 
deathly ill on the day the workers return silently to 
work. The workers, on learning of the little girl's 
death, are embarrassed by the relative importance of 
their own grievances. But their ability to respond with 
anything other than silence has been destroyed by 
Lasalle's assumption of the role of master and dealing 
with them as if they were slaves.76 The limited 
intimacy, the civility which had existed before is gone. 
The price for all involved is high. The workers are 
humiliated and the two places in which Lasalle exercises 
paternal authority, the shop and his daughter, are 
destroyed on the same day.
Camus's "The Silent Men" reintroduces trade or craft 
into the constellation of concerns, which Weil will call 
"roots," including family and place of origin, through
^Camus, Exile and the Kingdom. 67.
76Sprintzen, Camus, 257.
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which human beings define themselves. At the same time, 
the story gives us a devastating picture of the problems 
of modern economic relationships and the inadequacy of 
even the most efficacious of our solutions (e.g., trade- 
unions and the importance of craft to identity). The 
underlying sense that their lot will improve when all 
workers learn a craft, loses something in the 
confrontation with technological advances that mandate 
the disappearance of certain trades or crafts. As an 
assault on identity, this situation exacts an emotional 
as well as financial toll on the artisan that may be as 
bad as that experienced in the factory. Collective 
revolt in the name of a craft, itself, is doubly 
threatened by the disappearance of the craft and by the 
loss of perspective that usually attends collective 
action. Camus's "The silent Men" illustrates the deeper 
issues of human relationship at stake in the persistent 
economic changes of the twentieth century. Obsolescence 
and efficiency often render vocation a very problematic 
source of human identity and, therefore, dignity.
Through the reconception of work, Weil and Camus identify 
this tendency and seek a value to counter it.
Discerning this countering value requires addressing 
the question of syndicalism. Despite his acknowlegement 
of the successes of the trade-union movement, Camus, like
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Weil, distrusted collective action. Both thinkers 
acknowledged the value of having a group from which to 
draw a part of one's identity, but each also knew the 
danger of such affiliations. Their ideas of resistance 
were formed during World War II, that is, in the context 
of resisting collectivities that embraced the choiceless 
choice of "assimilation or destruction" as their raison 
d'etre. Because collectivities are susceptible to 
intolerance, Camus's affinity for trade-unionism appears 
problematic. In this regard, however, it is important to 
recall the that Weil and Camus were each members of the 
French Resistance. There are times when one must stand 
with a collection of other individuals to face down a 
clearly recognized evil. What if the evil to be faced 
down is not so apparently malevolent, as in the case of 
modern working conditions and the collective response of 
trade-unionism? A preliminary response might be that 
there is a deeper value present in their appreciation for 
craft-based trade unions. That value is derived not from 
the collectivity, but rather from the shared recognition 
of the value of the work itself. For Weil and Camus, 
the appeal of an artisan-based mode of labor was the re- 
introduction of a self-involved creative element to even 
the most rudimentary forms of labor. "Work in which one 
can have an interest," Camus wrote in The Rebel.
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"creative work, even though it is badly paid, does not
degrade life."77 The artisan does creative work in a
context, the context being the knowledge of a craft. A
job done well often requires a certain amount of
innovation, even if that innovation takes place within
well-established parameters. An excellent example is Dr.
Rieux's organization of the sanitation squads in The
Plague.78 Weil believed that this sort of innovation
entailed an immanent form of beauty intersecting the
beauty of decreated reality. "What is required is that
this world and the world beyond in their double beauty,"
she wrote in The Need for Roots, "should be present and
associated in the act of work.1,79 Proper instruction
and work undertaken in a certain spirit, here Weil
alludes to the relationship of knowing to apprenticeship,
offered the best way to achieve this association:
Such an association can be achieved by a mode of
presenting thoughts which relates them directly to
the movements and operations peculiar to each sort 
of work, by a process of assimilation sufficiently 
complete to enable them to penetrate into the very 
substance of the individual being, and by a habit 
impressed upon the mind connecting these thoughts 
with the work movements.80
^Camus, The Rebel. 216.
^Camus, The Plague.
^eil, The Need for Roots. 95.
“ibid.
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Creative work, then, is neither random nor nihilistic.
The work of the artisan presumes material limitations and 
rules of proceeding. It also presumes an everpresent 
consciousness of the work being done and a near perpetual 
engagement of mind and body that both Weil and Camus 
believed could serve as a powerful ethical model.
Weil and Camus both saw the value of this type of 
creativity in its applicability to the problems of the 
"order of the world." "The order of the world is the 
same as the beauty of the world," Weil wrote, "all that 
differs is the type of concentration demanded, according 
to whether one tries to conceive the necessary relations 
which go to make it up or contemplate its splendor."81 
By locating the difference between work and art in the 
type of concentration demanded, Weil reveals her belief 
that the difference between the two activities was one of 
degree, not of kind. By considering artistic creation 
rebellion "in its pure state" in The Rebel. Camus 
expressed a similar sentiment. In their political 
thought, the artisan brought mindful creativity to labor 
and craft could thus be used as a source of political 
identity and as a source of political action. Similarly, 
both Weil and Camus saw that the artist's orientation to 
the world might become a powerful metaphor for ethics.
81 Ibid., 295.
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The image of the creator, present in their conception of 
the work of the artisan, is also central and perhaps more 
at home in considerations of artistic creation. It was 
the individual as creator, of his or her existence, of 
his or her political order, that Weil and Camus sought to 
place at the center of political ethics. The discussion 
must now explore the suggestion, implicit in Weil and 
explicit in Camus, that the artist's quest to articulate 
the encounter with reality creatively through the 
depiction of beauty may be transformed into an apt 
metaphor for political ethics.
III. Artistic Creation and Political Ethics 
A creative element is essential to the reconception 
of work as craft. The realm of art provides another 
forum to explore the concept of creativity. To this end, 
Weil and Camus each examined the vocation of the artist 
in their search for a model of ethical being. Art and 
politics seem to share very little. In the minds of Weil 
and Camus, these apparently disparate pursuits had much 
to say to each other and the ethical life. For each 
thinker, the presence of beauty gave life meaning. Art 
fills the human need to articulate beauty. In the 
context of brutal necessity, Weil and Camus in different 
ways believed political order should also reflect this 
human need to express the beautiful. Applying the
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standard of beauty to political order would require not 
only rethinking politics, but also rethinking the 
beautiful. The value of the artist's quest for beauty to 
ethical being is as an image of the political actor's 
search for justice. The artist aspires to a creative 
expression of beauty which requires a discerning openness 
to reality that Weil and Camus each found wanting in 
contemporary political practice. This section will 
demonstrate that the references to politics in their 
separate considerations of art are not coincidental, but 
rather intelligible as the manifestation of their search 
for a creative approach to political life.
Weil's Political Artist: Beauty and Political Vision
All human activities have value for Weil to the 
precise extent that they further the human aspiration to 
make contact with decreated reality. It is incumbent on 
human beings to conduct their activities— in science, in 
art, in politics— in the manner of a search for contact 
with the good. Weil knew that bringing this quest for 
transcendence into the mundane reality of politics was 
vulnerable to an unacceptable messianism and thus 
required an extraordinary image of human conduct that 
would value the end without denigrating the process. 
Beauty, sought and articulated by the artist, was for 
Weil "one of the openings through which the breath and
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the light of God may penetrate.1,82 She wrote sparingly 
on art and the artist, but it is significant that many of 
her speculations on the subject came in reference to 
politics. The political world Weil encountered and 
described in her work was in dire need of beauty.
The object of art for Weil was the expression of the 
good through the depiction of beauty. Weil conceived 
beauty as a source of value, as a bridge between the 
decreated and the created, as evidence of the presence of 
decreated reality in mundane created reality. Recognized 
as a mystery by Weil, beauty was nonetheless a fact. A 
powerful presence in the human imagination, beauty was 
already an authoritative fount of value. "All human 
beings," Weil observed, "use words that refer to beauty 
to designate all the things they rightly or wrongly give 
value to, whatever the nature of the value might be. One 
might believe that they regard beauty as the supreme 
value.1,83 Beauty could bestow value because it 
expressed the unity of created and decreated reality: 
"there is here below but one single beauty that is the
“Simone Weil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in 
Intimations of Christianity. 166. The other "openings" 
were the pure "core of theoretic science" as discussed in 
Chapter One and "affliction" which will be addressed in 
Chapter Four.
“ ibid., 190.
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Beauty of the World."84 Like all human constructs, 
however, the value derived from beauty was susceptible to 
faulty interpretation. But even faulty interpretations 
reflected the unity in human experience. All other 
beauties, Weil argued, in science, in art, in politics, 
"are reflections of that one, be they faithful and pure, 
deformed and soiled, or even diabolically perverted."85
Though our capacity to apprehend beauty lay in the 
decreated part of our souls, the value of beauty to 
ethical existence lay in its appeal to the created part. 
"Doubtless the very essence of the perception of beauty," 
she wrote, "is itself the sentiment of that necessity one 
of whose facets is brutal constraint and the other 
obedience to God."86 Weil believed that "this truth is 
made manifest in the carnal part of our soul, and even in 
some sort to our bodies."87 In much the same way that 
the pervasive force of necessity drains the human spirit 
of energy and hope, discovering the beauty of the world 
in our activities nourishes the spirit, actually feeding 
the carnal part of the soul via the decreated part. Weil 
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"Beauty," she wrote in The Need for Roots, "is something 
to be eaten; it is a food."88 As human beings need food 
to survive, so human beings need beauty to live. It was 
thus imperative for every human endeavor to try to give 
expression to beauty.
Like everything touching the decreated, beauty 
defied precise definition. "Beauty," Weil wrote in 
Gravity and Grace, "is the harmony of chance and the 
good."89 The conciseness of this description belies its 
complexity. The embrace of beauty entails a guest for 
the transcendent. Because we are human that quest 
involves materiality, which is to say chance, 
impermanence and risk. Weil was exceedingly aware of the 
impermanence of things material. Yet, what is expressed 
endures even if its physical embodiment does not.90 The 
risk is that the expression of the beautiful may in fact 
be grotesque or dangerous. This risk can be partially 
offset if human beings remember that to know the good 
through beauty requires attention to necessity and that 
the object of knowing will defy ultimate comprehension. 
Beauty, then, is the recognition, through imagination and
^eil, The Need for Roots. 93.
89Weil, Gravity and Grace. 204.
90This insight is critical to Weil's conception of 
rootedness as will be seen in Chapter Four.
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reason, of necessity in the good. "Beauty," Weil wrote,
"is necessity which, while remaining in conformity with
its own law and with that alone, is obedient to the
good."91 Beauty in necessity is the inevitable counter
to the force of necessity. "The beautiful in nature,"
Weil wrote, "is a union of the sensible impression and of
the sense of necessity. Things must be like that (in the
first place), and precisely, they are like that."92
Recognizing beauty as a counter to the force of
necessity is critical to understanding Weil's ethical
thought. In her last work, Weil wrote:
The great instigators of violence have encouraged 
themselves with the thought of how blind, mechanical 
force is sovereign throughout the universe. . . .
We shall find a more powerful encouragement in the 
thought of how these innumerable blind forces are 
limited, made to balance one against the other, 
brought to form a united whole by something which we 
do not understand but which we call beauty.93
The perception of beauty balances the apparently blind
force perceived in necessity. Attention to beauty offers
the possibility of limiting the effect of force. In its
balancing capacity, beauty not only produces pleasure in
perception, but also reveals an elegantly ordered
functionality. In the recognition of beauty, the
91Weil, Gravity and Grace. 204.
92Ibid.
93Weil, The Need for Roots. 11.
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ordering faculty of knowing finds its positive, creative 
function. To know the world is to be able to recognize 
and articulate the beautiful. "The subject of science," 
Weil wrote, "is the beautiful (that is to say, order, 
proportion, harmony) in so far as it is suprasensible and 
necessary.1,94 Similarly, "the subject of art is 
sensible and contingent beauty discerned through the 
network of chance and evil.1,95 The beauty sought 
through knowing in science, art, and as Weil later 
demonstrates, politics, is the beauty of order, 
proportion and harmony rooted in her Platonic conception 
of the good. In politics, this beauty of order, 
proportion and harmony is manifest as justice. Weil 
recasts the goals of political life in terms of this 
justice, that is, she desires a functional polity, rooted 
in the good, exhibiting the attributes of beauty.
It is significant that this conception of beauty 
(and justice) and the applicability of art to political 
life appears in Weil's last work, The Need for Roots. In 
this work, she argues that "uprootedness," that is, the 
deprivation of human beings' need to exercise real, 
active, natural participation in the life of a community, 
is the product of the violence of unlimited force and the
94Weil, Gravity and Grace. 204.
^Ibid., 204.
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fundamental cause of human misery in the twentieth 
century.96 Communities, whose members are cut off from 
their own identity, use aggression as a substitute for 
self-reflection. The accompanying violence coupled with 
the absence of self-reflection inevitably translates into 
suffering. Weil's early pacificism led her to believe 
that it is the inability to reflect that leads them to 
sacrifice their lives in the name of a soulless 
collectivity. By restoring the reflective to the social, 
Weil sought to recast political life in the nearly 
Kantian terms of obligations owed to human beings:
"There exists an obligation toward every human being for 
the sole reason that he or she is a human being."97 For 
Weil, the pause felt when confronting another human being
was an invitation to reflection.98 The result of that
reflection could only be the affirmation of the 
obligations owed all human beings. Acting in conformity 
with these obligations would revalue all human being.
Revaluation of the individual over and above the 
collectivity necessitates a critical reconsideration of 
the founding principles of a community. A successful 
reconsideration of those principles engenders an
96Weil, The Need for Roots. 43.
97Ibid., 5.
98Weil, "Essay on the Notion of Reading," 297-303.
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appreciation of the beauty therein expressed, grounding 
that community more deeply in its place and in its 
traditions. Weil called this amalgam of place and 
traditions the "vital medium." The vital medium must not 
be a source of prejudice. She wrote, "There is one's own 
particular vital medium; but there are others besides.
It has been produced by a network of causes in which good 
and evil, justice and injustice have been mixed up 
together, and so it cannot be the best possible one."99 
Institutional manifestations of the vital medium should 
be preserved as long as the beauty therein can be 
discerned, that is, as long as the institutions reflect 
the nutritive character of the vital medium. When those 
institutions cease serving that function, the 
articulation of the vital medium can be altered, but the 
beauty expressed in the vital medium must be preserved. 
The capacity to alteration requires a fecund environment 
in which the imagination is nurtured and the human soul 
is nourished.100 The chief adversary of this fecundity
"Weil, The Need for Roots. 161.
100This brief discussion of rootedness will be 
expanded in Chapter Four.
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is cultural stagnation and the associated violence of
internal oppression or external expansion.101
Bringing a creative imagination, that is, one
attentive to beauty, to bear on the maladies of the
polity is a critical component of Weil's conception of
the "political art." In a 1937 essay called "A Note on
Social Democracy" Weil began articulating her vision of
the "political art."102 In this brief essay, politics
appears as the work of the artisan, dependent upon the
creative faculties of knowing. Here, the effective use
of the imagination to counter the "collective
imagination" emerges as the centerpiece of any political
action. Weil describes imagination as the "fabric of
social life and the dynamic of history."103 She writes,
The state of men's imaginations at a given moment 
dictates the limits within which power can be 
effectively used, at that moment, so as to produce
101Weil uses her understanding of Marxism to analyze 
the nature of oppression in her early work Oppression and 
Liberty. The inevitable expansion of such regimes was 
the root of war and equally problematic for Weil. She 
addresses this question in the Need for Roots and also in 
earlier political essays like "Cold War Policy in 1939," 
"The Great Beast: Reflections on the Origins of
Hitlerism," and "East and West: Thoughts on the
Colonial Problem," in Selected Essays. 177-94, 89-140, 
and 195-210 respectively.
102Simone Weil, "A Note on Social Democracy," in 
Selected Essavs. 150-53.
103Ibid., 150.
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real results. Once the moment has passed, different 
limits come into operation.104
The ability to govern depends upon possession of a vision
that allows discerning these often subtle shifts in what
is possible and necessary. It is imperative that the
political actor maintain a critical distance on the
collective imagination, acting in conformity to its
needs, without succumbing to the temptation to be at the
mercy of its desires. The creative use of this political
faculty Weil called "methodical action." Methodical
action "does not mean taking measures at the moment when
they will be effective; it means choosing the moment when
they are possible, in anticipation of the one when they
will be effective."105 Of the political actor lacking
"this art of seizing the right moment," Weil wrote, "his
good intentions only pave the road to hell."106 In this
essay, as in her later work, political effectiveness is
determined by mindful attention, right action and its
consequences. These are the minimum requirements for the
just political act.
Imaginatively addressing the problem of




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
201
requires confronting social and political existence with 
an open mind. In this work Weil finds it useful to 
invoke the image of the artist in her discussion of 
political action. Here, political action is very much 
like composing; the political actor appears very much the 
artist. "The mode of political action outlined in these 
pages," she writes, "requires that every choice made be 
preceded by the simultaneous review of several 
considerations of a very different nature."107 In 
Weil's understanding of political decision-making there 
is the necessity of weighing issues and interests from 
several levels of existence simultaneously. Such 
decisions require, Weil wrote, "a high degree of 
concentration, more or less of the same standard as that 
required for creative work in art or science."108 
Politics must be conducted with attentiveness and 
imagination. So conducted, politics, like art and 
science, can be means to much greater ends, means to 
participation in the good. "Why should politics," Weil 
wonders, "which decide the fate of peoples and whose 
object is justice, demand any less concentration than art 
or science, whose respective objects are beauty and
107Weil, The Need for Roots. 216.
108Ibid.
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truth?"109 To the degree that they represented human 
aspirations to contact with the decreated, Weil believed 
politics, art and science and their objects justice, 
beauty and truth, were interchangeable as equivalences in 
the realm of the good. As such, they should be 
undertaken in the same spirit and with the same care.
Weil's introduction of beauty as a political value 
is risky because beauty defies precise definition and the 
ordered functionality of beauty's disclosure might take a 
dangerous form. Such risk, as some contemporary 
political theorists have argued, is an integral part of 
political life.110 Weil agreed, believing that the 
absence of risk "produces a type of boredom which 
paralyzes in a different way from fear, but almost as 
much."111 Weil used the image of the artist's work to 
address the problem of risk. A political life in which 
chances are not taken lacks the potential for the
109Ibid.
110Of contemporary commentators, the most valuable is 
likely Martha Nussbaum. See her The Fragility of 
Goodness; Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
and "Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of
Aristotelian Essentialism," Political Theory 20:2 (May 
1992): 202-246.
111Risk is one of Weil's enumerated needs of the soul 
in The Need for Roots. 34. She continues, "Risk is a 
form of danger which provokes deliberate reaction; that 
is to say, it doesn't go beyond the soul's resources to 
the point of crushing the soul beneath a load of fear."
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extraordinary. A risk-free political life succumbs to 
the inertial force of necessity. By contrast, chances 
taken in the name of beauty make demands on the human 
creative capacity and offer the possibility of another 
kind of political existence.
Weil believed that art like craft or trade required 
a period of preparation for the artist. Discerning 
beauty requires attentive knowing, but discerning is only 
the beginning of knowing. Expression is equally 
critical: "Simultaneous composition on several planes at
once is the law of artistic creation," Weil writes, "and 
wherein, in fact, lies its difficulty."112 As in the 
artist's dilemma about what elements to apply where, the 
complexity of political decision-making lies in the fact 
that these several planes of composition may in fact 
represent irreconcilable interests. Thus, there is a 
need for a mediating component derived from the 
imagination which Weil calls "inspiration."
Weil defines inspiration as "a tension on the part 
of the soul's faculties which renders possible the 
indispensable degree of concentration required for 
composition on a multiple plane."113 Inspiration 
requires an openness to the "supernatural" or the
112Weil, The Need for Roots. 216.
1l3Ibid.
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decreated.114 All who "persevere humbly and patiently" 
may develop the capacity for inspiration.115 Weil poses 
inspiration as an antidote to the conceit that all or 
even most political problems can be unravelled through 
the use of human reason narrowly understood. The broader 
faculty of knowing, including imagination and 
inspiration, is necessary. "The method of political 
action outlined here," Weil writes, "goes beyond the 
possibilities of the human intelligence, at least as far 
as those possibilities are known. But it is precisely 
that which lends it its value."116 Moreover, knowing is 
not enough. To have value, the insight into reality must 
be expressed. The chance must be taken. In art as in 
politics, risk cannot be avoided, and mistakes invariably 
will be made. The consequences of risk and mistakes can 
be minimized if one is properly prepared. Thus the need
114Weil's concern with the supernatural is at the 
core of her mysticism and so it is little surprising to 
find it similarly placed in her political thought. Many 
commentators, however, have resisted this idea. The 
supernatural has been, for some, a reason to consider 
only her speculations on God and the nature of religious 
faith. It is just as useful as the centerpiece of her 
social and political theory, for while truth cannot be 
attained in the world, it must be striven for. My own 
understanding of Weil's sense of the supernatural is 
heavily influenced by that found in Peter Winch, The Just 
Balance, especially, 207.
115Weil, The Need for Roots. 217.
116Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 0 5
for inspiration, a creative faculty developed through 
desire and concentration, stored and nourished in the 
human soul and exercised each time a decision is made. 
Political decisions are made and felt in the realm of 
created reality. As human acts, they can never finally 
be perfect in motive or effect. Weil concludes, however, 
that on this model, there is, "perhaps, the chance that 
the decisions though imperfect will be good ones."117
The tolerance of imperfection, of mistakes, is 
another important, neglected aspect of Weil's political 
vision. It seems anathema to a thinker so proud of her 
own intellectual rigor and intent on acting in accordance 
with the good. The imperfections of nature are part of 
the beauty of the world. The flaws in human being make 
the human need to discern beauty ennobling. Weil's 
understanding of Christianity and her reading of Plato 
allowed her to aspire to the ideal while remaining 
unperturbed by the impossibility of attaining it. The 
active, patient search for beauty in the created world 
reveals the value of the artist's temperament. "In order 
to write verse that contains some beauty," she writes, 
"one must have had the ambition to equal by the 
arrangement of words that pure and divine beauty which,
117Ibid.
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according to Plato, lies on the other side of the 
skies."118 Similarly in Christianity only "the desire 
for perfection has the virtue of being able to destroy in 
the soul some part of the evil that defiles it."119 
Governing structures, for which she adapted Plato's term 
"the Great Beast," for all their imperfections and 
dangers, are for Weil necessary to created existence.120 
Beauty offers a standard against which political 
institutions may be measured. The beauty to be found in 
governing structures reflects the ethical and spiritual 
success of a civilization in creating an order grounded 
in the good. The success of a community's political life 
can then be measured by the elegance as well as the 
efficiency with which it handles its imperfections, and 
thereby manages "risk."
In a functional political order, the political 
actor's desire for justice must be indistinguishable from
118Ibid.
119Ibid., 218.
120See Weil's essay "The Great Beast: Reflections on
the Origins of Hitlerism" in Selected Essays. 89-140. In 
her discussion in Waiting for God translated by Emma 
Craufurd (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1951), page 54, Weil
describes the tendency in some social collectivities to 
fancy themselves a kind of "ersatz divinity," but 
explains that "By social, I do not mean everything 
connected with citizenship, but only collective 
emotions." An entire section of Weil's Gravity and Grace. 
216-22, is devoted to reflections on "The Great Beast."
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the artist's desire for beauty. This desire may be
evident in the words as well as the deeds of the
political actor. For Weil, language was an often
unrecognized locus or instrument of the power over others
she called "force.1,121 Weil writes,
To the extent to which human language falls short of 
divine beauty, to that extent Man's sentient and 
intellectual faculties fall short of truth, and 
necessities of social life fall short of justice. 
Consequently, politics cannot but be as much in need
of efforts of creative invention as are art and
122science.
The dangers and inadequacies of human language account 
for the multiplicity of opinions which have as little to 
do with politics "as has the clash of aesthetic opinion 
in the cafes of Montparnasse to do with art."123 To the 
political leader or artist such opinions can only serve 
as a "certain stimulant" to be taken in very small doses. 
Political inspiration feeds upon, but does not rely 
solely upon this type of discourse. What Weil proposes, 
and in this Camus follows her, is recasting political 
activity with reference to beauty as an endeavor worthy
121Weil, The Iliad, or the Poem of Force. Weil was 
fascinated by Machiavelli and her understanding of force 
resembles Machiavelli's understanding of fortune. 
Understood in this way, force, most often used as a tool 
of domination, may also be used as an object of positive 
creative energy.
122Weil, The Need for Roots. 218.
123Ibid.
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of mention in the same breath as art or science.
"Politics are practically never looked upon as an art of 
so high a category," she writes, because we have "been 
accustomed to regard them solely, or at least 
principally, as a technique for acquiring and holding on 
to power."124 For Weil, the twentieth century by its 
tragic example had to mark the end of this way of 
thinking about politics. The destructiveness of modern 
politics demanded human beings face that "now, power is 
not an end."125
Camus's Creative Politics: Beauty and Rebellion
The relationship between the vocation of the artist 
and an ethical political life was central to Camus's 
thought. The essence of the diversity of human 
experience, he believed, could be more fundamentally 
captured by art than it could be empirically observed and 
conclusively stated by science, especially political 
science. Camus viewed art as participatory, as ethical 
act. "The first choice an artist makes," Camus wrote,
"is precisely to be an artist, and if he chooses to be an 
artist it is in what he is himself and because of a
124Ibid.
125Ibid.
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certain idea he has of art.”126 For Camus, art was a 
functional, creative response to the absurdity of the 
human condition. This section will demonstrate that his 
writings on the nature and function of art, as a form of 
creative rebellion, are intelligible as meditations on 
the freedom of human action in the modern world. Camus 
valued a self-reflective, creative existence as a 
corollary to thoughtful political action.
The creative rebellion Camus envisioned contained 
identifiable elements though the rebellion itself lacked 
a definitive structure. The specific modes of rebellion 
change as the conditions they meet differ. Before 
proceeding to draw Camus's analogy of artistic creation 
and political existence, therefore, the elements of 
creative rebellion and the manner in which they function 
must be identified.
Creative rebellion required vision or knowing of a 
special sort which Camus termed "lucidity." As the 
discussion of knowing demonstrates, the human being's 
need to articulate existence is the deepest human desire. 
That articulation, however, posits a value. The creative 
act inevitably values that which it depicts. Artistic 
creativity's promise as an ethical model lays precisely
126Albert Camus, Actuelles I. 263 quoted in Bree, 
Camus, 244.
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in this capacity to "create" value. Art as act entails a 
myriad of choices and embraces a diversity of values, 
from subject, to the form and medium chosen, to size. 
Though an expression of the artist's vision, the art 
Camus envisions cannot be nihilistic. The choice to 
create is an attempt to communicate, in a symbolic 
language commonly-held, the familiar or shared in human 
experience. For Camus, art is an expression of human 
knowing ordering the disordered world. Art's function is 
not the representation of some singular aspect of 
reality, but the derivation of a unity from reality. The 
articulated unity defies reality and Camus calls this 
defiant unity "beauty." The artist's expression of 
beauty reveals an order in that which is without order, a 
unity in that which lacks unity. The creative depiction 
of beauty defies absurd existence. David Sprintzen 
argues that the shortcoming of art as an ethical model is 
that it only offers this ordering vision to the 
partaker.127 But by only offering, the artist resists 
the temptation to impose the vision upon others or the 
world. There is much danger, from Camus's perspective, 
in a unity that fancies itself a totality. The artist's 
recognition of beauty allows the human creature as 
creator to order, if only for a moment, a world which
127Sprintzen, Camus: A Critical Examination.
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lacks coherence. This momentary clarity is then also 
available to the partaker, though the partaker must 
understand the temporary character of the artist's 
insight.
Reclaiming beauty in this way was critical for 
Camus's ethical thought as he believed contemporary 
totalizing conceptions of beauty had become analogous to 
the Truth claimed by Inquisitorial clerics in the past 
and the totalitarian dictators of his present. "Beauty," 
he writes, "even today, especially today, cannot serve 
any party; it cannot serve, in the long or short run, 
anything but men's suffering or their liberty."128 
Unlike Weil's conception of beauty as a bridge between 
the transcendent and the mundane, Camus held that 
beauty's metaphysical content was of only marginal 
importance in the political realm. Camus argued that 
defiant beauty now must chiefly serve human experience.
In The Rebel he wrote that "to create beauty" the 
creative being "must simultaneously reject reality and 
exalt certain of its aspects."129 In this rejecting 
capacity, beauty defies the absurd, acknowledging the 
world while expressing a preference for another vision, a 
vision in which that which human beings all share takes
128Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 267.
129Camus, The Rebel. 258.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
212
precedence. By its valuation of beauty, art articulates 
the human potential for the realization of this 
experiential sameness among human beings. For Camus, art 
and rebellion each speak from the ground of this common 
human "nature." Rebellion in man, Camus holds in a 
Kantian moment, "is the refusal to be treated as an 
object" and "the affirmation of a nature common to all 
men which eludes the world of power."130 It is in 
asserting this common human nature that art and rebellion 
defy the finality of absurd existence and the 
inevitability of human suffering. At the same time, art 
and rebellion, inasmuch as each requires an engagement of 
reality, offer a foundation on which to build social and 
political order. The character of this engagement, the 
imaginative reconstruction of this foundation, is 
problematic and raises the issue of the relationship 
between Camus's conception of rebellion and modern 
conceptions of revolution.
The defiant character of beauty, Camus understood, 
means that its "procedure" which "is to contest reality 
while endowing it with unity is also the procedure of 
rebellion."131 The character of the creative act is
130Ibid. This is as close as Camus gets to positing 
a formal "human nature."
131Ibid., 276.
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rebellion, but Camus took pains to distinguish this 
rebellion from modern conceptions of revolution. Modern 
revolution involves the physical imposition of a 
totality, a distortion of reality lacking limits or 
boundaries without which modern revolutions come to 
define themselves by their destructive capacities. 
Revolutions destroy the world in order to remake it and 
leave themselves open to being replaced in a similar 
fashion. Rebellion, on the other hand, though like 
revolution born of the absurd realization that things are 
not as they should be, is a response in quite another 
direction. While each entails a vision imposed, 
revolution physically imposes the vision, destroying in 
the act of creating. Rebel creation, by contrast, offers 
a vision of a more complete, if never ultimately 
complete, existence. Genius without discipline was 
madness for Camus. Far from a nihilist denial of 
discipline, Camus believed creative rebellion was "the 
affirmation of a limit, a dignity, and a beauty common to 
all men [which] only entails the necessity of extending 
this value to embrace everything and everyone and of 
advancing toward unity without denying the origins of 
rebellion."132 Together, art and rebellion posit a
132Ibid., 251.
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value whose function is to limit history: that value is
the beauty of the coherence of human experience.
Imagination, thought, and action, Camus argues, 
demand a corresponding unity in order to exist.
Therefore, the human conception of a better world could 
be no more adequately expressed than in artistic 
creation. But the notion of unity does not entail the 
imposition of a totality. Unity must not lose its 
tensional relationship to the diversity of existence.
Any vision of a better world must remain a vision. No 
creative work is final; vision always demands 
rearticulation. Unlike the revolutionary's material 
aspiration to absolute unity, the rebel's vision must be 
grounded in the goal of a more lucid articulation of 
unity rather than the revolutionary consummation of 
totality. Creativity, not tyranny, is the authentic 
political manifestation of lucidity.
In The Rebel, art emerges as the final perspective 
on the content of rebellion. But life in fruitful 
rebellion requires discipline of the self. In The Myth 
of Sisvphus. Camus wrote that artistic creation is an 
activity that "calls for daily effort, self-mastery, a 
precise estimate of the limits of truth, measure and
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strength."133 Art, Camus believes, "constitutes an 
ascesis." a curious term which adds a religious character 
to the idea of aesthetic discipline.134 But Camus 
clearly did not intend the artist to be a monk, nor did 
he wish to bring to mind Nietzschean ascetic priests, an 
interpretation of the role of political and spiritual 
leaders for which Camus had great sympathy.135 Instead, 
art like political existence is a matter of constant 
confrontation with reality: lucidity, like its
expression, is an ongoing experience. Art, for Camus, is 
a vocation, literally a calling from within, a yearning 
to creative expression consonant with the human need to 
defy death. Creation is the human longing for freedom 
hurling itself against a terminal existence. The product 
of the creative process, while significant, is not as 
critical to Camus's ethical thought as the creative
133Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 115. Philip Thody in 
Albert Camus: A Study of His Work (New York, 1957), 104, 
finds "[t]he lyricism of The Mvth of Sisyphus is genuine, 
that of The Rebel seems forced and is an attempt to 
reintroduce feeling into a world from which an excess of 
logic has banished it."
134Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus. 115.
135From the prison chaplain in The Stranger to Father 
Paneloux in The Placrue. this is a recurring character in 
Camus's fiction. These characters deny the world as it 
"is" for a world beyond that is "ought," which is 
unacceptable to Camus to the degree that it allows these 
knowing figures not to dirty their hands in the plagues 
of this world.
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process itself. It is the act of creation, the process, 
which articulates and mediates the tensions of existence: 
unity and diversity, order and disorder, revolution and 
rebellion, the "is" and the "ought," thought and action, 
the mundane and the divine, reason and revelation. While 
creative rebellion can never claim, as is the temptation, 
to resolve these tensions, it nonetheless takes as its 
task expressing their tensionality as a unity. To the 
degree that politics is about instituting something,
Camus posits the expression of this tensional wholeness 
as that which is to be instituted.136 The difficulty is 
that such visions are temporary, while the institutional 
arrangements that issue from them tend to be more or less 
permanent. Can we afford to think of our institutions as 
incomplete or temporary? Camus's answer is "yes," if we 
understand the temporary as legitimate but incomplete, 
that is, if we understand that institutions must be 
subject to change when the conditions they were formed to 
meet change. This apparently fluid political order 
requires an acuity in managing change that Camus's 
conception of creative politics was designed to foster.
136That politics is about instituting something is 
the contention of post-modern thinkers like Jean-Francois 
Lyotard. See Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, Just Gaming 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985). For
a critique of the postmodern view of the question, see 
Honi Fern Haber, Bevond Postmodern Politics: Lvotard,
Rortv. Foucault (New York: Routledge, 1994).
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At the same time, creative rebellion also requires 
respect for limits. For Camus, creative rebellion is the 
"political art." Such expression as the artist employs, 
Camus believed, bestows meaning upon the creative act, be 
it artistic or political.
Genuine creativity, in art or politics, requires the 
recognition of limits. Beauty limits the creative 
process through the impermanent material character of its 
articulation. Creativity is further limited by the 
artist-actor's use of elements or what Camus called 
"style." Creation gives expression and form to the 
"impossible demand" to impose order on what seems 
hopelessly disordered.137 The kind of order the artist 
imposes on reality, Camus says, is indicative of the 
intensity of the artist's rejection of reality. At the 
same time, the degree of rejection determines the value 
of the work. The rejection may be next to non-existent 
as in the case of realist art, which makes a futile, if 
exhaustive attempt to depict reality. The rejection may 
also be total, as in the case of excessively abstract or 
formalist work. But realism and formalism, like the 
values posited by modern revolution, are manifestations 
of the same mistake: neither sufficiently mediates the
tensions of existence; neither exhibits the balance
137Camus, The Rebel. 271.
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required of true creativity. From Camus's perspective, 
realism and formalism each lack the discipline or 
ontological limits of style.
In the act of creation, it is "style" that limits 
the artistic reconstruction of the world. "The unity in 
art," Camus writes in The Rebel. "appears at the limit of 
the transformation that the artist imposes on 
reality."138 Style is the limit imposed by the artist 
"by his language and by a redistribution of elements 
derived from reality."139 Whereas beauty is a more 
general aesthetic quality, that which is to be expressed, 
style is as much act as quality, the manner of the 
artist's expression. Style is the means through which 
the artist gives form to reality. "In this domain,"
Camus argues in The Rebel, "as in others, any unity that 
is not a unity of style is a mutilation. Whatever may be 
the chosen point of view of an artist, one principle 
remains common to all creators: stylization, which
supposes the simultaneous existence of reality and of 
mind which gives reality its form."uo Style is the 
consistent application of the creative sensibility to the 
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by the autonomy of reality, while the faculty of knowing 
confronts reality to derive a creative interpretation.
The essential element of the act of creation is 
maintaining the interaction of form and content. No 
convincing unity is expressed in a work in which "the 
content overflows the form, or in which the form drowns 
the content."141 The two chief defects of modern art, 
Camus believed, the tendencies to realism and formalism 
had their analogs, their parallels, in the conduct of 
modern politics.
It is the style of the artist as well as the style 
of the political community that determines the 
potentiality for the existence of beauty or justice in 
that community. In the social and political realm, style 
gives form to the community's and the individual's 
existence. It is a discipline of self and society which 
finds its expression in institutions, rituals or 
myth.142 Camus's idea of style functions as a locus for 
his concern for maintaining the discipline required of 
true creativity and the nearly ascetic commitment 
required of the artist. The artistic genius creates and 
respects his or her own limits. In the ethical realm,
141 Ibid.
142See Camus's concern with the funeral ritual in 
both The Stranger and The Plaque discussed in Chapter Two 
above.
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those limits begin at the point of contact with the 
another human being. The creative political actor must 
act in the context of others and remain mindful of this 
limitation. Like Weil, Camus believed the presence of 
the other is decisive. For Camus it means that political 
life too must remain conscious of style. The vision is 
offered to, not imposed upon the other. Likewise, in 
creative political existence, the actor must find a way 
of expression that remains conscious and respectful of 
the limits that existence in a community of human beings 
requires. All is not permitted.
As an ascetic activity, then, creation requires the 
conscious discipline of the artist. In art, some measure 
of artistic genius may be found in any of the several 
aesthetic activities. Sculpture, Camus argued, is "bent 
on capturing, in three dimensions, the fugitive figure of 
man, and on restoring the unity of great style to the 
general disorder of gestures."143 Likewise, the 
painter's choice of frame and subject is about imposing 
stability on incessant change. Each of these forms 
impose its own order and assert its own unity. But 
political existence requires engagement with reality and 
neither of these art forms interacts with its world to a 
degree satisfactory to Camus. Style entails interaction,
143Camus, The Rebel. 256.
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and Camus's insistence on interaction defines his notion 
of creative human existence.
Camus's idea of the novel illuminates his notion of 
interaction as art's function in the modern world. The 
novel, Camus believed, was the product of the time of the 
spirit of rebellion, allowing the artist to embrace the 
world as the home of human beings while denying it as the 
place of their torment.144 The novel draws upon 
humanity's need to control its destiny, depicting that 
control (if not imposing it, as in modern revolution) 
while remaining conscious that the very notion of the 
human control of destiny is an impossibility. This 
concern with destiny is reflected in human desires for 
perpetuation and possession. For instance, Camus
144Compare Camus's view of the function of the novel 
with that of M. M. Bakhtin in his work on the categories 
of literature and their subcategories. His concern is 
the novel as the only developing form of literature. 
Literature, Bakhtin believes, assimilates real historical 
time and space. At various stages of literary 
development, this process of assimilation produces a 
novelistic narrative which yields associated images of 
human beings. See Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination:
Four Essays, translated by Michael Holquist (Austin,
1981).
Germaine Bree writes in Bree, Camus. 242:
"Literature was for Camus an essential human activity, 
one of the most fundamental. It expresses and safeguards 
the aspiration toward freedom, coherence, and beauty, 
those components of man's relative happiness, an 
aspiration which alone makes life valuable for each 
separate transient human being. It defines that part of 
existence in which each individual is more than a social 
unity or an insignificant cog in the evolution of 
history.1
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believed that a sense of its permanence makes suffering 
endurable. " [I]n this insatiable need for perpetuation,1 
Camus wrote, "we should better understand human suffering 
if we knew that it was eternal."145 Perpetuation allows 
the theoretical presence of eternity, Camus's reasoning 
goes, which in turn gives human beings a sense of 
destiny. Millennialist faith in the return of Christ, 
the Enlightenment's faith in the human conquest of 
nature, and the history-driven totalitarian regimes of 
the twentieth century had all been symptomatic of this 
tendency.
Western liberal democracies were not immune from a 
similar, if less openly monstrous, flaw. Liberal 
commercial democracies, where human rights were bound up 
with the possession of property, freely bought into the 
fetish for destiny. Camus argues that it is for the sake 
of destiny that human beings desire possessions: the
human need to possess, on which commercial societies are 
founded, leads to the need to possess others in the way 
that objects are possessed, all belying a deeper need to 
control some part of human destiny. In the novel, for 
Camus an artistic form born of the modern era, this very 
human need is satiated. In the novel, Camus wrote in The 
Rebel, the reader "is finally able to give himself the
145Camus, The Rebel. 261.
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alleviating form and limits which he pursues in vain in 
his own life."146 The novel's significance is that it 
engages the reader in the reader's present, it "creates 
destiny to suit any eventuality and is, therefore, part 
of absurd existence, while denying it by positing a 
destiny."147 It is the novel's handling of destiny,
Camus thinks, which is its chief aesthetic value. The 
novel defies the absurd, offering a means to discern the 
permanent value of human existence, that is, it squarely 
rejects reality "without accepting the necessity of 
escaping it."148
The style of Camus's rebel creation, then, be it in 
art or politics, is a creativity somewhere between 
realism and formalism. Human creation can never be 
perfect: by definition it bears the distortion "that is
the mark of both art and protest."149 Style must retain 
the delicate equilibrium that is the mark of both 
creation and civilization. "It is the same thing with 
creation as with civilization: it presumes uninterrupted
tension between form and matter, between evolution and 
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The Rebel. "If the equilibrium is destroyed, the result 
is dictatorship or anarchy, propaganda or formal 
insanity. In either case creation, which always 
coincides with rational freedom, is impossible."150 The 
twin lessons of modernity, which Camus gleans from his 
experience, are that reforms require the reinterpretation 
of human existence and that all interpretations of human 
existence are in need of the limits of style. Modern art 
and contemporary European politics each chose either 
realism or formalism. Each choice is a counterproductive 
fundamentalism detrimental to human existence. By 
contrast, the style of the rebel acknowledges and 
embraces the boundaries and limits of the "created 
universe."
For Camus, the purposes of artistic creation and
political participation are the same: the imaginative
participation in the reconstruction (rebellion) as
opposed to the material destruction (revolution) of the
human being's universe. Camus offers Proust as an example
of an artist who accomplished the artist's task. Proust,
demonstrated that the art of the novel can 
reconstruct creation itself, in the form that it is 
imposed on us and in the form in which we reject it. 
In one of its aspects, at least, this art consists 
in choosing the creature in preference to his 
creator. But still more profoundly, it is allied to 
the beauty of the world or of its inhabitants
150Ibid.
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against the powers of death and oblivion. It is in
this way that his rebellion is creative.151
Art describes reality without conceding to it, embraces 
life without denying death. Similarly, political 
existence involves engaging reality without conceding to 
the finality of the absurd. Camus's fundamental 
requirement of both artistic creation and political 
participation is that they assert the value of unity in 
the face of absurd diversity. The assertion and the 
unity, creation and the value it posits, are 
dialectically related. Neither can exist without the 
other. As the value that drives human creativity, unity 
in the midst of diversity nurtures and exalts the human; 
it does not beat human beings into an unnatural 
homogeneous conformity. Illustrating the point, Camus 
wrote that "[r]eligion or crime, every human endeavor in 
fact, finally obeys this unreasonable desire and claims 
to give life a form it does not have. The same impulse, 
which can lead to the adoration of the heavens or the 
destruction of man, also leads to creative literature, 
which derives its content from this source."152 For 
Camus, the need or quest for unity is always the passion 
that lifts human beings above "the commonplaces of the
151Ibid., 267-268 (my emphasis) .
152Ibid., 262.
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dispersed world" and is thus the fount for all
extraordinary human endeavors, artistic and political.
Camus could not distinguish the task of the artist
from the obligations of human beings living in community.
In a lecture on Algeria entitled "Appeal for a Civilian
Truce" Camus conceded:
I am not a political man, and my passions and 
inclinations do not lead me to public platforms. I 
step onto the podium only when forced to by the 
pressure of circumstances and by my conception of my
function as a writer. As to the basis of the 
■Algerian problem, I shall probably have, as events 
multiply and suspicions increase on both sides, more 
doubts than certainties to express.153
The writer's obligation is to express with passion in a
way not hostile to reason the complexities of a given
situation (in this case, the civil war in Algeria,
Camus's home, a conflict of the most personal kind). For
Camus, the essential element in the relationship between
art and politics may be found, then, in the motivation of
the artist: the assertion of what human beings hold in
common through the articulation of the lucid encounter
with reality. Camus would have us understand him (Camus
as artist) as neither a reporter describing (as in
realist art) nor a prophet prescribing (as in formalist
art) . The artists' vocation is not judge, but justifier:
"judging contemporary man," he wrote, "in the name of a
153Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 132 (my 
emphasis).
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man who does not yet exist is the function of
prophecy."154 The prophet judges absolutely. The
artist cannot. Camus elaborated in a lecture on the role
of the artist:
If he judged absolutely, he would arbitrarily divide 
reality into good and evil, and thus indulge in 
melodrama. The aim of art, on the contrary, is not 
to legislate or to reign supreme, but rather to 
understand first of all. Sometimes it does reign 
supreme, as a result of understanding. But no work 
of genius has ever been based on hatred or contempt. 
This is why the artist, at the end of his slow 
advance, absolves instead of condemning.155
Camus deals with this guestion of the artist as prophet
in the short story "The Artist at Work" in Exile and the
Kingdom. The story's principal, the painter Jonas, is
named for the Biblical Jonah, the reluctant prophet.156
Jonas becomes so consumed by being the celebrated person
called artist that he must undertake a period of
154Ibid., 266. "Judging" is one of the central 
problems in Camus' work, as this characterization of the 
prophet and that of the judge-penitent in The Fall (New 
York, 1956) indicates, Camus did not want to judge, yet 
knew that to live is to judge. Also if we accept Camus' 
understanding of the work of the prophet, it is difficult 
to characterize him as such though Jean Kellogg does so 
in Dark Prophets of Hope: Dostoevsky. Sartre. Camus. 
Faulkner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
More useful, perhaps, is the approach of Felix S. A. 
Rysten who studied the figure of the false prophet in the 
work itself. See Rysten, False Prophets in the Fiction 
of Camus. Dostoevsky. Melville, and Others (Coral Gables: 
University of Miami Press, 1972).
155Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 266.
156Albert Camus, "The Artist at Work," in Exile and 
the Kingdom. 110-158.
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spiritual and physical exile to restore his creativity. 
Jonas rediscovers his creative self only by putting down 
his brushes. Jonas realized that the work of the artist 
is understanding, not explanation. The artist as cause 
celebre spends far too much time explaining or listening 
to explanations of the work. Though the artist's is an 
incomplete understanding, his task is expressing, 
creating it. To view the work of the artist as either 
comprehensively descriptive or prescriptive is to 
bastardize the tension that the artist seeks to 
articulate. Here Camus's notion of the artist's ascesis 
is essential. Ascetic discipline compels the artist 
constantly to rearticulate his lucid experience with 
reality. Lucidity demands the artist justify human 
existence, even if it means condemning the present order 
as inhuman. This is the artist's spiritual and political 
obligation, for the need to rearticulate his existential 
experience is ontological as well. A just political 
order demands an ascetic engagement of reality by the 
political actor.
At the poles of absurd existence, then, are 
absolutes. Modern revolution embraces absolutes in the 
name of a given set of values. It posits an absolute 
knowledge of human nature: either in the form of abject
sinfulness or in a superhuman form capable of all
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knowledge. By contrast, rebellion is existence in 
resistance to the assertion of absolutes. It 
simultaneously acknowledges human limitations, and denies 
the moral and ethical tyranny implicit in those 
limitations. The unity or wholeness posited by the 
artist is of the commonality of human experience. This 
commonality of human being is the only value explicit in 
Camus's aesthetics, and it is the foundation of his 
understanding of political participation. In The Rebel. 
Camus writes,
One can reject all history and yet accept the world 
of the sea and the stars. The rebels who wish to 
ignore nature and beauty are condemned to banish 
from history everything with which they want to 
construct the dignity of existence. Every great 
reformer tries to create in history what 
Shakespeare, Cervantes, Moliere, and Tolstoy knew 
how to create: a world always ready to satisfy the
hunger for freedom and dignity which everyman 
carries in his heart. Beauty, no doubt, does not 
make revolutions. But a day will come when 
revolutions will have need of beauty.157
An articulate longing for unity must not degenerate into
a futile attempt at definition. Camus understood that
attempts to define human nature inevitably fall into the
trap of enumerating a set of contingent values. The
capacity to participate creatively in community, or
philosophically, to participate creatively in a community
of being, is the only value that Camus derives from his
157Camus, The Rebel. 276.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 3 0
sense of a common human nature. Camus, in choosing 
rebellion, revealed his belief that expressing a 
commonality in human experience need not mean the precise 
definition of human nature.
Camus's aesthetic considerations, examined for what 
they tell of his at times obscure political position, 
reveal a man preoccupied with preserving human existence 
in community, while embracing a politics profoundly 
individual and ethical, rather than collective and 
institutional. Camus's was a politics of individual 
participation in human community, an ethic of self- 
conscious political participation.158 The danger in 
such thinking, of course, is that each might mistake 
personal will for universal law. But this is the precise 
tendency Camus thought the ascetic requirement of his 
ethic, derived from his notions of human creativity, 
would derail. The self-conscious effort on behalf of the 
individual would lead to an awareness of some "common 
human nature" which could act as a basis for the
158Camus found his own ethical standard difficult to 
live up to. He has been roundly criticized by Sprintzen, 
Camus: A Critical Examination: Patrick McCarthy, Camus
(New York: Random House, 1982); and Conor Cruise
O'Brien, Albert Camus of Europe and Africa (New York: 
Viking Press, 1970) for his ethical paralysis over the 
matter of the Algerian Civil War. Camus was nonetheless 
honest about the personal nature of the conflict. See 
Camus, "Algeria" in Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 109- 
154.
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formation and undergirding of human community. Camus had 
no utopian vision that a day would come when such a 
civilization would emerge. Camus the artist recognized 
that such a mode of being was at best a potentiality 
within human beings. Nonetheless, chief among a 
citizen's political duties is the constant questioning of 
existence, not in existential despair, but rather, as a 
challenge to human potentiality.
IV. Conclusion: Creative Politics
The paired images of the artisan-worker and the 
artist in the thought of both Weil and Camus are 
instructive as to the nature of creativity and its 
application to a political world characterized by force. 
Creativity involves bringing the faculties of the 
individual to bear on politics without sacrificing human 
dignity, in person or soul, to force. The creative form 
of knowing the world entails the daring to see what is 
not self-evident (taking chances) and the wisdom to 
embrace that which is self-evident (protecting vital 
media). In the political thought of Weil and Camus, work 
and art are conceived as complementary activities 
oriented toward revealing the ordered, functional beauty 
of the world. As images of human activity (especially 
political activity) in the world, each demands the 
individual know the world self-consciously and bring that
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knowledge to bear on the world in a form either useful or 
insightful or both. The ethic proposed is a difficult 
one; the responsibilities of the individual are manifold. 
But this difficulty is what makes creativity appealing as 
an ethical model, for Weil and Camus separately 
envisioned the difficult creative life as an ethical 
antidote to the comparatively "simple" ethic of obedience 
required by collective political movements.
Neither Weil nor Camus confused creativity with the 
absolute power to impose individual will. This is the 
precise use of force they were trying to counter. The 
primacy of knowing to a creative existence required 
preparation, the most useful image of which is 
apprenticeship. In the political realm, preparation 
meant an openness to the reality which is the context of 
all politics. Absurd necessity determined the ultimate 
limits of all human activity, and, often, determined the 
character of that activity. Power and force, the 
institutional and personal forms of human-made necessity, 
were human responses that often mirrored the 
arbitrariness of necessity without the benefit of 
necessity's indifference. Creative political action is 
thus limited by the exigencies of necessity. The 
responsible political actor's task was to address 
creatively the shortcomings of the social and political
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world without denying that context to the point of 
nihilism or totalitarianism. Authentic creativity, be it 
work, art, science or politics, occurs in the context of 
lived reality. In the political thought of Weil and 
Camus, creativity is the faculty of making use of 
available materials to create something better, that is, 
to humanize the social and political context.
Respect for this prevailing social and political 
context is decisive. It reveals the influence of the 
French Resistance experience Weil and Camus shared. The 
goal of creative political existence is profoundly subtle 
transformation not reactionary revolution. Even in the 
worst of tyrannies, reactionary revolution is likely to 
result in tyranny under another guise, as Camus 
discovered in the post-liberation purges in France. In 
the creative politics Weil and Camus seek, membership and 
identity are crucial to grounding ethical action. Their 
affinity for trade-unionism belies this tendency in 
reference to worker-artisans. Sharing a vocation appears 
as grounds for recognizing identity with others via 
commonly-held interests. As useful as the image is, 
however, the trade-union is a specific and rather narrow 
association prone to the difficulites of prejudice. The 
value of the image of the artist is in complementing the 
trade union's specificity with a broader conception of
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membership. In choosing to share the product of his or 
her work, the artist makes an offer of a very personal 
nature and professes a faith that the work of art will 
speak to others from the ground of a common human 
experience. The narrow conception of membership 
represented by trade unions is thus limited and 
supplemented by the artist's profession of faith in the 
commonness of human being.
Artisanship and art thus form two significant 
portions of a conception of citizenship. As a bridge 
between the old and the new, Weil and Camus valued the 
creativity they found in artisanship and art as a model 
for ethical political action. The two activities seem to 
encourage innovation while remaining respectful of 
tradition. Chapter Four will establish the applicability 
of creativity to the political circumstances identified 
by Weil and Camus. How to establish a new way of being 
in an already established context of social and political 
mores without destroying that in the flawed community 
which has value? The next chapter will explore how Weil 
used creativity to address the problem of uprootedness in 
her final work and how Camus sought the creation of a 
style to address the shortcomings of rebellion.
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CHAPTER 4
RECONCILING FREEDOM AND JUSTICE:
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WEIL AND CAMUS
I. Introduction
No political actor creates ex nihilo. All political 
activity occurs in a context with predefined limitations. 
The political actor is limited not only by imagination 
and personal physical constraints, but by law, custom, 
locally accepted modes of behavior, local desire for the 
action and available physical and mental resources. 
Knowing that creation occurs in a context, that is, 
acknowledging and respecting these limits, is the 
difference between the creative political actor found in 
the thought of Weil and Camus and the modern 
revolutionary they found at work in their world. Camus 
remarked that true genius does not first destroy in order 
to create. The modern revolutionary, impatient for 
change, found it more useful to destroy that which 
existed in order to begin anew in materially constructing 
the revolutionary vision. To counter this tendency, more 
conservative elements became rigidly reactionary. The 
resulting dialectic of revolution and reaction created a
2 3 5
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decentered politics in which neither side could 
strategically afford to respect limits. The appeal of 
creative political action to Weil and Camus was as a 
response to this dialectic, and it entailed recovering 
respect for the limits of human action in the world.
The Resistance experience was critical to the 
development of their political thought. Weil and Camus 
each learned that resisting evil was not the same as 
creating a workable order grounded in the good. Secret 
meetings, sabotage, subversion and feigned loyalty were 
not the stuff of citizenship. Building the postwar world 
would require positive political action. To this end, 
they created different but not entirely divergent 
political theories based on their visions of the postwar 
world. The necessary objective for both was the 
reconciliation of a collective form of justice with an 
individual freedom in harmony with human dignity. The 
reconciliation required a conceptual reorientation to 
justice and freedom each thinker believed must be 
undertaken if Europe was to be fruitfully reconstructed 
after the war.
Their political visions, geared toward this 
conceptual reconciliation, present and address a coherent 
set of problems attending political and social order in 
the aftermath of total war: How could the integrity of
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the individual be preserved without succumbing to 
solipsism? How could a safe context called "home" be 
created without generating the monstrous collectivities 
wrought by twentieth century revolutionaries? How to 
create justice in a community without compromising the 
freedom of the individual? What are the reciprocal 
responsibilities of the community and the individual and 
the reciprocal obligations of the individual and other 
individuals? These problems persist in one form or other 
into the post-Cold War world. This chapter will show how 
Weil and Camus each presented and addressed these issues. 
What emerges in their thought is that ethical political 
action must be undertaken by a whole human self, firmly 
grounded in its specific origins, but committed to the 
general survival and enrichment of human beings.
II. The Integrity of the Individual 
Weil and Camus each asserted a common human dignity 
to counter the anonymity of collective political 
existence. Giving voice to that common humanity absorbed 
both thinkers from their earliest writings. For Weil, it 
began in her consideration of Marxism.1 Weil believed 
the precise value of Marx's thought to be his early
1See the discussions of Weil and Marxism above. See 
also Blum and Seidler, A Truer Liberty; McLellan, Utopian 
Pessimist; and Mary Dietz, Between the Human and the 
Divine.
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valuation of the human being. Long after she abandoned 
revolutionary Marxist methods, Weil clarified her idea of 
the individual in her essay "Human Personality."2 In 
this 1937 essay, she asserted the importance of fragile 
human potentialities over the more material aspirations 
of modern society. She chose to ground human action in 
respect for the divine in every other human being. Camus 
analyzed the human condition from the perspective of the 
solitary human being's confrontation with the absurd. 
Recognizing despair as a common but futile response to 
this encounter, Camus sought a way to live with its 
inevitable consequences. Camus's rebellion consisted in 
saying "no" to the inevitability of the absurd and "yes" 
to that which human beings share. While neither thinker 
could abandon the human need for community, both agreed 
that the needs of the human beings should be the occasion 
for the community, rather than the reverse.
Weil: The Impersonal and Ethics
In the possibilities inherent in individual human 
beings, in their will to know the good, in their creative 
energy and in their intelligence, Weil found the only 
possible effective counter to the power of
2Weil, "Human Personality" in Selected Essays. 9-34. 
The essay is a response to the "Personalism" of Emmanuel 
Mounier.
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collectivities. In an early essay on the efficacy of
Marxism called "Prospects" she wrote:
Let us not forget that we want to make the 
individual and not the collectivity, the supreme 
value. We want to form whole men by doing away with 
that specialization which cripples us all. . . .  We 
want to give back to man, that is to say the 
individual, the power which it is his proper 
function to exercise over nature, over tools, over 
society itself.3
The essay on "Human Personality" is a definitive
statement of Weil's conception of the individual human
being. A just political order grounded in the good
requires an inversion of the relationship between the
collectivity and the individual. Though the character of
the human presence is determinant for Weil, the presence
of the collective must still be accepted before it can be
transformed:
The human being can only escape from the collective 
by raising himself above the personal and entering 
into the impersonal. The moment he does this, there 
is something in him, a small portion of his soul, 
upon which nothing of the collective can get a 
hold.4
The personal/impersonal distinction is decisive. For 
Weil everything that is personal is error and sin.
Saying "I" or taking the collective signification "We" as 
the sole source of personal identity unduly distinguishes 
the individual from the rest of humanity. Weil's
^eil, Oppression and Liberty. 19.
4Weil, "Human Personality," in Selected Essays. 15.
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conception of ethics begins with the recognition that 
everything that is impersonal in human beings is sacred. 
The impersonal is a reflective distance allowing love for 
others in themselves rather than through some imposed 
conception of them. Seeing others from this reflective 
distance, paying ••attention” to others, allows the 
individual to see the intrinsic value of the human being. 
The distance required by the impersonal is not a distance 
on the other, then, it is a distance on the self. It is 
the requirement of a selflessness in reference to the 
other simply because the other is a human being. 
Ethically, seeing the other from the perspective of the 
impersonal creates a responsibility to all other human 
beings "to safeguard, not their persons, but whatever 
frail potentialities are hidden within them for passing 
over to the impersonal."5 Primary obligation thus flows 
from individual to individual.
Identifying the potentialities within human beings 
and then providing for their protection was part of 
Weil's conception of human being as sacred. The sacred 
is that in the human being which expects to be treated, 
against all experience, according to the good rather than 
evil.6 For Weil, this expectation was a verifiable part
5Ibid., 16.
6Ibid., 10.
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of human experience and evidence of the residual presence 
of the divine in human beings. The inevitable 
confrontation with evil always surprises, producing a cry 
of outrage. Redressing this outrage takes the form of 
protective devices like governing institutions and their 
manifold theoretical justifications. Concepts like the 
notion of "rights" and the collectivity-derived authority 
of institutions may be read both as articulations of that 
outrage and as measures of how much the causes of the 
outrage are actually (mis)understood. While these 
structures may provide comfort, they often create their 
own necessity and their own injustices. The amount of 
comfort these structures provided were no measure of 
their success. Comfort was a function of the personal. 
The protective artifices valued in the twentieth century 
were ill-conceived because they privileged comfort, that 
is, the personal, over the impersonal as that which was 
to be valued.
The success of collectivities in the twentieth 
century derived from their ability to pander to the needs 
of the personal while serving only their own prestige and 
power. The psychological mechanism was not difficult to 
discern: there was comfort, that is, protection from the
exigencies of necessity, Weil knew, in losing one's self 
in a collectivity, in taking membership in a collectivity
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as the fount of individual identity. The discipline of
the impersonal was Weil's ethical counter to this
temptation to comfort. Valuing disinterested action
required removing from social and political institutions
whatever was detrimental to the growth of the impersonal
in its members. In the resulting order,
for every person there should be enough room, enough 
freedom to plan the use of one's time, the 
opportunity to reach ever higher levels of 
attention, some solitude, some silence. At the same 
time, the person needs warmth, lest it be driven by 
distress to submerge itself in the collective.7
Weil's earlier emphasis on creatively refashioning labor
and free time takes a renewed importance in this social
order. Creative ethical action requires an impersonal
orientation to others and the necessity of the world.
Each has the potential for impersonal action provided the
human being "can root himself in the impersonal good so
as to be able to draw energy from it," Weil wrote, "then
he is in a condition, whenever he feels the obligation to
do so, to bring to bear without any outside help, against
any collectivity, a small but real force."8 This "small
but real force" is the significant potential
manifestation of the creative that the individual can and
must freely exercise in social and political life.
7Ibid., 17.
8Ibid., 15.
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The good, known through the decreated part of the 
human soul, is the source of acting with impersonal 
force, but drawing on the good requires a stillness which 
modern civilization has not allowed. To know the good, 
Weil believed, human beings needed silence and warmth. 
What they got in the modern world was "icy 
pandemonium."9 The structures which order human 
existence are cold and indifferent. To overcome this 
indifference human beings respond with an ever-increasing 
volume of activity. The modern human environment was 
characterized by a seemingly endless competition among 
noises, mechanical and human. In her critique of modern 
working conditions, Weil documented the mechanical noise 
drowning out human life. In the political realm, the 
noise of empty rhetoric had obscured the cry of outrage 
against injustice. Weil used the notion of rights as an 
example. Like the Romans, Weil believed, modern 
civilization had preoccupied itself with the language of 
rights:
The notion of rights is linked with the notion of 
sharing out, of exchange, of measured quantity. It 
has a commercial flavour, essentially evocative of 
legal claims and arguments. Rights are always 
asserted in a tone of contention; and when this tone 
is adopted, it must rely upon force in the 
background, or else it will be laughed at.10
9Ibid., 17.
10Ibid., 18.
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In this notion of rights, the appeal against evil comes 
from the level of the personal, the selfish. A political 
community based on this idea of personal rights devolves 
into a kind of tyranny of individuals offering no defense 
against dictatorship. "Thanks to this word,” Weil 
thought, "what should have been a cry of protest from the 
depth of the heart has been turned into a shrill nagging 
of claims and counter-claims which is both impure and 
unpractical.1,11 Shrill nagging about rights is just 
noise hindering the more important search for justice by 
obscuring the fact that while everyone should be 
respected equally, everyone is not equally privileged.12
The shared element in human existence is life in a 
state of affliction, not some set of universal rights.
The pervasiveness of noise only deepens the plight of 
those who do not recognize the suffering they share with 
the rest of humanity. For Weil, affliction is the true 
state of human being, a device for pulverizing the soul 
and the pride. Engaging affliction is the first 
requirement of action in accordance with the good or
11Ibid., 21.
12Richard H. Bell, "Reading Simone Weil on Rights, 
Justice and Love," in Bell, ed., Simone Weil's Philosophy 
of Culture. 214. See also McLellan, Utopian Pessimist. 
Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, and Winch's 
Wittgensteinian encounter with Weil called simone_ Weil: 
The Just Balance.
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truth. Weil's description of the state of affliction
echoes Camus's later description of the absurd:
I may lose, at any moment, through the play of 
circumstances over which I have no control, anything 
whatsoever I possess, including those things which 
are so intimately mine that I consider them as being 
myself. There is nothing that I might not lose. It 
could happen at any moment that what I am might be 
abolished and replaced by anything whatsoever of the 
filthiest and most contemptible sort.13
The business of living, its noise and indifference,
shield human beings from affliction. Only those who are
materially afflicted or those who seek the good know
their own affliction. Most people avoid confronting
their own affliction by ignoring the affliction of
others. Yet, acting on the impersonal requires an
annihilation of this selfish self, that is, putting
oneself in the place of the afflicted. Only "the
supernatural working of grace" can so orient a soul as to
make it capable of attending to affliction and thus
knowing truth.14 Ethical action in the world must be
based on this "intense, pure, disinterested, gratuitous,
generous attention" Weil called "love."15
Action grounded in love means attending to the
affliction of self and other, attending to the sacred in
13Weil, "Human Personality," in Selected Essavs. 27.
14Ibid., 28.
15Ibid.
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human being. "Attention" thus is the core of ethical 
action in the world. Weil's concise idea of justice 
derives from this beginning: "Justice consists in seeing
that no harm is done to men."16 God will deliver the 
eternal part of the soul from evil. "Therefore," Weil 
concludes, "it is for men to see that men are preserved 
from harm."17 While people can act pursuant to this 
goal, no single human being can protect all others from 
harm. Nor can human beings be trusted always to act with 
the goal of preserving others in mind. Weil is forced to 
recognize the inevitable need for protective structures. 
At the end of "Human Personality" she insisted that these 
structures would have to be rethought and recreated with 
the protection of the sacred in human beings as their 
charge. By so reconceiving the political order, Weil 
hoped to strip contemporary political discourse of its 
noisy vernacular by valuing the impersonal perspective in 
political life.
Camus: The Indomitable Men
Camus, in the middle of editing her works for 
posthumous publication, agreed with the spirit of Weil's 
thought on the integrity of the individual. "S[imone]. 
Weil is right," he wrote in a notebook entry of September
16Ibid., 30.
17Ibid.
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1950, "it's not the human being that must be protected, 
but the possibilities within him."18 The individual's 
heroic defiance of the absurd (Sisyphus, those who 
battled The Placrue. The Rebel) was a central theme in all 
of Camus's work. The subjects of his two philosophical 
essays, suicide in The Mvth of Sisyphus and murder in The 
Rebel, reveal his belief that the greatest human crime 
was snuffing out those possibilities either in oneself or 
another.19 To inflict death, on self or others, was to 
destroy potential, to exercise a power it should not be 
in the human province to wield. Camus realized, however, 
that protecting the possibilities in human beings was 
only the beginning. Convincing human beings to act 
creatively from that potential, mindful of their 
limitations as human beings, must be the larger objective 
of ethical thought.
In the aftermath of the Liberation, Camus believed 
that participation of the kind he saw in the Resistance 
had been a successful first step in the direction of a 
politics grounded in a creative ethics. The activities
18Albert Camus, Notebooks 1942-1951. translated by 
Justin O'Brien (New York: Paragon House, 1991), 265.
19Even his brief, regrettable support for the post- 
Liberation purges in France was ultimately countered by 
the extended anti-capital punishment essay "Reflections 
on the Guillotine." For Camus and the purges, see the 
discussion below and Footnote 34.
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of the Resistance convinced Camus that action like that
derived from the violent passions of war could be
transformed into acting within a more peaceable
understanding of politics:
Of course the Resistance did not begin as a 
political struggle. The fight against the Vichy 
government was only a consequence of the fight 
against the occupier. But under the conditions of 
clandestine action, war took on a new form. Our 
military machine had to be constructed out of many 
different pieces. Such an undertaking is of a 
political nature. Committing sabotage is an act of 
war. But bringing together saboteurs, co-ordinating 
throughout the country activities carried out by 
people and groups with different social 
backgrounds— this is an act of politics.20
The successful cooperative interaction of individuals in
resisting the Nazis convinced Camus that a new order, an
order in which politics was to be reclaimed by
individuals, free of the authority of ideologies or
Weil's divine, was possible. This order would be one
in which the face of man is seen in bright light. 
Politics is no longer dissociated from individuals. 
It is addressed directly by man to other men. It is 
a way of speaking. If the Resistance is remembered 
as more than just a moment in our history, it will 
be remembered for having placed our citizens face to 
face.21
20Albert Camus, "Resistance and Politics," Combat. 1 
September 1944 quoted in Between Hell and Reason. 47.
21Ibid., 48.
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Camus hoped to secure this order in a politically 
democratic and economically socialist postwar France.22 
This hybrid social order would protect human 
potentialities by keeping the individual engaged in 
democratic political processes while protected from the 
tortuous currents of an "open" capital-driven market.
The postwar coalition of elements of the Resistance 
that would bring this vision to fruition broke down 
before the war ended in 1945.23 Camus abandoned the 
editorship of Combat in 1946, but continued his ethical 
explorations in The Rebel.24 The work consisted of 
stinging critiques of most of the major intellectual 
movements of modernity. Camus sought to free the modern 
human being to act by critiquing these inherited 
presuppositions, clearing the way for genuinely creative 
action. The result was an idea of rebellion as a
22See below the discussion of Camus, editorial, 
Combat, 1 October 1944, in Between Hell and Reason. 57- 
58.
^Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals,
1944-1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1994) offers a brilliant discussion of the prewar and 
wartime trends in French intellectual culture which led 
to the splintering of the Resistance movement once the 
Nazis were defeated. Judt's larger objective is to show 
how French intellectuals' affinity for Socialist thought 
made it difficult to overcome the consequences of 
Communist realpolitik while remaining true to their 
Marxist roots.
24Camus, The Rebel.
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singular act undertaken by an individual not in the name
of one intellectual system or other, but rather in the
name of a common human experience. The Rebel was the
beginning of Camus's attempt to harness the frustration
of modern humanity and to refocus it into a positive,
constructive way of being in the world.
Camus took pains to limit the rebellion he advocated
in The Rebel. Rebellion for its own sake, like that of
the modern revolutionary, preserved nothing; it justified
destruction by its intention to build another image.
Camus sought to limit the revolutionary by appealing to
the fact of our common human being:
In assigning a limit within which begins the dignity 
common to all men, rebellion defined a primary 
value. It put in the first rank of its frame of 
reference an obvious complicity among men, a common 
texture, the solidarity of chains, a communication 
between human being and human being which makes men 
both similar and united.25
In every other human being's power to rebel lies the
precise limit beyond which the action of any individual
or group cannot go. This is the rebel's "no.11 Political
activity founded on "no" can only result in a livable
order if the rebel knows when and why to say "yes." The
members of the Resistance had said "no" to the Nazis.
25Ibid., 281.
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When the time came to cay "yes” they could not agree on
what to affirm.26
The capacity to say "yes" was central to Camus's
conception of creative rebellion. Europeans had just
lived through a thirty year historical crisis accompanied
by the unprecedented destruction of human life and human
possibilities. As Europe picked up the pieces, Camus
thought about the reconstruction in terms of what was yet
to be created. He knew that every historical crisis
terminates in institutions. If we have no control 
over the crisis itself, which is pure hazard, we do 
have control over the institutions, since we can 
define them, choose the ones for which we will 
fight, and thus bend our efforts toward their 
establishment. Authentic arts of rebellion will 
only consent to take up arms for institutions that 
limit violence, not for those which codify it.27
Camus urgently believed that the reconstruction should
not be blind to its own power to define the terms of the
postwar world. The individuals who undertook the
rebuilding would have to remember their humanity and in
their work and say "yes” to preserving human dignity.
The work would need to be done with moderation and a
26See Judt, Past Imperfect, especially Chapter 3 
"Resistance and Revenge" and Chapter 4 "What is Political 
Justice?" 45-74 and 75-98.
27Camus, The Rebel. 292.
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respect for human limits. "Approximative thought," Camus 
wrote, "is the only creator of reality."28
Rebellion in the name of human dignity required a 
face-to-face postwar politics. Dignity could be served 
by concentrating on the "concrete realities" of human 
existence: "on occupation, on the village, where the
living human heart of things and of men is to be 
found."29 A commitment to human dignity meant a 
political context responsive to the needs of work, home 
and family— in short, the recasting of the political 
context as a human context. In this human context may be 
found what transcendence there is in Camus's thought.30 
Camus's is a decidedly horizontal conception of 
transcendence. For Camus, the "the living human heart of 
things and men" made up the eternal in human existence. 
"Politics," Camus wrote, "to satisfy the demands of 
rebellion, must submit to the[se] eternal verities."31
28Ibid., 295.
29Ibid. , 298.
30Camus's resistance to a traditional notion of 
transcendence is well-noted. See Rosen, "Marxism, 
Mysticism and Liberty; Hanna, The Thought and Art of 
Albert Camus: Fred Wilhoite, Bevond Nihilism; Isaac, 
Arendt. Camus and Modern Rebellion; and Sprintzen, Camus: 
A Critical Examination. Weil and Camus have been 
compared on this issue in Dunaway, "Estrangement and the 
Need for Roots: Prophetic Visions of the Human Condition
in Albert Camus and Simone Weil."
31Camus, The Rebel. 298.
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Camus prescribed a mode of action in which the human
being "indefatigably confronts evil."32 He had no faith
that institutions alone could teach human beings how to
behave toward each other. If Camus had no doubt where
and with whom the preservation of human dignity must
begin, he had no illusions where it would end:
Man can master in himself everything that should be 
mastered. He should rectify in creation everything 
that can be rectified. And after he has done so, 
children will still die unjustly even in a perfect 
society. Even by his greatest effort man can only 
propose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of 
the world. But the injustice and the suffering will 
remain and, no matter how limited they are, they 
will not cease to be an outrage.33
In rebellion Camus found a mode of existence that he
believed charged human beings to confront the absurd in
the name of a positive value rather than in existential
despair. His faith in this value, in that in the human
being which should be preserved, is what Camus might
earlier have called a "leap." Like other acts of
eluding, Camus's leap gave him a standard of reference:
Camus's faith in humanity's ability to save itself was
the standard to which he held the postwar world. More
often than not the world did not measure up.
A war conducted with no regard for human dignity
bred a postwar world fundamentally hostile to human
32Ibid., 303.
33Ibid.
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dignity. Worse, Camus found, this hostility was harder
for the individual to redress alone. The answers "yes"
or "no" were increasingly inadequate to meet the
complexity of the questions of the postwar world. Camus
was disillusioned by the direction taken by the postwar
purges which he defended for six months in late 1944 and
early 1945.34 He keenly felt the inadequacy of
individual human action the day after the atomic bomb was
dropped on Hiroshima, writing, "The world is what it is,
which is to say, nothing much."35 In the 1950s, he felt
his own impotence as his homeland Algeria was torn apart
by brutal civil war. He could only call for a cessation
of the killing:
I am interested only in the actions that here and 
now can spare useless bloodshed and in the solutions 
that guarantee the future of a land whose suffering 
I share too much to be able to indulge in 
speechmaking about it.36
^See Camus's responses to Mauriac in defense of the 
purge in editorials of 20 October 1945 and 25 October 
1945 in Combat and his acknowledgement that the purge had 
gone awry in an editorial in Combat of 5 January 1945 in 
Camus, Between Hell and Reason. 66, 71, 100. See also 
the biographical accounts of this period of Camus's life: 
Lottman, Albert Camus: A Biography; McCarthy, Camus; and
Brian Masters, Camus: A Study (Totowa, New Jersey:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1974). See also the Judt's 
discussion of the purges in Past Imperfect.
35Camus, editorial, 8 August 1945, Combat. in 
Between Hell and Reason. 110.
^Albert Camus, "Preface to Algerian Reports," in 
Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 112.
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But there were moments and there were people. Camus
supported the Algerian Socialist Aziz Kessous in his
attempt to encourage a dialogue between the two sides in
the civil war.37 In a 1955 speech, Camus lauded deposed
Columbian President Eduoardo Santos as one of those men
"whose sacrifice and example every day help us to
live."38 He found in Santos a spirit he had hoped would
characterize the postwar world, but instead found that it
remained the exception. Camus took the occasion of
praising Santos as an opportunity to illustrate and call
for social and political action in the name of human
dignity. In the speech Camus spoke forcefully:
What is beginning is the period of the indomitable 
men devoted to the unconditional defense of liberty. 
This is why your [Santos's] attitude serves as an 
example and a comfort to all those who, like me, 
have now broken with many of their traditional 
friends by rejecting any complicity, even temporary, 
even and above all tactical, with regimes or parties 
whether of the Right or of the Left that justify, 
however little, the suppression of a single one of 
our liberties I39
The "indomitable" political actor had only his or her
humanity, and the freedom that conception entailed, to
call on in choosing modes of political action. Failure
37Camus, "Letter to an Algerian Militant," in 
Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 127.
38Camus "Homage to an Exile," in Resistance. 
Rebellion and Death. 100.
39Ibid., 105.
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was inevitable, significant successes were rare, and 
blind partisanship was dangerous. The rebel's effort, 
self-consciously aware of its own limits, was nonetheless 
of inestimable value.
Weil and Camus thus each held to the idea of a 
transcendent ethical principle, though their conceptions 
of that principle were markedly different. Weil's was a 
more traditional understanding of transcendence in 
ethics. It took the form of an obedience to the divine 
residual in human nature. Each created person, possessed 
of a fragment of divine being, was precious. Love of the 
divine mandated that it was the obligation of each human 
being to see to the preservation of every other human 
being. Camus conceded the need for a transcendent 
principle, but could not find it in religion or ideology. 
He looked instead to engender an awareness of what human 
beings share: the experience of suffering, the awareness
of death along with the joys of life and love. Like 
Weil, Camus believed that the potentialities in human 
beings must be watched over and guarded jealously by 
every human being. There is a paradox in the position of 
both Weil and Camus: each seeks an external limiting
mechanism inside of each human being. Each person is the 
source of his or her own preservation. Dangerously close 
to solipsism, this is only half of the equation. Each
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person is also the source of the preservation of all 
others and bound by his or her humanity to act so.
Neither thinker believed it was enough to protect 
the possibilities within human beings. These human 
beings must also be encouraged to act upon those 
possibilities. The emergent conception of freedom 
entailed acceptance of the limits of all human acts as 
well as a responsibility to other human beings as subject 
to the consequences of those acts. It also meant 
sometimes acting for cause with little or no hope for 
success or recognition. Such recognition could not be a 
consideration when acting on the impersonal. In the 
anonymity of the act, Camus's indomitable actor must face 
the apparent (absurd) futility of the struggle. Both 
Weil and Camus knew that facing this futility would be 
less difficult in a world where others were sharing that 
burden, that is, making their own creative responses to 
the conditions of injustice. Acting in the name of human 
dignity would require recognizing this shared component 
of the struggle. This meant avoiding the trap of the 
personal and acting from the perspective of the 
impersonal. The personal sense of futility could not be 
allowed to color the decision to act freely.
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III: Counter-Collectivity: Rootedness and Home
Preserving the integrity of the individual was the 
primary goal political order should set for itself.
There still must be a political order. What of the 
character of that order? Weil and Camus agreed that it 
should provide what the French Third Republic in 
particular and European civilization in general had not 
provided: a place of safety that could be loved and
defended against tyranny. Weil and Camus each attributed 
the fall of the Third Republic to the indifference of the 
French population to its fate. The Occupation meant not 
only the end of the structures of the Republic itself, 
but called into question the idea that a France existed 
worthy of love. By their actions, members of the 
Resistance defied the disappearance of France, but knew 
that they would have to recover the meaning of France 
once the occupier was repulsed.40
Preserving human dignity required a context of 
safety and support; it required creating a home.
Scholars of both thinkers have approached the issue of 
community from the perspective of the critique of
40See Judt, Past Imperfect. This "meaning of 
France" was the point on which the hoped-for cooperation 
broke down.
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totalitarianism.41 The critique of totalitarianism is 
primarily negative and throws the analysis back upon 
outmoded forms of the polity. By approaching the problem 
from the perspective of homelessness, the critique or 
diagnosis is only a starting point. Once totalitarian 
structures are dismantled, home must still be conceived 
and built. The critique of totalitarianism is a 
necessary beginning, but creating home is a more positive 
political act.
Homelessness is a neglected aspect of the political 
thought of both Weil and Camus. For Weil, homelessness 
was the state of having been torn from one's roots, from 
all that sustains the human being. She thus isolated the 
phenomenon of uprootedness as the central problem of 
human existence. For Camus, a native of French Algeria, 
the problem of homelessness was an intensely personal 
one. Home, for Camus, consisted of the land and people 
of his native Algeria as well as the French intellectual 
tradition in which he had been educated. During the 
Second World War, his function as editor of the 
Resistance newspaper Combat forced him to define "French" 
and in so doing identify himself as a Frenchman, albeit
41Two excellent examples are Mary Dietz's discussion 
of the collectivity in Between the Human and the Divine. 
50-59 and Jeffrey Isaac's discussion of "Totalitarianism 
and the Intoxication of Power" in Arendt. Camus and 
Modern Rebellion. 37-67.
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one of Algerian origin. In the 1950s, the war for Arab- 
Algerian independence from France demanded that he choose 
either France or Algeria magnifying the complexities of 
home for Camus. Home, as an issue for both thinkers, was 
not just the recovery of the roots of a particular 
milieu, but also the creation of a community which could 
nourish human beings without the tyranny of 
totalitarianism. Weil and Camus tried to conceive a 
milieu in which human beings could feel safe in the 
exercise of their freedom. For both, justice was an 
environment to be conceived and built, not an abstract 
principle.
Weil: Rootedness and Patriotism
The Need for Roots is Weil's meditation on 
deracinement or uprootedness.42 The willingness of 
uprooted Europeans to destroy their environment confirmed 
the inadequacy of that environment as home. For Weil, 
roots, as one of her more astute critics has shown, meant 
that cultural values not only have weight (gravity), but
42The French title of the book is L'Enracinement. 
Prelude a une declaration des devoirs envers l'etre 
humain (Paris: Gallimard, 1951). Enracine connotes
"deep rooted. The societal problem of uprootedness 
identified by the work, deracinement. is thus grave and 
unambiguous: an uprooting suggesting eradication.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 6 1
also meaning and coherence (grace) .43 Reestablishing
roots, Weil believed, should be the first priority of
postwar reconstruction. Weil described rootedness:
A human being has roots by virtue of his real, 
active, and natural participation in the life of a 
community, which preserves in living shape certain 
particular treasures of the past and certain 
particular expectations for the future. This 
participation is a natural one, in the sense that it 
is automatically brought about by place, conditions 
of birth, profession, and social surroundings.
Every human being needs to have multiple roots.44
Rootedness indicates a sense of naturally mutual
belonging, an identity of interest, between an individual
and his or her milieu.45 As Eric Springsted correctly
argues, rootedness means that "communities are not
imperious creators of our persons, but creators because
they allow us our ability for self-creation— or
decreation. "46
Weil first encountered uprootedness in her study of
the effects of modern working conditions. Modern workers
lacked roots in urban areas where forms of industrial
43Eric Springsted, "Rootedness: Culture and Value," 
in Bell, editor, Simone Weil's Philosophy of Culture. 
161-188.
^Weil, The Need for Roots. 43.
45In the conclusion of her Between the Human and the 
Divine. Dietz argues that the organic metaphor of "roots" 
diminishes the sense of belonging to a place in Weil's 
work.
46Springsted, "Rootedness: Culture and Value," 182-
183.
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production kept them alienated from themselves, their 
work and each other, while barely providing for their 
sustenance.47 Roots were also missing in the 
countryside where technology and the demand for higher 
levels of productivity meant that labor was no longer 
attuned to the cycles of nature. Moreover, Weil 
believed, rural laborers thought that reformers had 
ignored their very real concerns in order to concentrate 
on those of urban laborers.48 These issues, coupled 
with those of collaboration and resistance, convinced 
Weil that the architects of postwar France would confront 
a population more divided and displaced than it had been 
before the war. For Weil, the explanation and the 
solution were of a piece: "Whoever is uprooted in
himself uproots others. Whoever is rooted in himself 
doesn't uproot others."49
Weil had to be careful not to recreate the 
totalitarian collectivity she saw at work in the world.
In the modern state, Weil discerned an accomplice in the 
uprooting of generations of Europeans. The nation-state, 
Weil believed, had become the single most significant 
collectivity in human existence. The nation, simply "a
47Weil, The Need for Roots. 72.
^Ibid., 91.
49Ibid., 48.
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territorial aggregate whose various parts recognize the 
authority of the same state," had become the source and 
fount of all human identity, the sole object of the 
otherwise ennobling human attributes of loyalty and 
sacrifice.50 As such, it had become the repository for 
the human being's "most valuable possession in the world 
of temporal affairs, namely, his continuity in time."51 
Yet, at the apex of its influence, the nation-state had 
undergone a "sudden and extraordinarily rapid 
decomposition," uprooting humanity, leaving it "stunned" 
and confused as to how to respond.52
The decomposition of the nation-state was masked by 
an entirely modern conception of patriotism. As a 
passion directed at an external collectivity called the 
nation, Weil believed, modern patriotism had supplanted 
an elder system of obligations: to lord, king, city,
neighbor, and family. The elements of the elder system 
were distinct but interrelated, "[t]he whole formed 
something very complicated, but also very human."53 To 
the modern state, distant and powerful, the human being 
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needs demanded. The human being so objectified is
uprooted with deeply disturbing ethical consequences:
Everything points to the fact that, unless 
supernatural grace intervenes, there is no form of 
cruelty or depravity of which ordinary, decent 
people are not capable, once the corresponding 
psychological mechanisms have been set in motion.54
Patriotism had become just such a psychological
mechanism. It motivated human beings to conquer in the
name of liberation and for the prestige of the nation.
"Conquering the world and liberating the world," Weil
wrote, "are two incompatible forms of glory, but which
can be easily reconciled with one another in reverie."55
Weil had seen the phenomenon at work in Germany in 193 3
and its consequences at work in the rest of Europe
thereafter.56 War, conquest and martial glory were
incompatible with Weil's conception of home.
The modern state thrives on its own glory and not on
the real love of its members. The modern state, Weil
believed, "is a cold concern, which cannot inspire love,
but itself kills, suppresses everything that might be
54Ibid., 112.
55Ibid., 113.
56See Weil's exposition of the failure of the 
Communist Party to confront the totalizing tendencies of 
Nazism in the series of ten articles she wrote while 
visiting Germany between 4 December 1932 and 5 March 
1933: Simone Weil, "The Situation in Germany," in
Formative Writings. 97-147.
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love; so one is forced to love it, because there is 
nothing else."57 The French model of the modern nation­
state came from Richelieu whose "devotion to the state 
uprooted France."58 Interposing the state between the 
individual and justice, Richelieu killed off "all 
spontaneous life in the country" to insulate the state 
from opposition.59 The spontaneity of life is a 
manifestation of rootedness and the source of a 
community's strength. Proper governance encourages the 
creative expression which gives voice to a community's 
sense of itself. In the spontaneous expression of its 
inhabitants, what Weil calls the vital medium finds its 
life. The modern nation-state, concerned only with its 
own power and prestige, cannot serve as a vital medium.
The task of those who would set up postwar France 
was easily stated, if difficult to execute: "To give the
French people something to love."60 France would have 
to be reconceived as a particular vital medium, distinct 
from but no better than other vital media. "In defining 
one's native country as a certain particular vital 
medium," Weil believed, "one avoids the contradictions
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and lies that corrode the idea of patriotism.1,61 The 
particular vital medium, the country, "has been produced 
by a network of causes in which good and evil, justice 
and injustice have been mixed up together, and so it 
cannot be the best possible one." It nonetheless 
"deserves to be guarded like a treasure for the good it 
contains."62 The State's duty is to foment and protect 
the creation of the country. It must preserve the 
conditions wherein the country can become "a life-giving 
agent, really turned into good, root-fixing ground" and 
"be made a favorable setting for participation in and 
loyal attachment to all other sorts of environmental 
expression. "63
Love is owed a country, not a nation-state. Because 
the country exists in a context of other countries, 
however, there are always outside pressures. When the 
time comes, human beings are obligated to protect the 
source of their own lives, their vital medium. But the 
inhabitants of a vital medium only fight in self-defense, 
not in aggression. The idealized form of patriotism Weil 
conceives is grounded in compassion and love, not concern 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 6 7
derives from a compassion for one's country as something
beautiful, precious, fragile and perishable.64 Weil
rather optimistically believed that such a patriotism
would appeal to even the disenfranchised:
Were such a relationship to be established between 
the people and the country, the former would no 
longer regard their own personal sufferings as 
crimes committed by the country against themselves, 
but as ills suffered by the country in and through 
themselves. The difference is immense.65
Love born of rootedness must be the eternal source of the
new French constitution. The fall of the Third Republic
represented a break in historical continuity that meant
"constitutional legality can no longer be regarded as
having an historical basis; it must be made to derive
from the eternal source of all legality."66 Weil
naively took for granted that a political order that
could show its debt to this eternal source would engender
the love and obedience of its members. Moreover, she
believed, it would create a reciprocal obligation between
rulers and ruled. "Since the people's obedience toward
public authorities is a necessity for the country," Weil
concluded, "this obedience becomes a sacred obligation,
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themselves, seeing that they form the object of it, the 
same sacred character."67
Weil's rather utopian attempt to recast patriotism 
derived from her deeply held conviction that prevailing 
forms of collective identity were evil, but that some 
form of collective identity was nonetheless necessary to 
the human spirit. A spiritual component, a stillness 
necessary to access the decreated, suffuses Weil's work. 
She argued that the "idolatrous course" of 
totalitarianism "can only be arrested by coming up 
against a genuinely spiritual way of life.”68 The 
immediate form this took was the restoration of beauty to 
human labor. In The Need for Roots Weil expanded on this 
theme. The beautiful, commonly shared and recognized as 
home, is that in the vital medium which is to be loved, 
preserved and protected. The beautiful in French 
civilization must be the inspiration for a new French 
order as the beautiful in European civilization must be 
the inspiration for a new European order. For Weil, the 
only counter to the tyranny of totalitarian forms of the 
collective was a spiritual dedication to the beauty of 
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Camus: The Complexities of Home
A native of Algeria raised in the French colonial 
school system there, Camus's circumstances forced him to 
conceive of home as something transcending national 
identification. In his political essays, Camus grappled 
with questions of home most pointedly on two occasions: 
in his "Letters to a German Friend" during the Second 
World War and in his work on the Algerian Civil War in 
the 1950s. In the first instance, Camus tried to come to 
terms with his conception of home by comparing it to that 
of his "German friend." The result is an effective, if 
idealized, reflection on the meaning and ethical 
obligations of membership. His task is even more 
difficult in his work on Algeria. Like a child 
confronted with a physically violent relationship between 
parents, Camus refuses to choose. Instead, he futilely 
calls for a cessation of the violence of civil war by 
appealing to the home, the love of the place, which the 
French and Arab communities ostensibly shared. In both 
cases, Camus groped for a conception of home by 
confronting unacceptable definitions and defenses of 
home.
Composed during the war, Camus's "Letters to a 
German Friend" attack the arrogance of German self- 
identity and the cruelty with which that identity was
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being imposed on the rest of Europe.69 By addressing 
the letters to a mythical "friend," Camus acknowledged 
the shared European responsibility for the calamity of 
1939-1945.70 He explained that when he says "you" he 
means "you Nazis" and not "you Germans." Similarly, when 
he says "we" he means "we Frenchmen" and sometimes "we 
Free Europeans." He claims to be "contrasting two 
attitudes, not two nations, even if, at a certain moment 
in history, these two nations personified two enemy 
attitudes."71 The enemy attitudes have to do with how 
the interlocutors define themselves in relation to their 
nations and each other. In the letters Camus begins 
articulating the hard lessons learned about home and 
country during two world wars.
In the first letter Camus contrasts the love of 
country espoused by his German counterpart to his own.
69Albert Camus, "Letters to a German Friend," in 
Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 1-32. "The Letters" were 
not published together until after the Liberation. Camus 
was uncomfortable with their publication because he felt 
they were written in a certain spirit at a certain time. 
They are no less critical to his political thought and 
may be read as Camus's definitive critique of nihilism. 
See Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern Rebellion. 93.
^ilhoite in Beyond Nihilism. 51, found that, in 
the "Letters" Camus rejected "the nihilistic conclusions 
which, to many, had seemed latent in his earlier works." 
Camus recognized in his "friend" a mirrored reflection of 
himself.
71Albert Camus, "Preface" to "Letters to a German 
Friend" in Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 4.
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The German, who equates love of country with blind
obedience, has charged Camus with not loving his country.
Camus is stung by the charge, but deflects it by arguing
that his idea of membership is the more authentic:
No, I didn't love my country, if pointing out what 
is unjust in what we love amounts to not loving, if 
insisting that what we love should measure up to the 
finest image we have of her amounts to not 
loving.72
The rapid fall of the Third Republic issued from a lack 
of confidence in its character, not a lack of love for 
the ideal of France. "I belong to an admirable and 
persevering nation," Camus wrote, "which, admitting her 
errors and weaknesses, has not lost the idea that 
constitutes her whole greatness."73 Camus's France was 
rummaging through its own past preparing to recreate 
itself in conformity with the idea her people (namely, 
the Resistants) had of her. A country that would 
undertake the task of recreating itself after such a 
calamity, Camus believed, had proven her worthiness.
"This country is worthy of the difficult and demanding 
love that is mine," Camus wrote, "[a]nd I believe she is 
decidedly worth fighting for since she is worthy of a
^Camus, "Letters to a German Friend," in 
Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 5.
^Ibid., 10.
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higher love."74 By contrast, the German's nation got 
the only love it deserved: a blind love in which it
could not possibly find self-justification. That 
inability to justify itself, Camus concluded, would be 
its undoing.75
In Camus's emergent conception of citizenship, love
of country enjoins the individual to hold it to a
standard of integrity. He defends the France that serves
as a home for his compatriots in the Resistance. The
citizenship in the name of which the resistants fought
was a critically discerning one. The willingness to make
demands of France while defending her, Camus explains to
his "friend," is love, that which separates "us" from
"you." Camus writes:
You were satisfied to serve the power of your nation 
and we dreamed of giving ours her truth. It was 
enough for you to serve the politics of reality 
whereas, in our wildest aberrations, we still had a 
vague conception of the politics of honor, which we 
recognize today.76
A just political order draws its strength from the love
of people who make up that order, not, as under the Nazi
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certain sort of human being is capable of a just order.
Who is this human being?
There I stop, for we know. Man is that force which 
ultimately cancels all tyrants and gods. He is the 
force of evidence. Human evidence is what we must 
preserve, and our certainty at present comes from 
the fact that its fate and our country's fate are 
linked together. If nothing had any meaning, you 
would be right. But there is still something that 
has a meaning.77
France as home was the something that still had a
meaning. In the period after the Occupation, that
meaning had taken form in the minds of those who
resisted: "We had formed an idea of our country that put
her in her proper place amid other great concepts—
friendship, mankind, happiness, our desire for
justice."78 The country the Resistants defended should
know its place in the midst of, not above, concepts like
friendship and justice. It was incumbent upon the
citizen to remind those who governed that their authority
rested on their ability to preserve a space in which the
human needs for belonging, friendship, and justice could
be met.
Camus contrasted this sense of France as protector 
of the human with the German's conflicting sense of 
national glory. "You," Camus wrote, "are fighting
^Ibid., 14. 
^Ibid.
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against everything in man that does not belong to the 
mother country."79 The German's disregard for the 
intelligence and the heart made him capable not only of 
the destruction of France, but of the bastardization of 
the name of France in the form of Vichy. In the third of 
the "Letters" Camus recognized that the Resistance fought 
from an
awareness of having been not only mutilated in our 
country, wounded in our very flesh, but also 
divested of our most beautiful images, for you gave 
the world a hateful and ridiculous version of them. 
The most painful thing to bear is seeing a mockery 
made of what one loves And that idea of Europe that 
you took from the best among us and distorted has 
consequently become hard for us to keep alive in all 
its original force.80
The Germans had done far worse than simply overrun
France. They had made a mockery of home and thus
revealed their own failure to grasp its importance.
France, Germany and the rest of Europe, that is, home,
would have to be reestablished after the war. This was
not new: home "always has to be established.1,81 Those
who resisted should have a clearer idea of what needed to
be established simply because they so keenly felt its
loss. That they could not agree does not obscure the
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Camus was hesitant about applying the contents of 
the "Letters" beyond the circumstances of Occupied France 
because they are so clearly propaganda pieces.
Otherwise, to suggest, as he does, that even a segment of 
the French population had self-consciously paused before 
the invader to find its moral bearings while its people 
were being killed and its property confiscated is self- 
justifying and disingenuous. The "Letters" are much more 
valuable as reflections on the trauma of discovering that 
one's home is so inadequate as to not be worth defending. 
This problem confronted all of Europe after the war. The 
former Resistants worked for the possibility of 
recreating home after the war. In the "Letters," Camus 
began articulating what that home should look like: a
place where terms like country, friendship, mankind, and 
justice were equivalencies. Whatever their shortcomings 
as propaganda, the "Letters" were a cautionary tale of 
the dangers of excessive allegiance to the modern state 
and the importance of a self-critical love of home.
The clarity of Camus's conception of home in the 
"Letters" was undermined in the colonial circumstances of 
Algeria. Civil war in Camus's homeland was an attempt by 
Arab elements to shed the authority of the French who 
made up about a tenth of the population. Camus was of 
humble beginnings, so though a colon, that is, descended
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of French immigrants to Algeria, he was not part of the
small number of colons who owned much of the property and
held much of the political power in Algeria. Still, he
had been fortunate enough to be educated in the French
colonial school system and considered himself French-
Algerian. He told an interviewer in 1957:
No one is more closely attached to his Algerian 
province than I, and yet I have no trouble feeling a 
part of the French tradition. Consequently, I 
learned, as naturally as we learn to breathe, that 
love of one's native land can broaden without 
dying.82
The conflicts in Algeria tested the sources of Camus's 
identity and his understanding of "home.” The violence 
of the war demanded that Camus choose between his French 
ancestry or the Algeria to whose people and physical 
beauty he was so attached. But for Camus, the violence 
meant that neither side represented home and it became 
imperative not to choose.
Camus defended the French presence in Algeria. He 
thought that the "dream" of the sudden disappearance of 
the French was "childish." At the same time, their right 
to be a presence gave the French "no right, in my 
opinion, to destroy the roots of an Arab culture and
“Camus, "The Wager of Our Generation," in 
Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 243.
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life."83 It was Camus's position that the Algeria he 
called home was home to both Arab and colon alike. He 
would not recognize an Algeria in which one or the other 
community was missing. As both sides had legitimate 
claims to the place as home, each was responsible for 
advancing a dialogue in which the significant ineguities 
of the situation were addressed. Camus tried 
unsuccessfully to promote dialogue and quell the 
violence:
We Frenchmen must struggle to keep repression from 
becoming general so that French law will continue to 
have a generous and obvious meaning in our country; 
we must struggle to remind our people of their 
mistakes and of the obligations of a great nation, 
which cannot, without losing its prestige, answer a 
racial massacre with a similar outburst.84
Concessions would have to be made by the Arab militants
as well. Camus's frustration showed in one of his less
sanguine moments:
You Arabs must spare no effort to show your people 
that, when they kill civilian populations, terrorism 
not only raises justifiable doubts as to the 
political maturity of men capable of such acts, but 
also strengthens anti-Arab elements, reinforces 
their arguments, and silences French liberal opinion 
which might find and put through some solution 
leading to reconciliation.85
“Camus, "Letter to an Algerian Militant," in
Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 127.
120Ibid., 21.
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It is doubtful that anyone would take seriously the 
judgment of a "European" about someone else's "political 
maturity" in the aftermath of two world wars. But 
Camus's purpose was to establish a dialogue in which 
negotiation would replace bloodshed, cooperation would 
replace the brutal dialectic of reprisal and get the 
warring sides to see what they held in common, the love 
of a place.
Camus's qualifications to speak out on the Algerian 
crisis were that "I have lived through the Algerian 
calamity as a personal tragedy and that I am incapable of 
rejoicing over any death whatever."86 He hoped to be a 
voice of reason calling the two sides, united by "our 
love of common soil and our anguish," to dialogue.87 
Both sides were accountable for the reconciliation. The 
one million Frenchmen who had called Algeria home for a 
century and the millions of Arabs and Berbers who had 
called Algeria home for many centuries "must live 
together at the crossroads where history put them."88 
Home, for Camus, must be strengthened by the different 
interests within it. In a world of conflict, difference
“ Camus, "Appeal for a Civilian Truce in Algeria," 
in Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 132.
87Ibid., 133.
“ ibid., 136.
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must be the starting point of dialogue, of living
together. Camus called for a cessation of the bloodshed,
a recognition of kinship and negotiation from the shared
love of Algeria. As home, Algeria must be able to house
the needs and interests of diverse populations without
violence. Such diversity is essential to human
existence, Camus wrote,
because differences are the roots without which the 
tree of liberty, the sap of creation and of 
civilization dries up. Nevertheless, we stand 
facing each other as if frozen, as if struck with a 
paralysis that can be cured only by brutal and brief 
outbursts of violence.89
A dialogue was never established. Algeria was granted
its independence from France by President deGaulle in
1962. A mass exodus of colons began and only 100,000 of
the original 1.2 million remained by 1964.90
Camus is persistently criticized for not choosing
sides in the conflict, particularly from the left with
its expectation of support for the oppressed.91 His
89Ibid.
^See Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace:
Algeria. 1954-62 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987). See
also the biographical account of Camus's life during this 
period in Lottman, Camus; A Biography.
91Most vocal among Camus's critics are Conor Cruise 
O'Brien, Edward Said, Patrick McCarthy and Anthony 
Rizzuto. See O'Brien, Albert Camus of Eurooe and North 
Africa (New York; Viking Press, 1970); McCarthy, Camus, 
Rizzuto, Albert Camus's Imperial Vision (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1981) and more 
recently Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York:
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silence, it is argued, is tacit approval of the 
oppressive colonial system. But Camus was not silent. 
Here as on other occasions he sided with an idea he had 
of human beings and home against a realpolitik of 
violence. Unlike most of his critics, at stake for Camus 
in Algeria was home. If he could not intellectualize 
brutality and theoretically bring about a resolution to 
the civil war, it was not from want of effort. Camus 
made no attempt to reconcile the France-to-be of the 
"Letters" with the France that conducted a war of 
decolonization in Algeria. At home in the Resistance, 
Camus could not find home in either camp in Algeria.
The intractable positions of the two sides in the 
civil war were symptomatic of the totalizing tendencies 
of modern politics. Each side claimed freedom as its 
birthright and justice as its goal. Yet, neither was 
willing to engage the other's understanding of these 
terms. While Camus shared with Weil a suspicion of the 
modern state and its totalizing forms, he also shared her 
sense of the importance of home to human existence. For 
Weil, home was a place vivid in the imagination, a vital
Vintage, 1993). Alec Hargreaves appreciates the 
complexities of Camus's position. See Hargreaves, "Camus 
and the Colonial Question in Algeria," Muslim World 77 
(July/October 1987): 164-74 and Hargreaves "Caught in the 
Middle: The Liberal Dilemma in the Algerian War,"
Nottingham French Studies 25:2 (October 1986): 73-82.
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medium where roots could be established. For Camus home 
was a longed-for peace that he was helpless to bring 
about. In the "Letters” he lauded a France that would be 
based on the self-critical values of the Resistance but 
never came to be.92 In colonial circumstances, the 
ideal of home clashed with the harsh reality of 
colonization where the homes of others had been corrupted 
if not destroyed, so his appeals on the Algerian question 
could only identify the elements of home in the broadest 
possible terms.93 Perhaps Camus's dual status as a 
colon, that is, his self-identification as both Algerian 
and French, explains his failure. Perhaps a larger 
civilizational failure to recognize the need to recreate 
the nation-state as home is to blame. What is certain is 
that the two thinkers shared a belief in the 
establishment of a place of safety for the individual, a 
place from which at least part of the individual's 
identity could be drawn, a place where freedom could be 
reconciled to justice.
92See Judt, Past Imperfect.
93See Simone Weil, "East and West: Thoughts on the
Colonial Problem," in Selected Essays. 195-210 and Albert 
Camus, "Algeria," in Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 
111-153.
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IV. Reconciling Freedom and Justice
For Weil and Camus, the goal of a political order as 
home would reflect the reconciliation of individual 
freedom and a collective form of justice. Fred Rosen 
recognized this need and suggested that the 
reconciliation was necessary because in modern 
totalitarian politics justice had been "invoked in such a 
way that the pursuit of justice often involves the 
sacrifice of liberty."94 Camus recognized this tendency 
and suggested that a more limited form of justice 
"actually depended upon freedom and also served to 
restore and preserve it."95 Weil's rationalist approach 
to liberty, finding the source of freedom in the 
individual's capacity to overcome servitude to necessity 
by directing "his action intelligently," later conceived 
liberty as intelligible choice in the political realm. 
Rosen associates her conception of justice "with love, 
attention, the refusal to harm others, duty and 
obligation.1,96 While Camus sought reconciliation in the 
relationship of freedom and justice, Weil found the nexus 
of freedom and justice in their shared transcendent 
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thinker, Rosen argues, successfully accomplished the 
difficult reconciliation.
Rosen correctly identifies the impulse behind the 
attempted reconciliation. The totalitarian 
bastardization of the language of freedom and justice 
meant that their reconciliation would require breathing 
new life into the tired abstractions the terms had come 
to signify. The interest of Weil and Camus in this 
project may be found in their shared concerns with 
preserving individual integrity and reshaping the modern 
nation-state into a community more recognizable as home. 
For both, sustaining the integrity of the human being 
meant encouraging the free individual to creative 
expression through word and deed. It was not sufficient 
merely to be possessed of freedom, but it was incumbent 
on the ethical political actor to exercise that freedom. 
Exploring the freedom Weil and Camus separately 
envisioned required a context, thus their shared need to 
recreate community. As this section will demonstrate, 
Weil and Camus each give voice to an emerging conception 
of justice as a context required for the exercise of 
freedom. Home could not be just a physical place.
Freedom could no longer be thought of as equivalent to 
the unchecked will of the individual and justice could no 
longer be thought of as something dispensed. Justice, as
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a dimension of home, must form the lived context of all 
legitimate postwar politics.
Veil: Justice and Consent
In an essay written in the same period as The Need 
for Roots. Simone Weil examined the relationship between 
justice and freedom by considering their nexus, 
consent.97 Free consent entailed obedience to necessity 
short of collaboration with evil. Acting in obedience to 
necessity meant opening the self to the divine without 
using that openness disingenuously to justify all manner 
of acts. Consent to obedience must be understood as 
aspiring to the good. Weil thought that human beings 
found their only true freedom in this obedience. "Where 
obedience is consented to," she held, "there is freedom; 
there and nowhere else."98
As part of created reality, however, human beings 
had latitude when it came to acting in conformity with 
this obedience. A real choice must be made. Human 
beings could, and most did, choose not to act in 
accordance with obedience to necessity and in so doing 
valued ends other than the good. They might also draw on 
the decreated part of the human soul and agree to consent 
in a manner conforming to obedience to necessity. True
97Weil, "Are We Struggling for Justice?".
98Ibid., 8.
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consent entailed making the latter choice: choosing to
obey the order of necessity to the degree circumstances
allowed. This idea of consent formed the core of Weil's
conception of justice.
Human beings, caught in the web of necessity, lack
the will to treat themselves justly. Justice requires a
community of people mutually consenting to value the
good, to obey necessity by minimizing the harm human
beings do one another. Justice was a spiritual as well
as a political value. Weil wrote:
Justice has as its object the exercise of the 
faculty of consent on earth. To preserve it 
religiously wherever it exists, to try to create 
conditions for it where it is absent, that is to 
love justice.99
The just community preserves the implied equality of
human beings as human beings. For justice to exist,
human beings must be treated with the same respect. Her
idea of consent made Weil quick to disavow the apparently
democratic implications of her argument. "Democratic
thought contains a serious error," Weil argued, "it
confuses consent with a certain form of consent, which is
not the only one and which can easily, like any form, be
mere form."100 There could only be justice among
persons equally regarded. In the just encounter, this
"ibid., 5.
100Ibid., 6.
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equality derived not from similar material or
intellectual resources, but rather from mutual agreement
to consent to the obedience of necessity. A just
environment valued and preserved freedom, that is,
encouraged this obedience. Once freedom was understood
as obedience to necessity, the love of justice could be
preserved in the exercise of that freedom.
Weil was convinced that wherever lives were lived in
consent to true obedience there was a blossoming of
beauty, poetry, and happiness. The dearth of such places
in the midst of manifold claims of just (often,
democratic) government based on consent meant that
bastardized forms of consent were the rule rather than
the exception. These unacceptable forms of consent
tended to be grounded in the economic order:
Consent is neither to be bought nor sold. 
Consequently, whatever the political institutions, 
in a society where monetary transactions dominate 
most of social life, where almost all obedience is 
bought and sold, there can be no freedom.101
Weil associates these economic circumstances with the
degradation of humanity she had seen in the factories.
Driven by profit, this lack of freedom or uprootedness
had come to characterize Western civilization. To
establish roots, to ground human existence in the good,
101Ibid.
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freedom and its political and economic context would have 
to be re-created.
Weil began her creative reconstruction of freedom 
and its context in The Need for Roots. She struck first 
at political orders that had convinced themselves they 
were based on consent. She found their weakness in the 
rights-claims they encouraged. Her critique of rights 
was not intended to refute the need for rights, but 
rather to recast the way rights were thought about. To 
the degree that rights spoke from a sense of the 
integrity of the individual, they were critical and 
should be preserved. To the degree that all political 
discourse had devolved into irresolvable conflict among 
rights-claims, rights had assumed too primary a role in 
modern politics.102 Weil's answer to the problem was to 
value the obligations owed human beings over rights- 
claims, relegating the latter to a "subordinate and 
relative" role.
Subordinating rights to obligations was a creative 
leap bordering on the revolutionary in that it forced
102See Edward Andrew, "Simone Weil on the Injustice 
of Rights-Based Doctrines," Review of Politics 48 (Winter 
1986): 60-91; Bell, "Reading Simone Weil on Rights, 
Justice and Love," in Bell, editor, Simone Weil's 
Philosophy of Culture. 214-234; as well as the 
discussions in Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, 
134-140 and McLellan, Utopian Pessimist. 244 and Blum and 
Seidler, A Truer Liberty. 53-54, 260-261.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 8 8
Weil to reconceive law in nearly natural law terms. In
her conception, as Collins and Nielsen have shown, nature
(or obligation) compels, while law (the statutory
protector of rights) counsels.103 Rights-claims, then,
are almost always legal claims while obligations, Weil
believed, always derive their authority from a natural
order existent above the legal. Rights, redefined as
specific manifestations of obligations to be met, would
have to be enshrined in statute because they could be
binding only when recognized by the community:
A right is not ineffectual by itself, but only in 
relation to the obligation to which it corresponds, 
the effective exercise of a right springing not from 
the individual who possesses it, but from other men 
who consider themselves as being under a certain 
obligation toward him.104
Rights are only protected in the sense that they are
grounded in a recognized obligation. Human beings are
obligated to protect the sacred in each other by the mere
certainty that they are human beings. Obligation
therefore derives from the decreated, the residue of the
eternal in created reality. Defiling the sacred by
causing or failing to relieve the affliction of another
103Ronald K. L. Collins and Finn E. Nielsen, "The 
Spirit of Simone Weil's Law," in Bell, editor, Simone 
Weil's Philosophy of Culture. 235-259.
104Weil, The Need for Roots. 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 8 9
is an affront to God. By divine mandate, human beings 
are obligated to redress the affliction of others.
A social order based on obligation is difficult to 
conceive and Weil depends on a Kantian recognition of 
human obligation to every other human being. Obligation 
is a recognition. Law can sustain the environment in 
which obligations are met, but obligations cannot be 
dependent upon law or other convention, for convention is 
prone to modification while human obligation is eternal. 
Human beings shared divine origins, all were created out 
of decreated reality, and these shared origins, not some 
conception of an "eternal destiny," determined the 
universality of obligations. Weil believed that 
obligations must become a fact of political existence 
independent of eternal destiny. "A human being's eternal 
destiny cannot be the motive of any obligation," she 
wrote, "for it is not subordinate to external 
actions."105 What is owed the human being as human 
being is respect shown through the medium of earthly 
needs. Our obligations stem from the vital needs of the 
human being alone. The just environment or vital medium 
must meet these needs which Weil enumerated in The Need 
for Roots. Chief among human needs for Weil was food or
105Ibid., 6.
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nourishment: no one should suffer hunger. All other
human needs she drew by analogy from this one.
Weil distinguished between the needs of the body and 
the needs of the soul. The needs of the body, food, 
warmth, sleep, health, rest, exercise, and fresh air, 
could be provided by a certain arrangement of the 
individual human life, that is, through the creative 
exercise of human freedom. Creating a livable human 
order, however, was a spiritual as well as a social and 
political problem. In creating a livable human order 
"the first thing to be investigated is what are those 
needs which are for the life of the soul, what the needs 
in the way of food, sleep and warmth are for the life of 
the body."106 The needs of the soul were less tangible 
than those of the body and thus more fragile and less 
easily met. They must not be "desires, whims, fancies 
and vices."107 Their obscurity, however, marked the 
difficulty in refashioning political life in conformity 
with justice. Privation of the needs of the soul left 
the soul in "a state analogous to that of a starved or 
mutilated body."108 A livable and just human order
106Ibid., 9.
107Ibid.
108Weil, "Draft for a Statement of Human Obligations" 
in Selected Essays. 224.
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required that the needs of the soul be enumerated and
defined for "the lack of any such investigation forces
governments, even when their intentions are honest, to
act sporadically and at random."109
The first need of the soul was order. Weil knew her
audience had spent the war years subverting the order
imposed by the Nazis in occupied France. The adjustment
to a legitimate order after the war would be difficult.
The anti-order of resistance presented her with an
opportunity to rethink order itself. For Weil, order is
a texture of social relationships such that no one 
is compelled to violate imperative obligations in 
order to carry out other ones. It is only where 
this, in fact, occurs that external circumstances 
have any power to inflict spiritual violence on the 
soul.110
An order which creates situations in which one must 
choose between basic obligations is unacceptable, indeed, 
crime was the denial of some obligations to simplify 
existence. Overcoming this difficulty required 
conceiving needs as occurring naturally in seemingly 
"antithetical pairs." These pairs, for Weil, must be 
seen "to combine together to form a balance." She was 
confident that a "veritable human order" could provide a
109Weil, The Need for Roots. 9.
110Ibid., 10. Though Weil claims the necessity of 
pairing the needs of the soul in The Need for Roots, she 
actually pairs them in "Draft for a Statement of Human 
Obligations."
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space wherein needs which seemed to conflict could be 
"fully satisfied in turn."111
Liberty and obedience formed the first of Weil's 
antithetical pairs. Liberty (or freedom) was the ability 
and obligation to choose in accordance with the good. 
Choices should always be grounded in understanding the 
laws and mores of the community which were reflections of 
the communal encounter with necessity. Written laws 
should be comprehensible to the average intelligence.112 
Freedom grounded in obedience to law and custom was 
necessarily limited. Law served to limit the range of 
choice. Otherwise, freedom would become a burden, human 
beings would cease to enjoy liberty and "end up by 
thinking that liberty is not a good thing."113 Liberty 
also entailed obedience to necessity in the form of 
leaders whose positions were based upon a consent freely 
given. Consent was an attitude of soul not to be coerced 
by threats or the promise of reward, particularly 
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be sold."11* Only free action in an attitude of consent 
could show initiative while embracing responsibility.115
Human beings must have a stake in their community, 
impersonal as well as personal. Weil's pairing of 
equality and hierarchy derives from this idea. Equality, 
she wrote,
consists in a recognition, at once public, general, 
effective and genuinely expressed in institutions 
and customs, that the same amount of respect and 
consideration is due to every human being, because 
this respect is due to the human being as such and 
is not a matter of degree.116
While advancing equality as equal respect owed all human
beings as human beings, Weil conceded inequality in the
realm of wealth and power. To offset this inequality,
she proposed that the exercise of important public
functions carry serious personal risks. She advanced "a
conception of punishment in which social rank, as an
aggravating circumstance, would necessarily play an
important part in what the penalty was to be."117
Hierarchism was "a certain veneration, a certain devotion





Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 9 4
relation to the powers they exercise, but as 
symbols.11118 Persons of such symbolic rank would be 
particularly answerable to the community for their 
conduct. She did not fear the emergence of a class 
structure accompanying her notion of hierarchy. The 
development of distinctions of social rank was inevitable 
in any case. She argued that, more important than the 
emergence of a class structure, the "effect of true 
hierarchism" would be "to bring each one to fit himself 
morally into the place he occupies."119
The responsibility accompanying status and political 
power flowed naturally from Weil's pairing of honor and 
punishment. Honor was an important source of respect for 
self and others. She described it as regard given a 
human being due to social surroundings, like membership 
in a group having a noble tradition enshrined in history. 
For Weil, crime, especially that in which the individual 
evidenced a lack of self-respect, was a measure of a 
society not meeting the soul's need for honor. Crime, 
then, was as much a judgment on society as on the 
individual. Punishment undertaken in the right spirit 
should have as its goals the restoration of self-respect 
and the reintegration of the human being into the
118Ibid., 19.
119Ibid.
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community. Punishment should educate as well as punish. 
"Punishment must be an honor," Weil wrote. It "must not 
only wipe out the stigma of the crime, but must be 
regarded as a supplementary form of education, compelling 
a higher devotion to the public good."120
The reintegration of criminals into the social order 
is necessary because of the fear and terror the presence 
of a criminal class is likely to create. Fear for 
personal safety is inimicable to social order. Personal 
security is required for human beings to take the 
creative risks that stimulate the life of a community. 
Security and risk, thus, are vital to a healthy social 
order. Security is simply the absence of fear or terror 
except in unavoidable, brief and exceptional 
circumstances. Providing security might entail risk, but 
might also encourage the taking of necessary chances.
The absence of risk is not at all desirable, writes Weil, 
for it "produces a type of boredom which paralyzes in a 
different way from fear, but almost as much."121 
Boredom stifles creativity and thereby discourages the 
initiative and innovation necessary for social change and 
essential to keeping a community vital.
120Ibid. , 21.
121Ibid., 34.
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Considerations of risk and security raise issues of
property. At risk in civil society is not only personal
safety, but also property. Despite her socialist
background, Weil considered property a vital need of the
soul. She carefully distinguished between private
property and collective property. The soul, she wrote,
"feels isolated, lost, if it is not surrounded by objects
which seem to it like an extension of the bodily
members."122 Private property did not include money and
entailed more than the articles of ordinary consumption.
At issue was the owner's stake in the right order of the
community: "the majority of people should own their
house and a little piece of land round it, and, whenever
not technically impossible, the tools of their
trade."123 At the same time, there should be property
commonly-held by the members of a community in which all
felt a stake:
Where a real civic life exists, each one feels he 
has personal ownership in the public monuments, 
gardens, ceremonial pomp and circumstance; and a 
' display of sumptuousness, in which nearly all human 
beings seek fulfillment, is in this way placed 
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Property, commonly and privately held, was critical to 
Weil's understanding of membership in a just community. 
Inequalities were inevitable; but to foster a sense of 
membership, the differences between the lives of the 
wealthy and the lives of the poor must be differences in 
degree not in kind. Keeping these inequalities in check 
would be the responsibility of the better off. For Weil, 
in a community where property was a necessary component 
of community life, ownership must be recognized as a 
vital component of membership or belonging.
Weil does not rely on structures to meet the needs 
of the human soul. She clearly envisions a community of 
responsive, responsible citizens. She tries to maintain 
a delicate balance between personal responsibility and 
civil liberties. She was least successful in keeping 
this balance in her considerations of the obligations and 
responsibilities of intellectuals which she addressed in 
her pairing of freedom of opinion and truth. Weil 
believed that the intelligence, in order to be creative, 
had need of unlimited freedom of expression. That 
expression, however, must meet the inexpressible and, 
therefore, problematic, criterion of truth. Authors 
seeking to contribute to a "complete and correct 
tabulation of data concerning each problem" should be 
free from risk by law. "On the other hand," she held,
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"publications destined to influence what is called 
opinion, that is to say, in effect, the conduct of life, 
constitute acts and ought to be subjected to the same 
restrictions as are all acts."125
It is unclear how Weil would distinguish between the 
valued accumulation of data and the dangerous pandering 
to opinion. It is clear that she intended to punish 
authors for "irresponsible opinions" in intellectual 
matters.126 Weil wished a kind of self-evident truth 
to be the arbiter of the difference between data and 
irresponsible opinion, truth being the most sacred of the 
needs of the soul. Drawing on her Platonic roots, she 
suggested that the just society set up judges responsible 
for "publicly condemning any avoidable error." These 
judges would be given power "to sentence to prison or 
hard labor for repeated commission of the offense, 
aggravated by proven dishonesty of intention."127 Her 
main requirement of these judges was that they "love 
truth." Weil intends truth to be carefully understood as
125Ibid., 24.
126 Weil also uses the data/opinion distinction to 
justify limiting the actions of associations and the 
formation of parties. See ibid., 29-33. Organizations 
cannot be free as they lack the human capacity for 
freedom. Associations based on interests should be 
closely supervised by the government, while associations 
based on ideas should be outlawed.
127Ibid., 39.
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openness to the divine part of the human soul. As a 
standard, indeed, as a tool of judgment, however, truth 
suffers the defects of its virtues. Here, what faith 
Weil has in human nature breaks down. The data/opinion 
distinction and the council of judges are potentially 
tools of tyranny. She institutionalizes the discipline 
necessary in all human creative endeavors. In so doing, 
she provides a body of human beings with the authority to 
define, far too precisely, the subjects and boundaries of 
creative action in the community. Weil, like many before 
and since, succumbs to the temptation to enforce social 
control on human thought and creativity in the name of 
truth.
Despite the unfortunate discussion of truth and 
freedom of opinion, the value of Weil's enumeration of 
the needs of the soul is the picture it provides of the 
just political order. Justice on this model is not a 
series of statements, but rather is made possible by the 
creation of conditions for the exercise of a certain kind 
of human freedom. A political order that does not create 
the conditions necessary to meet each of these needs, one 
that does not make of itself a vital medium, cannot 
expect the love that is true obedience and will not 
survive. Ignoring these needs begat the hopeless and 
destructive human beings of the twentieth century. In
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protecting the individual by seeing that these needs are 
met, Weil hopes for the emergence of a new form of 
collectivity deriving its legitimacy from the created 
climate of justice rather than from its structures. For 
Weil, structural forms are secondary to providing for the 
needs of the human body and soul. Weil's faith is that 
meeting those needs will mandate just as opposed to 
arbitrary structures. These structures will provide the 
context in which the needs of the soul will be met.
Except for the seriously flawed council of judges 
discussion, Weil fortunately leaves devising the 
structures which will support these needs to the 
formulation of others. The crucial points have been 
made: human beings have duties toward themselves, but
obligations toward other human beings. Justice is as a 
context within which human beings are free to pursue the 
needs of the body and soul. It is critical that none of 
the needs she enumerates can be met by the solitary self; 
they require the authentic human interaction which modern 
political order made impossible and which Weil, like 
Camus, hoped to foster.
Camus: The Style of Freedom
"There is justice," Camus wrote in The Rebel, "in 
restoring freedom, which is the only imperishable value
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of history*"128 For Camus, justice was a state of being 
that could only be attained by providing for the free 
exercise of human creative capacities. The freedom Camus 
envisioned was not the fictional "absolute freedom" he 
criticized throughout The Rebel. but rather a freedom 
limited by law and the freedom of others. From the 
waning days of the Resistance until the end of his life 
reconciling freedom and justice was the focus of Camus's 
political thought.129 The reconciliation meant the 
creation of a community in which the freedom of all was 
exercised mindful of the freedom of others. This 
community should yield space for the development of 
individual genius as well as for cooperation among its 
members. But Camus ultimately eschewed consideration of 
the kind of institutions that would provide such freedom, 
seeking it instead in the conduct of individual human 
beings. Camus found the reconciliation of freedom and 
justice in what he called "style." The just community 
would encourage the development in each citizen of a 
creative way of life, a "style" of life, distinct from 
but complementary to that of the community.
128Camus, The Rebel. 291.
129See the discussions in Wilhoite, Bevond Nihilism. 
170-175; Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern 
Rebellion. 185; Sprintzen, Camus. 189-193.
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The primacy of reconciling freedom and justice 
emerged while Camus was editor of the Resistance 
newspaper Combat. In an editorial of 8 September 1944, 
Camus wrote that "the question for all of us is how to 
reconcile justice with freedom.11130 Making life free 
for the individual and just for all would be a difficult 
task:
We do not deny that such a balance is difficult. If 
we look at history, we see that it has not yet been 
possible, that between freedom and justice there 
seems to exist a state of contradiction. How could 
there not be? Freedom for each means freedom for 
the rich and ambitious; that invites injustice. 
Justice for all means the submission of the 
individual to the collective good. How can we 
speak, then, of absolute freedom?131
Human beings were obligated to work through the
contradictions. This was life in rebellion: to point
out the contradictions, make the effort at reconciling
them, and recognize that "justice does not come without
[this] revolt."132 A new social and political
environment would have to be created. The human creative
capacity would be severely tested: "under conditions so
desperate," Camus wrote, "the hard, marvelous task of
this century is to create justice in the most unjust of
130Camus, "Justice and Freedom," Combat. 8 September 
1944, in Between Hell and Reason. 51.
131Ibid.
132Ibid.
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worlds and to protect freedom from those souls who, out 
of principle, choose servitude.11133
Tony Judt has shown that many French intellectuals, 
Camus included, believed that it was the job of a free 
press to show the way.134 As editor of Combat. Camus 
fashioned working definitions of the two concepts in an 
attempt to make them compatible. Justice was "a social 
state in which each individual starts with an equal 
opportunity, and in which the country's majority cannot 
be held in abject conditions by a privileged few."135 
"And we shall call freedom," he continued, "a political 
climate in which the human being is respected for both 
what he is and for what he says."136 Setting aside the 
Camus's dubious assumption about the possibility of every 
individual starting out with an equal opportunity, the 
value of his conceptions lies in making the two terms 
compatible by conceiving them as related elements of the 
same environment. Justice was a "social state," while 
freedom was a "political climate." Reconciling the two
133Ibid., 52 (my emphasis) .
134See Camus, "Critique of the New Press," Combat. 31 
August 1944 and Camus, "The Journalistic Critique,"
Combat. 8 September 1944, in Between Hell and Reason. 44, 
52. See also Judt, Past Imperfect.
135Camus, editorial, Combat. 1 October 1944, in 
Between Hell and Reason. 57.
136Ibid.
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values would take place at the communal or institutional 
level: a just state would ensure a free political
climate.
Camus's uncharacteristic and short-lived faith in 
institutional arrangements can be directly traced to his 
recent Resistance experience. Before the Occupation, the 
Third Republic had failed France. During the Occupation, 
widespread collaboration was a failure of French citizens 
as individual political actors. After the Liberation, it 
made sense for Camus to stress the creation of an order 
fit to be inhabited by human beings rather than a way of 
being human out of which that order would emerge. This 
position, while temporary, was nonetheless theoretically 
consistent with Camus's desire to create a home for the 
free human being. Camus, like other Resistants, believed 
postwar France must be a working model for all of Europe. 
What institutional arrangements were appropriate to this 
vision?
Our plan is to make justice reign throughout the 
economy and to guarantee freedom through 
politics. . . . What we want for France is a 
collectivist economy and a liberal political 
structure. Without a collectivist economy to take 
away money's privilege and put money back to work, 
political liberalism would be a farce. But without 
the constitutional guarantee of a liberal political 
structure, a collectivist economy could consume all 
individual initiative and expression.137
137Ibid.
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Blending a socialist economy and liberal political
structures with the requisite "intellectual and moral
honesty," Camus and his Combat cohorts envisioned a "New
Socialism" which might provide the difficult balance
necessary to allow freedom and justice to coexist.
Camus was not particularly interested in
theoretically justifying this structural vision. He
lacked the political naivete to believe that creating a
different kind of political order required creating a new
philosophy. He was content with the name "Socialism."
Brilliant or original theoretical justifications were not
always corollaries of effective political action. "It is
not absolutely essential," he wrote:
that political doctrines be new. Political thought 
(though not necessarily political action) can do 
without genius. Human affairs are complicated in 
detail but simple in principle. Social justice can 
be realized without brilliant philosophy. It 
requires the basic elements of good sense, which are 
clearsightedness, energy and selflessness.138
Perhaps more important, the twentieth century had shown
that political doctrines do not succeed through their
novelty but rather through the "energy and sacrifice they
inspire."139 Camus could not speak to what socialist
theory meant to the socialists of the failed Third
138Camus, editorial, Combat. 24 November 1944, in 
Between Hell and Reason. 85.
139Ibid.
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Republic, but he did know that now socialism gave "form
to the impatience, to the fever for justice" of many of
his compatriots.140
Camus carefully distinguished his "New Socialism"
from earlier forms. He despised the socialism which took
refuge in "false optimism":
It preaches love of humanity so as to exempt itself 
from serving men, inevitable progress so as to 
ignore the question of wages, and universal peace so 
as to avoid necessary sacrifices. That form of 
socialism is accomplished above all by the 
sacrifices of others.141
Camus's "new" socialism had no faith in progress and was
willing to make sacrifices. Rejecting "weakness and
lies," it was "convinced that the fate of men remains
always in the hands of men" and that only by "tenacious
efforts" could the human condition be improved.142 This
would mean revolution, but of a different sort:
For this socialism, justice is worth a revolution. 
And because revolution comes harder to this 
socialism— since it respects human lives— its 
revolution is all the more likely to require only 
the necessary sacrifices.143
Camus lost faith in his "New Socialism" at the precise
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sacrifices." These editorials coincided with the purge 
trials and executions in France that Camus initially 
supported and then rejected in January of 1945.144 His 
revulsion with the purges forced him to reconsider his 
conception of politics. The purges, in which the lives 
of suspected collaborators were ruined when not actually 
taken, bespoke a type of revolution based on murder that 
Camus could not long support. A way to reconcile freedom 
and justice would have to be found that did not rely on 
murder, especially state murder.145
In the Rebel. Camus sought the intellectual roots of 
the murder of millions of human beings in the first half 
of the twentieth century. He found them in the dubious 
notion of absolute freedom. Only the human being 
possessed of absolute freedom could justify taking 
another life, destroying the possibilities that life 
represented. To redress the ubiquity of murder, to 
preserve the integrity of the individual and to create 
justice, then, required interrogating the absolute 
freedom that many modern artists and philosophers had 
tried to claim. The attempt to release human beings from
144See Camus, editorial, Combat. 5 January 1945, in 
Between Hell and Reason. 100. See Judt's valuable 
discussion of the purges in Past Imperfect. 57-74.
145See Camus's impassioned 1957 plea for an end to 
death by guillotine "Reflections on the Guillotine" in 
Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 175-235.
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the constraints of necessity proved disastrous, creating
not freedom but a murderous chaos. Camus wrote:
Chaos is also a form of servitude. Freedom exists 
only in a world where what is possible is defined at 
the same time as what is not possible. Without law 
there is no freedom.146
For Camus, like Weil, law marked the limit of human
freedom, the limit of human creativity. Human beings are
ends in themselves. Law regulates "means" while removing
"ends" from the province of human beings who are ill-
equipped to handle it. Law conceived as the monitor of
means in the defense of an end undefined is the
limitation at the root of Camus's conception of
rebellion. Rebellion occurs within limits indigenous to
the human condition that must be recognized by the rebel.
Whether those limits are legal, social or ontological,
historical or metaphysical, there is always a constraint
beyond which the rebel cannot move. In human
interaction, that limit is death. Rebellion preserves
the tension between the motive for the revolt and the
limit. Camus's critical insight is that the limit exists
whether it is recognized or not. Creative rebellion,
free action in the name of justice, recognizes the limit;
destructive revolution does not.
146Camus, The Rebel. 71.
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All rebellion, limited or not, is claimed as the
legitimate exercise of freedom in the name of justice.
Camus intends his conception of rebellion as a counter to
the idea of absolute freedom. Rebellion "puts total
freedom up for trial" and "specifically attacks the
unlimited power that authorizes a superior to violate a
forbidden frontier."147 The rebel understands that
"freedom has its limits everywhere that a human being is
to be found— the limit being precisely that human being's
power to rebel."148 The rebel claims this freedom with
limits for humanity while denying humanity absolute
freedom. In so doing, the rebel rejects the Hegelian
master-slave dialectic:
He is not only the slave against the master, but 
also man against the world of master and slave. 
Therefore, thanks to rebellion, there is something 
more in history than the relation between mastery 
and servitude. Unlimited power is not the only law. 
It is in the name of another value that the rebel 
affirms the impossibility of total freedom while he 
claims for himself the relative freedom necessary to 
recognize this impossibility. Every human freedom, 
at its very roots, is therefore relative.149
Human justice, Camus argues in The Rebel, is the justice
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a conception of freedom limited precisely by the freedom 
of every other human being.
Camus's analysis begs the question of conflict 
resolution. Law limits the freedom of human beings in 
relation to one another, with the implication that all 
resulting disputes can be resolved through legal 
processes. But the inadequacies of the trial in The 
Stranger, the limited effectiveness of the authorities in 
The Plaque and the dubious ethical stance of Clamence the 
judge-penitent in The Fall calls even this most general 
of assumptions into question. The absence of an 
effective dispute-resolution mechanism in Camus's work is 
an unresolved weakness, but it illustrates that his real 
concern is the conduct of the individual. Camus suggests 
that with the self-regulated individual conflicts will be 
minimal and non-violent, since violence is an 
impermissible violation of the other. Camus, therefore, 
concerns himself with the problem of individual conduct, 
specifically, how to overcome murder as the political 
modus operandi of the twentieth century.
Learning how to live with the massive destruction 
of human life and potential in the first half of the 
twentieth century was not "a matter of constructing an 
ideology," Camus wrote in Combat, "but simply of pursuing
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a certain style of life.1'150 Camus could not disengage
authentic freedom from the ability to create a "style" of
life. Style was a term he used frequently in his
discussions of art and rebellion.151 In art, style
referred to the limited transformation the artist imposed
on reality through the creative act. The correction the
artist imposes on reality, Camus wrote, "by his language
and by a redistribution of elements derived from reality
is called style and gives the re-created universe its
unity and its boundaries.1,152 Style's imposition is
limited, the human actor cannot impose truth. Style,
rather, expresses a vision. In the ethical realm, style
refers to acting in conformity with an understanding an
individual has of what it means to be a human being and a
member of a community. Style is the element of action
preserving the tension between vision and reality:
It is the same thing with creation as with 
civilization: it presumes the uninterrupted tension
between history and values. If the equilibrium is
150Camus, "A New Social Contract," Combat, 29 
November 1946, in Between Hell and Reason. 135. This 
essay is part of the series of essays Camus wrote between 
19 November and 30 November 1946 entitled "Neither 
Victims Nor Executioners."
15lStyle is a neglected aspect of Camus's ethical and 
political thought. Sprintzen, Camus. 223, defines it a 
purely artistic term indicating "the way the sensuous 
qualities and dramatic meanings are expressed in the 
medium."
152Camus, The Rebel. 270.
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destroyed, the result is dictatorship or anarchy, 
propaganda or formal insanity. In either case, 
creation, which always coincides with rational 
freedom, is impossible.153
In ethics, the style of life preserves the tension
between the law and mores of the social order and the
individual's view of his or her role in that order. The
style of the social order finds expression in laws,
customs, mores, and rituals. Because it gives expression
to a community's sense of its own meaning, this
collective sense of style resembles Weil's conception of
the vital medium. The political actor, by giving subtly
(or not so subtly) different articulations of his or her
role in a social order, contributes to the growth and
self-understanding, the style, of that order. A
political act can be complete, but never perfect, so the
actor can never claim to have acted with absolute
freedom: "Through style," Camus wrote, "the creative
effort reconstructs the world, and always with the same
slight distortion that is the mark of both art and
protest."154
Style is not something an individual or community 
does, but rather is something an individual or community 
is. "Great style," Camus held, "is invisible
153Ibid.
154Ibid.
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stylization, or rather stylization incarnate.1,155
Acting in accordance with style entails responsibilities
that can put the actor at odds with an illegitimate, but
prevailing communal style. In the case of Vichy, it
would have been much easier for the few members of the
Resistance to assume France had no meaning and for them
all to become collaborators. But as with the artist
whose style is the model for this ethic, style entails
discipline and a commitment to the potential beauty of
human being. This actor, Camus said in a late speech,
without refusing to take part in the combat, at 
least refuses to join the regular armies and remains 
free-lance. The lesson he then finds in beauty, if 
he draws fairly, is a lesson not of selfishness but 
rather of hard brotherhood.156
Acting with style while finding limits in the freedom of
others is acting in accordance with the limited freedom
Camus envisioned. This freedom is not the absolute
freedom of the artist who partakes of either extreme of
realism or formalism. It is rather the limited freedom
that "presupposes health of body and mind, a style that
reflects strength of soul, and a patient defiance.1,157
Like all freedom, Camus concluded, this freedom involved
155Ibid., 272.
156Camus, "Create Dangerously," in Resistance. 
Rebellion and Death. 267.
157Ibid.
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a perpetual risk. Modem human beings "avoid risk today, 
as they avoid liberty with its exacting demands in order 
to accept any kind of bondage and achieve at least 
comfort of soul."158 Camus hoped to overcome this 
passive, deadly way of life through his formulation of 
style.
A style recognizing the limits of human freedom 
entailed obligations.159 Camus illustrated the style of 
the citizen by speaking of the obligations of the artist. 
Life in community entailed dialogue and effective style 
compelled interaction. In a 1957 lecture Camus said, "If 
there is any man who has no right to solitude it is the 
artist. Art cannot be a monologue.1,160 It was the 
artist's job to justify humanity, not judge it; to engage 
humanity in a conversation about itself. "The aim of 
art," Camus believed, "is not to legislate or reign 
supreme, but rather to understand first of all."161 To 
be self-governing was the mandate of membership; to be 
informed, the requirement of self-governance. Only by
158Ibid.
159Here, I think, Camus like Weil values obligations 
above rights. Scholars like Rosen argue that a 
reconception of rights is the primary concern of Camus's 
political theory.
160Camus, "Create Dangerously," in Resistance. 
Rebellion and Death. 257.
161 Ibid., 266.
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understanding can the artist or citizen begin to know 
what it is he or she must reorder. "The more 
undisciplined what he must put in order," Camus said,
"the stricter will be his rule [of self] and the more he 
will assert his freedom [through his work]."162 The 
artist's freedom, then, like that of the free citizen, 
entails responsibilities to the community. The artist 
must respect limits, of medium, of subject, of the 
artist's abilities. The citizen must also respect 
limits, of resources, of law, of the other's capacity to 
rebel. The ability to act while respecting limits 
defined the freedom of the artist, and, Camus believed, 
the freedom of the human being.
For Camus, the question of whether by pursuing 
justice freedom would be attained was moot. "It is 
essential," he argued, "to know that, without liberty, we 
shall achieve nothing and that we shall lose both future 
justice and ancient beauty."163 Only the promise of 
liberty, Camus thought, would draw human beings out from 
their isolation into a dialogue, into a communal 
interaction that could embody justice. Camus believed 
that art, undertaken in the spirit outlined above, was 
one way to realize the coexistence of freedom and
162Ibid., 268.
163Ibid., 266.
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justice. This model of creativity also spoke to a
necessary reorientation to citizenship and community.
Camus had a distinct faith that such a world was
possible. In the aftermath of Hungary and two years
before his death, Camus wrote that his faith was:
that throughout the world, beside the impulse toward 
coercion and death that is darkening history, there 
is a growing impulse toward persuasion and life, a 
vast emancipatory movement called culture that is 
made up both of free creation and of free work.164
Camus envisioned the style of a culture as the
aggregation of the styles of its members. The task, the
"long vocation" of the artist and political actor was to
add to that culture by their "labors" and "never
subtract, even temporarily, anything from it."165 The
obligation the creative political actor shared with every
other human being was "to defend personally to the very
end, against the impulse toward coercion and death, the
freedom of that culture— in other words, the freedom of
work and of creation.1,166
164Camus, "Kadar Had His Day of Fear," in Resistance. 
Rebellion and Death. 162.
165Ibid.
166Ibid.
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V. Conclusion: Politics and "The Human Heart of Things"
Their orientations to political reality were 
markedly different. Weil believed that each human being 
was possessed of the capacity to act upon the residual 
decreated or divine part of the human soul. Her ethical 
thought thus depended upon paying close attention to the 
affliction of the other and the shared obligation of each 
human being to see that the needs of all human beings 
were met. To so act was certainly politically ethical, 
but more important for Weil, it was to transform 
necessity into a livable environment and to act in 
accordance with obedience to God. Justice for Weil was 
creating an environment, a home, in which the created 
part of the person would be valued by other human beings 
like the decreated part would be by God. By contrast, 
Camus, as demonstrated above in the discussion of "the 
indomitable men," found his transcendent principle, the 
baseline for his ethics, in the everyday conduct of human 
life. The "human heart of things" must be served by 
politics in the aftermath of total war. Shared human 
experience must be embraced and celebrated if there was 
to be fruitful life in political community. A style, 
respectful of limits, must be encouraged as part of 
communal membership. Only by supporting the diverse 
creative talents of individual human beings could a
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permanent but evolving communal style be sustained. Only 
by recognizing a limit in the freedom of other human 
beings could real order be established.
Despite the differences, the similarities in the 
concerns and goals of Weil and Camus are striking. In 
the objects of their political thought, each identified 
the same problems: reconceiving individual freedom
without nihilism; recreating community without the 
debilitating effects of totalitarianism or the alienating 
effects of an unregulated market; and in meeting these 
two requirements, finding a way to reconcile justice and 
freedom in such a way as to obligate each human being to 
become the caretaker of every other human being. Their 
solutions, while differing in form, were strikingly 
similar in substance. They each met the problem of 
nihilism in freedom by advocating a recognition of the 
commonly-held interests of all human beings. Against the 
totalizing tendencies in modern politics, each viewed the 
postwar world from the perspective of homelessness. The 
modern nation-state must be replaced by a renewed sense 
of country as home drawing its strength from the cultural 
inheritance of its inhabitants and distinguished by the 
creative capacity of its members to transform that 
culture. These communities must be recognized as 
precious, but not in such a way as to exclude the
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inestimable value of other communities. Finally, justice
for both thinkers took the form of home wherein human
beings could exercise their freedom mindful of the limits
represented by the style of the place (laws, customs) and
the freedom of others.
There is something utopian in their
formulations.167 The context in which they wrote
contributes to this tendency. Camus wrote in 1946:
The attempt, in short, is to define the conditions 
necessary for a political position that is modest—  
which is to say, free from both messianism and 
nostalgia for an earthly paradise.168
They both believed they had the obligation to recast the
French political landscape and to redefine the terms in
which political life was lived. The Nazi invader had
wiped away all that went before and when he was defeated,
something new would have to emerge or the mistakes of
1919 would be repeated. Weil may be forgiven for her
faith in postwar possibilities. She did not live to see
the liberation. Camus lived into the postwar world, but
held fast to his faith in human beings to save themselves
even after he gave up faith in their ability to fashion a
167A charge of utopianism would not be entirely 
unfair. See Weil, "Theoretical Picture of a Free 
Society" in Oppression and Liberty. 83-108 and Camus, "To 
Save Lives," Combat. 20 November 1946 in Camus, Between 
Hell and Reason. 120-122.
168Camus, "To Save Lives," Combat. 20 November 1946 
in Camus, Between Hell and Reason. 122.
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just political order. What is most important in their 
political formulations is the spirit in which they 
proposed to recast the postwar world: a spirit of
depersonalized self-interest, which was prerequisite to 
the exercise of true freedom, and the creation and 
revaluation of home as a just environment in which that 
freedom might be exercised.
Weil and Camus addressed the more pressing questions 
of political being and ethics in the twentieth century 
through the idea of creativity. They leave us with a 
difficult vision of political existence that is much less 
bound by specific political forms than contemporary 
political discourse might be comfortable with. In their 
thought, institutional and legal forms must be allowed to 
evolve out of the mores and traditions of communities or 
"vital media." At the same time, both thinkers wished to 
shift the responsibility for creating a political milieu 
of justice to human beings qua human beings. Far from 
denying the weaknesses to be found in human being, their 
conception of a critical creative political existence 
insists that human beings confront those weaknesses and 
resist temptations to power or wealth in the name of a 
human dignity which they believed we all hold in common. 
There are problems intrinsic to any vision that relies 
excessively on individual human beings to create, self-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 2 1
consciously, their existences. But acknowledging our 
debt to some inherited forms renders that burden a shared 
one. Weil and Camus are refreshingly candid about what 
is required: they are offering a prescription, not a
cure. Chapter Five will flesh out the possibilities and 
the problems with this prescription.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: THE POSSIBILITIES OF
CREATIVE POLITICAL EXISTENCE
Creative political being is best understood as the 
response of Weil and Camus to the destructive, 
absolutist, "rational" forms of political order that 
devastated twentieth century Europe. In their political 
thought, each countered the post-Enlightenment conceits 
of human rationality by reconceiving the rational and 
encouraging the use of the creative imagination in 
political problem-solving. This reconception of reason 
in politics demanded respect for human life and 
potentialities and aspired to the creation of authentic 
political order.
I. The Rational Character of Absolutist Rebellion 
In the political theory derived from the comparison 
of Weil's thought to Camus's, authentic political 
existence requires embracing a limited form of rebellion 
Things are never as they should be, only nearer to or 
farther from the ideal to which human beings must aspire 
an ideal which may also change over time. This is a 
fairly fluid conception of political reality. In the
322
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political thought of Weil and Camus, politics should be 
recognized as being as fluid an undertaking as the rest 
of human existence. Absolutist forms of rational 
politics denied this fluidity in the twentieth century.
The rebellion embodied in contemporary forms of 
politics was a rebellion of absolute ends achieved by 
absolute means. These absolutist forms of rebellion 
("modern revolution"), which Camus identified as 
"metaphysical" and "historical," reconstructed political 
reality in their own image.1 They entailed the 
intellectual and then material destruction of known 
reality and the creation of a new (their own) moral 
universe. These forms of rebellion assumed the power to 
name the contingent elements of their re-created 
universes and to posit their relationships as the 
rational organization of reality. Absolute rebellion 
thus joined the delusion of material superiority to 
intellectual invulnerability in a deadly combination.
The tragic result of this union of the passionate 
rejection of reality to the "rational" ordering of that 
reality was the justification of all manner of doing 
politics, including the slaughter of millions of human 
beings.
^amus, The Rebel, especially 23-104.
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The first absolutist form of rebellion identified by 
Camus is "metaphysical rebellion.1,2 This form of 
rebellion begins as a protest of human beings against the 
human condition and broadens to a more general rebellion 
against all of creation. In other words, the 
metaphysical rebel protests not only his condition, but 
all of creation. The rebel deems the apparent unity 
underlying all of creation as unsuitable for human 
habitation and judges the source of that unity, God, 
responsible. In this form of rebellion, God must be 
relieved of his duty as the source of all being.3 The 
metaphysical rebel overthrows God and the rebel assumes 
the throne. Henceforward, it is the rebel's 
"responsibility to create the justice, order and unity 
that he sought in vain within his own condition, and in 
this way to justify the fall of God."4
The removal of God precipitates a crisis of meaning, 
specifically, a crisis of moral meaning.5 Though 
claiming no belief in God, Camus recognized that the 




sThis insight is one of Camus's debts to Nietzsche. 
See ibid., 65-80.
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of understanding their relationship to the universe and
each other. A conception of the divine as a ground for
ethics had been modestly effective in keeping human
beings from slipping into something akin to the Hobbesian
state of nature. Rejecting this grounding, the
metaphysical rebel can claim absolute freedom. Camus
argues, however, that rather than "possessing" the
absolute freedom claimed, the metaphysical rebel has only
managed to create "the implacable reign of necessity."6
The rebel who could formerly claim to understand reality
only through the human relationship to God, now must
create a new understanding, a new orientation to reality.
The rebel is necessarily inadeguate to this task. The
resulting disorientation feeds the sense of homelessness
of modern human beings. The metaphysical rebel then
seeks solace in a structure and the new dispensation
takes a familiar if more deadly form:
To kill God and build a Church are the constant and 
contradictory purpose of rebellion. Absolute 
freedom finally becomes a prison of absolute duties, 
a collective asceticism, a story to be brought to an 
end. The nineteenth century, which is the century 
of rebellion, thus merges into the twentieth, the 
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Having driven God from His heaven, the metaphysical rebel
builds a new Church by embracing the revolutionary
movements inhabiting the rebel's "prison of history and
of reason." Aligned with the revolutionary's irrational
claims to absolute freedom, the rebel "adopts reason as a
weapon and as the only means of conquest which appears
entirely human.1,8
The weaknesses and overreaching aspirations of the
metaphysical rebel are one source of rational
totalitarian political orders of the twentieth century.
It was this absolutist form of political order and the
accompanying absolutist form of reason that Weil and
Camus each spent a great deal of energy combatting. Weil
identified this conception of society as "the domain of
the devil," wherein,
The flesh impels us to say me and the devil impels 
us to say us; or else to say like the dictators I 
with a collective signification. And in conformity 
with his particular mission, the devil manufactures 
a false imitation of what is divine, an ersatz 
divinity.9
For Weil, God's absence was not responsible for the 
tragedy of twentieth century political existence. Weil's 
God is only present in the decreated part of each human
8Ibid. Previous quote, ibid., 80.
9Simone Weil, Waiting for God. 54.
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soul.10 The responsibility for creating a livable
order, therefore, falls on each human being.
Metaphysical rebellion took that obligation to an
extreme, creating wounds in the human psyche that it
seemed could only be treated by a collectivist form of
politics. The consequences had been disastrous.
Camus identifies a second, related type of rational
rebellion called "historical rebellion." In this form of
rebellion, the rebel, freed from the reign of God, seeks
to exercise control of his existence by imposing a
definitive meaning upon history as the story of human
progress. The revolutionary order that must be created
in the present (by all manner of methods, including
executions and resettlements of whole peoples) is
justified by the inexorable march of human progress.
Camus finds in regicide the definitive act of historical
rebellion. Regicide was the historical rebel's
equivalent to the metaphysical rebel's dethroning of God.
Up to now, God played a part in history through the 
medium of kings. But His representative in history 
has been killed, for there is no longer a king.
10An argument could be made that this is where Weil 
found what value she did in Nietzsche. His madman finds 
God dead and blames man for killing him. Weil chooses to 
believe, through decreation, that God is still present in 
human beings, but not heeded (therefore, absent, not 
dead). For Weil, refashioning our way of being in the 
world requires attending to this residual divine 
presence.
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Therefore there is nothing but a semblance of God, 
relegated to the heaven of principles.11
Here again, the source of meaning formerly represented by 
the symbol of God is no longer an actor in human reality. 
Through the historical rebel's initial act, history, the 
terrifying and wonderful story of human civilization, is 
rendered incoherent.12 The historical rebel must re­
create that meaning and may do so to whatever advantage 
he pleases.
The issue in historical rebellion is not so much the
displacement of God (certainly a component), but the
rebel's claim to be able to read His mind. With the
representatives of God no longer participating in making
human history, its meaning has been lost. To recreate
that meaning, and to give that re-creation some validity,
the historical rebel must claim to understand history in
some coherent fashion, that is, in a way analogous to the
way God understands history.
If man is reduced to being nothing but a character 
in history, he has no other choice but to subside 
into the sound and fury of a completely irrational 
history or to endow history with the form of human 
reason. Therefore the history of contemporary 
nihilism is nothing but a prolonged endeavor to give
11Camus, The Rebel. 120.
12Ibid., 71, Camus wrote that "[c]haos is also a 
form of servitude."
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order, by human forces alone and simply by force, to 
a history no longer endowed with order.13
Hegel's dialectic is the intellectual manifestation of
this attempt and Marx's dialectical materialism is the
more immediate political form it took.14 The
totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century all take
rewriting history as part of their task, justifying their
actions in the present in the name of fulfilling the
grand design of history.15 All manner of terror has
been rationalized by claiming to read the mind of God.
Historical rebellion bore bitter fruit. "Cynicism, the
deification of history and of matter, individual terror
and state crime," Camus wrote, "spring armed to the
teeth, from the equivocal conception of a world that
entrusts to history alone the task of producing both
values and truth."16
Camus was not so concerned about the role of God in
the present as he was about the role the symbol God
13Ibid., 221.
14For the capacity of Hegel and Marx as historical 
rebels, see ibid., 189-226.
15Excellent work has been done on the importance of 
the critique of totalitarianism to the political thought 
of both Weil and Camus. On Weil, see for example, Mary 
Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine. 50-59. On 
Camus, see Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern 
Rebellion. 37-67.
16Camus, The Rebel. 146.
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played in the human past and what it meant to replace 
that conception with a single or collective human will. 
For her part, Weil believed the human presence bears the 
divine presence and she was, therefore, more concerned 
with the residual effects of God's presence.
Metaphysical rebellion sought to replace a God banished 
from His universe with a human presence. That presence 
took the form of a state fancying itself an ersatz 
divinity. To similar effect, the historical rebel 
sought to make up for that absence by creating a 
surrogate God in the form of a state capable of 
justifying its actions by its "comprehensive" 
understanding of the historical past. In both cases, the
transformation of reality is absolute and in both cases,
the transformed reality is explained "rationally" to the 
satisfaction of the many. In both forms of rebellion, 
the human capacity for reason, given free play in a
universe where all previous relationships and
understandings have been fundamentally altered or 
destroyed, becomes the arbiter of the "sacred."17 In 
this understanding, the sacred is secularized and what is 
valued above all else is derived from the founding
17In this context, "sacred" means supremely valued. 
While its spiritual component is preserved, any reference 
to a specific religious sense of the term must be 
omitted.
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principles of a Thousand Year Reich or a Communist 
Revolution.18
The role of reason in absolutist forms of rebellion 
is decisive to the countering strand of political thought 
represented by Weil and Camus. In the forms of absolute 
rebellion the universe as it was known is torn down. Its 
contingent elements are renamed and their relationships 
to one another are recast in terms intelligible to the 
human mind. Those elements which are not intelligible to 
the mind are dismissed as superstition and ignored.19 
The aspects of reality that make human beings human, 
things like love, compassion, commitment to the 
potentiality each human being represents, are ruled out 
at the beginning. All natural relationships can be 
explained rationally or are deemed unworthy of 
consideration.
18It is only fair to note that both Weil and Camus 
identified these tendencies in the institutional orders 
of the West where they were in a less advanced state of 
decay. Each expressed a hope that the West's emphasis on 
justice and freedom would derail the kind of absolutist 
politics experienced in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany 
and Fascist Italy. See for instance Weil, "Cold War 
Policy in 1939" in Selected Essays. 177-94 and Camus, 
"Homage to an Exile" in Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 
98-107.
19Camus identified these as "leaps" or "acts of 
eluding." This is also the tendency that Weil resisted 
by attempting to remain "intellectually rigorous."
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The modern "rational" project seemed to give human 
beings absolute dominion over the natural world. The 
notion of human dominion over nature is one (not to say 
the only) inheritance of the Enlightenment.20 In their 
separate analyses, Weil and Camus each found this view of 
reason to be fundamentally flawed. The very things left 
out of this rational conception of the world, 
specifically human emotion and imagination, were actually 
at work in this "rational" conception. There was nothing 
more simultaneously creative and rational than the 
apparatus devised by the Nazis for the destruction of 
European Jews during the Second World War.21 Yet the 
impetus for devising that apparatus was emotional: raw,
unchecked, irrational hatred. The conception of reason 
as devoid of emotional content characterized the 
absolutist forms of rebellion that created the 
destructive politics of the twentieth century. This 
"objective" and calculative form of reason is the precise 
form of reason that the creative conception of politics 
found in Weil and Camus seeks to overcome.22
20An argument of Nietzsche that Camus greatly 
appreciated. See Camus, The Rebel. 65-80.
21See, for example, Bauman, Modernity and the 
Holocaust and Rubinstein, The Cunning of History.
22The "calculative" nature of modern conceptions of 
reason is given extended exposition in the work of Thomas 
Spragens. See Spragens, The Ironv of Liberal Reason.
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The implication of this refashioning of the role of 
reason in politics is twofold. First, for both Weil and 
Camus, "rational" entails the integration of reason and 
the passions or imagination. There is no reason devoid 
of an emotional content. Objectivity is a dangerous 
myth. The best that can be hoped for is Weil's 
conception of the "impersonal" which makes a political 
value of empathy. Second, human beings are at least as 
good as they are bad. For the Christian Weil, human 
beings are drawn to the worldly and thus away from the 
good, but by nature each also houses a bit of the divine. 
This divine component, nourished and encouraged, can 
compel individual human beings to act in conformity with 
the good ("consent"). For his part, Camus accepted that 
human beings have as much capacity for good as for evil. 
For Camus, too, the good must be fostered and then 
persuaded to accept the limits of human action in the 
world. The integration of reason and imagination and the 
acknowledgement that human beings are good as well as bad 
represents an alternative to the "reason as a check on 
the passions" model of politics.
The first step in reclaiming reason for a creative 
politics was recognizing that the massive destruction 
wrought by "rational" politics in the twentieth century 
consumed enormous amounts of psychic and physical energy.
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The political thought derived from a comparison of Weil 
and Camus poses a simple question: Why can that energy
not also be harnessed into constructively creative 
pursuits? Neither Weil nor Camus believed that 
destruction could be expunged from political being, but 
both fervently hoped for the emergence of a new creative 
perspective on political being as a counter and may be an 
alternative to those destructive tendencies.
II. The Response of Creative Politics 
The creative conception of politics emergent in the 
comparison of the political thought of Weil and Camus 
tries to render the use of force and power, inevitable in 
politics, more just. For the two thinkers, the political 
is inescapably the realm of power and force. But while 
political order is often seen in terms of its 
institutions, Weil and Camus recognized the need to put a 
human face back on political order. Recognition of that 
human face demanded the reconciliation of freedom and 
justice. The difficulty broached by their political 
theory was, thus, devising a form of justice compatible 
with a limited conception of freedom. This limited 
freedom consisted of the exercise of the force that each 
human being brought to bear in interactions with
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others.23 The creative conception of politics, with its 
emphasis on free creation and its limits, would encourage 
the just exercise of power. In creative political 
action, the values of beauty, that is, order, proportion 
and harmony, are the guides by which the justice present 
in an order could be determined.
The exercise of individual force finds its limit in 
the presence of the other. The other's capacity to 
exercise force determines the character of that exercise. 
At the core of creative political existence is the 
ability to recognize the other as an analog to the self. 
In the realm of political action, human beings are not 
predisposed to place the other before the self. In 
politics, encounters in which one person possesses 
authority or power over another are common.24 As Weil 
argued, a force or power possessed demands to be wielded. 
It is the nature of power to want to replicate itself. 
Human beings cannot, however, avoid wielding power in 
certain situations, whether it is the power of a parent 
over a child or an agent of the law over the citizen. In
^eil wrote of this "small but real force" that 
each human being may bring to bear on reality in her 
essay on "Human Personality." See Weil, "Human 
Personality," in Selected Essavs. 15.
24Nicely illustrated by Peter Winch in his work on 
Weil. See especially the conclusion of Winch, Simone 
Weil: The Just Balance.
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a free society, law and its institutional manifestations 
can regulate the way power is wielded. A society's legal 
apparatus finds it difficult, however, to regulate the 
character of the power possessed, that is, law cannot 
anticipate new, extralegal forms the exercise of power 
may take. Weil and Camus believed the individual must 
regulate this aspect of power. In the conception of 
creative politics, the way power is used can and must be 
regulated by the self-governing individual. This is the 
ethical imperative of creativity. The temptation to 
wield the power without reference to the needs of the 
other must be resisted. Respecting this limit is the 
difficulty of creative political action.
Neither Weil nor Camus undertook a systematic 
discussion of creativity, but they found remarkably 
similar ways to talk about it in relation to politics. 
Both had occasion to consider the creative capacities of 
human beings in their criticisms of modern working 
conditions and each tied a conception of self-conscious 
political participation to a discussion of the artist's 
work. From these discussions a general understanding of 
creative politics can be derived. Creativity in the 
realm of politics values reflection and recognition of 
the other as necessary preludes and correlates to action. 
A creative politics is a politics of the possible.
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Political creativity involves imaginatively comprehending 
political reality from a perspective beyond immediate 
self-interest. Action issues from a recognition of the 
interconnectedness of human beings and of the limitations 
of human being. Politics is a communal undertaking.
Thus creative political actors are compelled to share 
their response to political reality, to offer, not to 
impose, a "solution” on others. The perspectives of the 
ruled are shared and acknowledged as valid for the 
purposes of public discourse. The result is the dialogue 
and compromise undergirding the vision of politics Weil 
and Camus shared.
Though in itself a political act, articulating the 
creative encounter with political reality is only the 
beginning of politics. The creative form of political 
action reconceives citizenship as a set of mutual 
obligations. This conception of political being counters 
the egoistic style of politics and requires thoughtful, 
responsible participation or citizenship. Hostile to 
prevailing forms of the collective, Weil and Camus each 
acknowledged that human beings live in communities from 
which they necessarily draw part of their identities. 
Political acts are never solitary; they always take place 
in a context of other people, of traditions, of mores, of 
practices, of laws. The creative conception of politics
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contributes to community-building by requiring civic 
responsibility in the form of dialogue beyond immediate 
and personal self-interest.
When speaking of the uses of political force or 
power, "creative” means imaginative, but careful in 
consideration and application. In this conception, power 
is more likely to be used to ends other than self- 
gratification, because creative political action begins 
with recognition by the actor of belonging to a place and 
to a community of others. By compelling the citizen's 
public articulation of his or her opinions, the creative 
perspective seeks to bind the citizen's self-interest 
inextricably to the interest of the place and the 
community. The solitary self is not a political self. 
Harm done to the community, as in Weil's understanding of 
crime, is done to the self. In the form of citizenship 
suggested by creative political action, the citizen must 
recognize the principle of the interconnectedness of the 
interests of the self and the community.
Weil and Camus each posited the political expression 
of the creative artistic temperament as an antidote to 
the power-driven destructiveness of modern politics.25 
Authentic political order must be characterized by the
^See the discussion of Weil, Camus, art and 
politics above in Chapter Three. See also Weil, The Need 
for Roots. 216-218 and Camus, The Rebel. 253-278.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 3 9
just exercise of power. This statement, however, means 
very little without an adequate understanding of justice 
and, for both Weil and Camus, a conception of justice 
required a corollary notion of beauty. In artistic 
creation, beauty has its ineffable quality, but also 
demands and manifests itself as order, proportion and 
harmony. The ineffable quality, call it "grace" in 
either its vertically transcendent Weilian form or its 
horizontally transcendent Camusian conception, is the 
inevitable motivation of the creative act. Beauty is a 
quality in creation of seemingly self-evident order 
discerned through the careful articulation of an 
encounter with reality. Beauty is never the last word, 
but always another word in the larger work of creation. 
Beauty brings order to disordered reality by restoring 
proportion to that which seems not to possess it and a 
harmony to the cacophony of noises which necessarily make 
up reality. Ordering the disordered with reference to 
proportion and harmony not only suggests beauty, but also 
justice, making this reconception of beauty attractive to 
both Weil and Camus as a source of political value.
In politics, justice, like beauty, connotes order, 
but not only order. Twentieth century politics had seen 
all manner of political "order." Justice means an 
equitable order in which, as Weil argued, no harm is done
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to human beings.26 Justice is an environment of 
equitable distribution (proportion) in which each citizen 
is recognized in his or her freedom as being limited only 
by the freedom of others. This is a freedom exercised in 
full knowledge that disputes will arise, but be justly 
resolved. The assurance of just dispensation must be 
rooted in the community's past. Justice, therefore, also 
required knowledge and respect for the traditions of the 
community and similar knowledge or at least respect for 
the traditions of other communities. It is unclear how 
disputes would be resolved among communities and between 
citizens of one community and other communities, though 
Camus briefly flirted with the idea of a kind of 
democratic "world government" right after the war.27 
The point is that in the creative conception, justice is 
simultaneously an environment and a way of being in the 
world. Authentic political order requires a commitment 
to justice in the form of care that equity is maintained 
in all disputes. This care is the "hard task" of
26Weil, "Are We Struggling for Justice?".
27Camus briefly proposed an international parliament 
to pass and enforce international law. See Camus, 
"International Democracy and Dictatorship," Combat. 27 
November 1946, in Camus, Between Hell and Reason, 128- 
130.
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political creativity.28 Like beauty, justice is not a 
thing to be possessed, dispensed or achieved once and for 
all. Minimally, justice like art demands care, attention 
to detail, mindfulness of the larger moral and political 
environment, and an awareness of its own temporality.
The foregoing is a fairly generalized account of the 
implications of the combined thought of Weil and Camus on 
issues of creativity and politics. The discussion is 
suggested by two elements of the Weil-Camus intellectual 
relationship: first, Camus read and appreciated Weil's
work while keeping his patterns of thought distinct from 
hers and second, both concerned themselves with the 
relationship of the aesthetic to the political, she from 
the perspective of the mystic philosopher and he from the 
perspective of the artist. But their writings considered 
separately seem to exhibit differing expectations for the 
creative perspective. Weil believed creativity to be an 
essential element in ruling, what she called the 
"political art." Camus perhaps had a deeper faith that 
all human beings possessed the creative capacity and 
should be encouraged in its exercise. The differences 
between them are differences in emphasis. These 
differences must be recognized, however, even if, when
28See Camus, "Justice and Freedom," Combat, 8 
September 1944, in Between Hell and Reason. 52.
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taken together, they generate the larger perspective 
depicted here: that each thinker saw the creative
temperament as a means to rehumanize politics.
Weil's political art is a nearly Platonic conception 
of the governance of those best-suited to govern. In her 
"Note on Social Democracy," she argues that just 
government requires a governor to use imagination 
effectively to counter the collective, less disciplined, 
imagination of the ruled. Governing successfully, that 
is, justly, depends upon discerning the temperament of 
the governed in order to know the limits within which the 
governor can act. The creative use of this "methodical 
action" compels the governor to master the art of 
anticipating and then seizing the right moment to act.
The seamlessness of the just exercise of political power 
constitutes its beauty. The order, proportion and 
harmony of the just political order should appear 
effortless. The best rule is effective to the degree 
that it preserves a just and equitable environment, while 
also being didactic, that is, serving as an example to 
the ruled of the way to exercise what political power one 
possesses.
Camus's conception of "style" spoke more directly to 
the members of a community. A political order 
encouraging the citizen to act in conformity with a
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vision of his or her role in the community was a just 
order encouraging freedom. The citizen's role in the 
community was not an egoistic fantasy, but rather derived 
from the individual's understanding of the style of the 
community. That style finds expression in the laws, 
traditions, and mores of the community. The need for 
knowledge of the communal style, therefore, compels the 
individual to be familiar with the laws, traditions and 
mores of the community. Communal style represents the 
boundaries of authentic action in the community. The 
more immediate limits of political action are the other 
inhabitants of the community. Individual style is a 
function of personality but also a function of the style 
of the community. Individual style explores its own 
creativity while respecting the potentiality represented 
by every other human being. In Camus's vision, the 
aggregation of the individual styles of the inhabitants 
of a community flesh out the skeleton of communal style 
represented by the laws, traditions and mores of a given 
community.
Weil and Camus, then, are each articulating a style 
of political being. For Weil, the political art is a 
style of rule to be practiced by those prepared to rule. 
For Camus, the style of the citizen forms and is formed 
by the style of the community. Weil fashions a style of
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rule; Camus a style of membership and belonging. Neither 
necessarily contradicts the position of the other.
Weil's emphasis on education and her sense of justice as 
an environment speak to her commitment to the creative 
possibilities within each human being. Similarly,
Camus's conception of style would certainly be reflected 
in a style of rule seen as a product of a given political 
environment. But Weil sees political authenticity 
flowing from the top down while Camus sees political 
authenticity generated from the ground up. The source of 
these differences are easy enough to discern. Weil's 
belief in an otherworldly divine means that human beings 
must learn through a grace bestowed through decreation. 
Camus's refusal of an otherworldly grace leaves him only 
the belief in the human potentiality for good as the 
source of authentic political participation.
III. Creative Politics: Recognition of the Other
Putting a human face on politics means returning the 
human form to the center of the conception of politics.
In the creative perspective articulated here, politics is 
only secondarily about the relationships between 
governing institutions. The institutional articulation 
of order becomes more or less permanent, but it is not 
good for all times and all situations. Institutions are 
to be seen as reflections of the collective values of the
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inhabitants of a community (rootedness) which may change 
subtly over time.29 The relative fluidity of 
institutional order must have its counter in something 
that is permanent and more or less unchanging. For both 
Weil and Camus, this something is the human presence that 
transcends borders and governing forms. The first 
function of political order must be the preservation of 
human potentialities. Politics must be fundamentally 
about ethics, that is, about the interaction of human 
beings with each other. The just community becomes the 
space of creative freedom wherein authentic interaction 
takes place and equitable order is maintained in spite of 
inevitable differences among people.
Two attributes of the modern political environment 
alienated human beings from their appreciation of the 
other as a human presence. First, reliance on 
institutional forms of social arrangement alienated human 
beings from each other, their tasks and obligations.
This critical insight reflects the residual appeal of 
Marx for both Weil and Camus. The "rational" arrangement 
of human society turned out to be the dehumanizing 
arrangement of human society. The second alienating
^Both thinkers believed preserving a society's 
story to be very important. For Weil the story is a 
critical part of "rootedness." Camus demonstrates the 
need in The Plaque, at the very least a "chronicle" of 
evil.
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component was related to the first: reliance on an
absolutizing form of reason. Mastering the uncertainty 
of nature by imposing seemingly rational structures upon 
it was one manifestation of this reliance. Another 
perhaps more critical manifestation was the subsidiary 
belief that human reason could so master reality only by 
holding the passions in check. The post-Enlightenment 
orientation to reason had not held the passions in check. 
Instead, the passions were sublimated, creating an 
anxiety about the contaminating presence of emotion and 
imagination in problem-solving. As Nietzsche predicted, 
this denial of passion or instinct in favor of reason was 
a denial of a critical part of human being. Weil and 
Camus each recognized that the repression of passion 
generated violently destructive forms of "reason." The 
excessively "rational" post-Enlightenment form of knowing 
exiled human beings from their passionate, creative, 
constructive natures. The absolutizing form of reason 
ruled out the discernment of beauty in the world and in 
others and, in so doing, rendered human knowledge a cruel 
parody of human experience.
A creatively constructive politics can only occur in 
a context made up of whole human beings. The human being 
produced by the twentieth century was homeless, that is, 
a fragmented personality without a spiritual or physical
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place. The conception of creative politics may be read 
as an attempt to make human existence whole through 
politics. The temperament required for creative 
political existence engaged and valued natural beauty, 
discerned order, harmony and proportion in nature and 
tried to apply these values to ethical and political 
interactions with other human beings. On these points, 
Weil and Camus agree in principle. The pictures of the 
political actor that emerge from their separate analyses, 
however, are significantly different. Here as earlier it 
is perhaps more valuable to read these differences as 
complementary rather than exclusive. Together they may 
yield a more complete picture of the sensibility of the 
creative political actor.
Weil's is an intimate conception of political 
interaction. She makes empathy a decisive ethical value. 
She valued entering into the experience of the other, 
particularly taking on the suffering of the other.30 
This affinity for the suffering of the other, in fact, 
hastened her premature death.31 Weil values a distance
30See especially Weil, "Human Personality," in 
Selected Essays. 9-34.
31Hospitalized with tuberculosis, Weil refused to 
take more nourishment than the starving in occupied areas 
of Europe were receiving. On her death certificate, this 
refusal to take proper nourishment is listed as the cause 
of death. See Petrement, Simone Weil: A Life.
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on the self (the "impersonal") as requisite to entering 
into the suffering of another. The ethical actor must be 
free of all self-interest except as it is understood as 
being bound up in the well-being of the other. For Weil, 
only this distance on the self creates the possibility of 
the intimate spiritual interaction with the other that 
must characterize human existence. Even this interaction 
is not wholly interpersonal. There is always the 
presence of a third, the divine presence. Acting on the 
impersonal is acting on the divine within, the residue of 
decreation, and bringing that divine to the encounter.32 
It may or may not elicit a similar response from the 
other, but it is an ethical imperative to respond to 
suffering this way.
The creative component of this response is its form, 
which calls for discerning the source of the suffering 
and addressing it in a way that will not dehumanize the 
sufferer even further. The creative effort is to bring 
the other into fellowship with the actor, to reintegrate 
the other into the community. Beauty is to be found in 
the possibilities of even the most destitute sufferer and 
there is beauty to be created in acting justly toward the 
afflicted. There is beauty in constructively acting on
32This is the ethical value of Weil's religious 
discussions. See for example, Weil, Waiting for God.
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suffering in the presence of the divine. In the just 
community this individual ethical imperative, this 
commitment to the possibilities within the afflicted 
other, is the primary political value. The value of 
empathy colors the self-understanding of this community, 
the structures of this community, and all exercise of 
political power within the community.
Weil's platonic conception of the "political art" is 
as a style of rule, but the ruler is to govern an ethical 
society valuing empathy and intimacy. Camus longs for 
the kind of community that Weil seeks to create; this may 
be the source of his affinity for her work. He has a 
general conception of political order in which each finds 
a style of membership. He too hopes for a society in 
which each member acts on empathy. Camus as political 
actor, however, fears this kind of intimacy and is not 
sure that politics can ever be this kind of intimate 
interaction. The hunger for power and the willingness to 
manipulate others is too ingrained in the human being. 
Moreover, for Camus, there is no divine to act as an 
ethical mediator. There is no "third" party to mediate 
our relationships to others. Camus must rely on human 
beings and he had far too much interaction with them to 
trust them with the kind of intimacy Weil seeks. As a 
result, he is most comfortable above the fray of
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politics, but knows that this perspective is not 
conducive to the formation of community.
There is much more than fear or distrust to Camus's 
more distant conception of political action. In a 
crisis, specifically in the crisis of modern politics, 
someone must remain above the fray. The distance on the 
self that Weil posits as necessary would appeal to Camus 
as an antidote to the tendency to "eluding." Someone 
must be able to see the political landscape for what it 
is, be able to maintain a critical distance. That 
someone must also be solitary/ a Cassandra with a voice 
but without a home in the community.33 Camus recognized 
politics as a collective activity, but remained deeply 
suspicious of all collective activity. The exception had 
been the Resistance experience, but even that led to his 
support of the purges, an error in judgement for which he 
seems never to have forgiven himself. But the role of 
clearsighted seer is necessary to political order and 
Camus indicates that in order for a human community to 
survive, someone must accept the role of solitary 
observer. Camus embraced this role without accepting the 
inevitability of the homelessness it seemed to entail.
He recognized the artist as a likely candidate for the
33Camus often considered himself Cassandra, 
particularly in his essays on Algeria. See Camus, 
Resistance. Rebellion and Death.
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role. But perspective must provide insight without 
exile. Camus's conception of the artist as an image of 
the political actor was intended to overcome the distance 
between the artist and the world, between the observer 
and the fray.
The observer's solitude is part but not all of an 
adequate conception of political action for Camus. All 
other members of the community have something to learn 
from the solitary observer (artist). The observer knows 
the political landscape through careful observation. The 
artist or observer gives form or a reading to that 
landscape by articulating it. Though that reading is not 
always readily understandable, it is articulate and may 
be discerned with effort. This is the value of the 
artist: the articulation means different things to
different people and thus encourages conversation. The 
articulation is never complete and always demands another 
effort. This renewal of the effort requires maintaining 
some perspective on the awful intimacy of politics. 
Members of a political community must respect 
perspective, while acknowledging the impossibility of 
permanently living at that distance. A community in 
which everyone is above the fray is not a community 
worthy of the name. Camus valued a balance between an
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observer's perspective on the nature of things and the 
need for a community, a home.
The optimum way of being in the creative perspective 
on politics probably lies somewhere between Camus's 
solitary observer and Weil's intimate empath. Together, 
however, the two give us a picture of what the creative 
might mean to political existence. Primary is the 
recognition that despite all its icy order, modern 
politics damaged human beings by destroying the 
possibility of real intimacy among human beings. Like 
Weil, Camus, too, longed for fellowship among human 
beings. He feared, as in The Plaque, that such 
fellowship and cooperation was only possible in 
extraordinary circumstances and for brief periods of 
time. The aspiration of both was to reveal that the 
twentieth century was just such an extraordinary time and 
represented the opportunity for a reorientation of 
political being.
As a theoretical position, creative political being 
relies on the creative individual to transform politics. 
Its strength is in this general empowerment of the 
individual, which frees the actor to act while demanding 
personal responsibility for the consequences of creative 
acts. Weil hoped to transform the all too human 
expectation of good into an ethic productive of a just
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environment. Camus regarded the good as a necessarily 
human creation and believed that acts could be judged 
based on how well they resonated with an immanent 
conception of the good. Both thinkers judged the good 
discernable in the world as beauty and justice, that is 
as the order, proportion and harmony evident and possible 
in the natural world.
The weakness of creative political being is this 
excessive reliance on the individual. Much of political 
theory begins from the presupposition that human beings 
are motivated by either self-interest, passion, desire or 
the need for self-preservation. Weil and Camus 
recognized the limited truth of these presuppositions.
The temptation to the "selfish" in human behavior is the 
motivation for Weil's conception of the impersonal, the 
distance on the self that necessarily precedes all 
ethical action. Camus posits the artist's temperament as 
a similar device that allows the emergence of a style in 
the context of other styles. Not everyone can be 
expected to observe these limitations in all situations 
at all times. Human beings act out of some form of self- 
interest and in community this tendency will create 
conflict. Neither Weil nor Camus deny that conflict is 
an inevitable component of political life. The question 
is, what does the creative perspective say to conflict?
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The peaceful functioning of a just political order 
requires some allowance for the resolution of conflict.
In a conception of politics relying on the creative 
action of individuals, the absence of a conflict- 
resolution mechanism could be a substantial weakness.
This is the point at which the creative perspective 
concedes that political order demands institutions. Weil 
and Camus were suspicious of institutional order and 
speak of it only vaguely in terms of the characteristics 
it should exhibit: it should have the highest regard for
law; it should be grounded in the community's past? and 
it should be flexible enough to meet the changing 
circumstances of the future without compromising the 
community's conception of itself. This general vision of 
political order hardly suffices for a blueprint. Their 
embrace of the need for political institutions is a 
recognition of weakness in human beings and consequently 
of politics as a human activity characterized by 
conflict. The value of the creative perspective in 
regard to conflict is that it does not seek to resolve 
conflicts once and for all. In fact, it may be its 
central value that it attempts to derive a political way 
of being in the world that preserves conflicts as 
tensions representing the ambiguities of human existence,
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the distortions of the order of nature that make up our 
perceptions.
Unlike absolutist rebellion, creative political 
being does not claim to resolve the tensions of existence 
by dissolving those tensions into a particularized 
imaginary unity that must then be imposed on political 
reality. In the creative way of being, legitimate 
tensions that have come into conflict may be temporarily 
resolved, that is, a compromise or agreement may be 
reached, but particular decisions are not then 
transformed into universal truths.34 In ideal 
circumstances, the decisions will be viewed as just, that 
is, as congruent with the good, but the essential tension 
between two competing perspectives will be preserved.
That is, the "losing" position will be recognized as 
legitimate in spite of the decision. The preservation of 
the tension requires the creativity to derive a 
resolution to the conflict between two legitimate 
positions and the discipline to understand that a 
resolution is not the final word on a given problem. It 
also requires patience with the resulting healthy 
fluidity of human political existence.
^Both thinkers had high regard for the role of 
basic tensions as depicted in Sophoclean tragedy. See 
Weil, "Antigone," in Intimations of Christianity. 18-23 
and Camus, "On the Future of Tragedy," in Lyrical and 
Critical Essays. 295-310.
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The creative perspective, by valuing the tensions of 
political existence, seeks to preserve the tensions while 
simultaneously offering resolutions to local conflicts. 
Here the value of the artistic sensibility reemerges. As 
in artistic creation, the articulation of the tensions in 
political existence requires choosing a medium, a mode of 
expression. The medium is a self-consciously chosen mode 
of communication. To the degree that it is successful, 
the use of the medium, what it expresses and how it 
expresses it, represents the creation of a common ground 
between hitherto distinct positions or realities. This 
common ground is essential to conversation: in art, it
may be a commonly-shared idea of the water lily; in 
politics, it may be a commonly-shared idea of the 
importance of equity. On that common ground, 
conversation may occur which, in ’'real11 political life, 
can result in the mediation of disputes. Each 
articulation is temporary and the opposing positions are 
only suggestions, but they are also important gestures, a 
reaching out from a place of reflection and careful 
consideration. It was this kind of politics that Weil
was thinking about when she wrote that "politics cannot
but be as much in need of creative invention as are art
and science."35 It was also this kind of politics Camus
35Weil, The Need for Roots. 218.
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envisioned when he wrote that "our proudest duty is to 
defend personally to the very end, against the impulse 
toward coercion and death, the freedom of [the emerging 
political] culture— in other words, the freedom of work 
and creation."36
IV. Concluding Remarks: Creativity and Political Thought
Simone Weil and Albert Camus, from their differing 
perspectives, proposed a reorientation to political being 
that here has been called "creativity." Implicit in this 
reorientation is a distrust of the traditional ways of 
doing and thinking about political business. This 
implication is confirmed by their use of categories of 
thought not ordinarily associated with politics. They 
were concerned with freedom and justice, traditional 
categories in their own right, but not before redefining 
them. While their insights on the problem of freedom and 
justice contribute to the ancient dialogue among 
political thinkers, neither Weil nor Camus is a 
systematic or traditional political theorist and the 
categories they bring to the discussion are necessarily 
different. "Rootedness," "style," and "empathy" are not 
traditional categories of political thought. Indeed, the 
body of political thought emergent in this comparison
^Camus, "Kadar Had His Day of Fear," in Resistance 
Rebellion and Death. 164.
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moves among and between traditions of political thought. 
Like all thinkers, their thought was a product of the 
interaction between their interests, educations and 
experiences. The result of this confluence is political 
theory from the perspective of the religious philosopher, 
concerned with grace, compassion and life seeking the 
divine on the one hand, and the artist, concerned with 
beauty, order and the creative expression of reality on 
the other. From these different perspectives emerges a 
political theory valuing human dignity before the usual 
institutional components of political order.
All this is not to say that the political theory 
which emerges from the comparison is not shaped by 
traditional political concerns. To the contrary, they 
may be called political thinkers precisely because they 
seriously engaged matters normally associated with social 
and political theory. A series of observations can 
illustrate the point: Each was concerned with the 
objectification of the modern human being in the 
workplace and in politics. As a response, Weil and Camus 
sought to empower the individual. Rosen suggests that in 
so doing they are drawing upon the tradition of radical 
individualism associated with French Revolution-era 
thought.37 They did embrace a language of individual
37Rosen, "Marxism, Mysticism and Liberty."
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freedom, but always grounded it in an understanding of 
the human need for community as home. Witnesses to the 
power of collectivities to pose as home, both thinkers 
utterly rejected Robespierre's idolization of the state 
as the ultimate guarantor of freedom and the cult of 
personality on which he based the state's legitimacy. 
Similarly, Weil and Camus insisted upon respect for human 
dignity and so drew upon the concerns of modern 
liberalism, but they rejected the laissez-faire economic 
stance that usually accompanies that position. In the 
critical realm of economics, they conceded the need for a 
form of the state reconceived as a "vital medium." Both 
thinkers preferred a humane form of socialism to either 
liberal capitalism or the absolutist form of socialism 
that had taken the name Soviet Communism. Finally, each 
viewed tradition and ritual as necessary expressions of 
civilizational meaning, but conceived that meaning as 
organic and emergent not as something static in a Burkean 
past. Even as they drew upon them, however, Weil and 
Camus found the traditional categories of political 
theory tragically inadequate. The modern conception of 
"rational" politics would not be enough to overcome the 
destruction of the first half of the twentieth century.
By opening political inquiry to questions of creativity, 
legitimate political order might be made to consider what
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Weil called the needs of the soul, needs like rootedness, 
free expression and love.
Creative political being, then, is a reconception of 
political existence intent on reinvigorating the pursuit 
of justice while imposing perceptible and acceptable 
limits on human freedom. As a mode of political being, 
creativity encourages the development of the human 
intellect and creative capacity while engendering respect 
for human life and regard for the mores and traditions of 
a community. This reconception of political existence 
was self-consciously intended to counter the dehumanizing 
tendencies Weil and Camus each perceived in twentieth 
century politics. Both thinkers used the creative 
political actor as an image of the ideal. Neither 
envisioned a civilization of artists and artisans, but 
both thought that the temperament engendered by a 
commitment to creativity could transform the destructive 
politics of the twentieth century into a more 
constructive form.
The impulse to think of politics in terms of 
creativity reflects the two thinkers' education in a 
decidedly neo-Platonic French intellectual tradition. 
Their shared concern with discerning and valuing beauty 
in the conduct of social and political life finds its 
roots in a line of western thought running from ancient
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Greece through Plotinus to Nietzsche and Bergson. From 
Plotinus came the desire for union with the One, 
exhibited in the beauty of the divine (or, for Camus, 
nature). In this perspective, creativity supplemented 
the intellect as an avenue of access or recognition of 
the transcendent. Clearly, the mystical component is 
stronger in Weil's thought, but both thinkers worked from 
the Plotinian presumption of the interconnectedness of 
all existence. Like Nietzsche and Bergson, their 
emphasis on creativity was intended as a counter to the 
modern overreliance on a certain form of reason. More 
significantly, perhaps, the creativity implicit in the 
political thought of Weil and Camus entails recognition 
of a limit that both attribute to the influence of 
ancient Greece.
The difference between the modern European and the 
ancient Greek, Camus wrote, is that "we have exiled 
beauty; the Greeks took arms for it."38 The 
contemporary exile of beauty derives from the modern 
tendency to dismiss or destroy all in nature that is not 
extolled. The consequence is that modern civilization is 
a civilization of extremes. The Greeks distrusted 
extremes, choosing instead a moderation in which all were
38Albert Camus, "Helen's Exile," in Lyrical and 
Critical Essays. 148.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 6 2
given a hearing. Modern humanity extols one thing: "a
future world in which reason will reign supreme."39 The 
need for a life without limits yielded a civilization 
more willing and able to destroy than to create. What is 
to be recovered, in the view shared by Weil and Camus, is 
the need, the capacity to create without destroying. 
Authentic creativity reaches its limit on the point of 
destroying nature (human or otherwise). In politics, 
both Weil and Camus believed, justice should be the 
object of such a creativity of limits. "The Greeks,"
Weil wrote, "defined justice admirably as mutual 
consent."40 The justice of the Greeks, Weil thought, 
found its limit in the agreement of others. Her 
contention found echo in Camus. Equity for the Greeks, 
Camus wrote, "supposed a limit, while our whole continent 
is convulsed by the quest for a justice we see as 
absolute."41 The twentieth century vividly illustrated 
that only madness and power are needed to destroy. Real 
genius, a genuine creativity respectful of limits, would 
be required to (re-)build a civilization nearly 
destroyed.
39Ibid., 149.
40Weil, "Are We Struggling for Justice?", 1.
41Camus, "Helen's Exile," 149.
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Far from encouraging a licentious individualism, 
then, the idea of creativity found in the political 
thought of Weil and Camus was an attempt to reconcile 
human freedom with the limits and complexities of life 
lived in community. The terms in which they write, 
"rootedness,” "style," even "beauty," are not the terms 
of traditional political theory. But the politics of the 
twentieth century revealed the emptiness and inadequacy 
of the terms of modern political discourse. What was 
required in the aftermath of Auschwitz and Hiroshima was 
a new vocabulary. This analysis of the political thought 
of Simone Weil and Albert Camus reveals their shared 
belief that part of that vocabulary was already 
available.
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